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


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Near East & South Asia

JPRS-NEA-88-083	CONTENTS	6 DECEMBER 1988
ISLAMIC		
Muslim Leader Describes Islam As I	Progressive Force [Jerusalem AL-NAHAR 2	29 Sep]1
ARMENIAN		
Moscow Blamed for Deterioration of	f Situation in Karabakh [Paris HARACH 2	!4-25 Sep]3
Writers' Union Demands Effective N	Moderation in Karabakh [Beirut AZTAG] Measures in Karabakh [Paris HARACH 6 C	Oct] 4
NEAR EAST		
REGIONAL		
Sudanese Leaders Comment or	n Rumored Plans To Unite With Libya	5
Statement by Foreign Mi	inister [Khartoum AL-ASHIOOA' 13 Sepl	
Interview With Mubarak	al-Mahdi [Khartoum AL-ASHIQQA' 13 Se	<i>epj</i> 0
Statements by Opposition	on [Khartoum AL-ASHIQQA' 13 Sep]	c
Delay to Restoration of Cairo-	ars in Iraqi Projects [London AL-MAJALL]	.AH 12-18 Octl9
Problems in Gulf Stock Marke	ets Discussed THE MIDDLE EAST Octl	
Experiment Links Television I	Between Jordan, Egypt Cairo AL-AHRAM	[<i>AL-DUWALI 9 Oct]</i> 10
Fount Rejects Demands Relate	ed to Tabab <i> [London AL-MAJALLAH 19-2</i>	25 Oct/ 11
Egyptian Laborers To Help Re	ebuild al-Faw [Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DUW	7ALI 9 Oct]11
PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS		
Adverse Effects of Rift With J	ordan on West Bank Education Decried	
Herusalem AL-RAYADIR AL	L-SIYASI 1 Octl	
Israelis Sign Trade Protocol W	ith Palestinians [Jerusalem AL-BAYADIR]	AL-SIYASI 8 Oct] 13
PLO Criticized for Disregardii Need for Provisional Governm	ng Palestine National Charter [Amman AL nent Assessed [Jerusalem AL-BAYADIR AI	-RA Y 30 Sepj 16 L-SIYASI 22 Oct] 18
ALGERIA		
Rackground Political Leaning	s of Key Officials Discussed [Paris LIBER	ATION 12 Octl 19
LADH Members Interviewed	on October Demonstrations [Tunis LE MA	IGHREB 28 Oct]21
EGYPT		
m it again at mil	CD D-i (D-win Al WATA)	VI 41 '40 401 20 Con1 2'
Aby Charalah Calla for Estable	ince of Power in Region [Paris AL-WATAN] lishing Arab Armed Force [Paris AL-MUST	TAORAI 15 Octi 22
AU Ghazalan Cans loi Establ	To 'Extinguish' Uprising [AL-AKHBAR 9]	Novi24
Paper Urges U.S. To Recogniz	ze Peace Opportunity <i>[London AL-SHARQ</i>]	[AL-AWSAT 20 Nov] 25
Cabinet Meets Reviews Econo	omic situation ICairo Radiol	
Studies for Soviet Aid to Naj'	Hammadi Completed [EGYPTIAN GAZE	TTE 19 Oct]26
Fifty NDP Members Resign O	Over Election Practices [AL-SHA'B 2 Oct]	
Egypt's Revolution Organizati Muslim Protherhood Leader 9	on Members Interviewed [AL-ANBA' 13 N Sa'd Lashin Arrested [AL-SHA'B 1 Nov]	22
New Law Uncovers 96 Smalle	er Investment Companies [UKTUBAR 9 Oc	ct127
Economy Minister on Assistar	nce for Al-Rayvan Depositors [MENA]	
Electricity and Energy Ministe	er Discusses Future Projects [London AL-H	<i>[AWADITH 14 Oct] 2</i> 7
Palestinian Journalist Arrested	d in Cairo Airport [AL-SHA'B 1 Novl	30
Ministry of Agriculture Seeks	Increased Fertilizer Production [EGYPTIA	N GAZETTE 20 Octj 30

	New Fodder Company Uses Modern Techniques [AL-MUSAWWAR 7 Oct]	31
	Tourism Ministry Recommends Limiting Tourist Agency Licences [UKTUBAR 2 Oct] 'Extremist Students' Try To Stop University Celebration [AL-AKHBAR 26 Oct]	31
	Asyut Students Protest Attack on Teacher [AL-AKHBAR 28 Oct]	32
	ISRAEL	
	IDF Chief Evaluates Army's Role in Uprising [YEDI'OT AHARONOT 23 Sep] Religious Ideologue Envisions Islamic State [YEDI'OT AHARONOT 16 Sep]	33
	JORDAN	
	Minister Calls For Arab Fleet To Promote Economic Interests [AL-DUSTUR 19 Oct]	39
	LIBYA	
	Iron, Steel Plant To Use Numerous Non-Libyan Employees [AL-ZAHF AL-AKHDAR 12 Sep]	40
	MOROCCO	
	Spanish Authorities Detain Moroccan Citizens [London AL-MAJALLAH 9-15 Nov]	41
	OMAN	
	Incentives To Aid Competitiveness of Local Goods [TIMES OF OMAN 13 Oct]	41
	SUDAN	
	Radio, TV Unions Decry Culture Minister's Alleged Interference [AL-MAYDAN 4 Oct]	42
SOU	UTH ASIA	
	AFGHANISTAN	
	AFSOTR: Outstanding Example of Afghan-Soviet Friendship [THE KABUL TIMES 10 Oct]	43
	Fertilizers, Drugs Given To Peasants [THE KABUL TIMES 12 Oct]	43
	Autumn Sowing Campaign On [THE KABUL TIMES 9 Oct]	43
	Kabul Roads Under Construction [THE KABUL TIMES 12 Oct]	44
	INDIA	••
	No Similarity Seen In CPI (M), Congress (I) Positions [ANANDA BAZAR PATRIKA 6 Oct]	44
	Opposition Feuds May Destroy Opportunity [ANANDA BAZAR PATRIKA 23 Sep]	43
	Commentary Asserts Bangladesh Tirades Self Defeating [ANANDA BAZAR PATRIKA 8 Oct] Nayar Chides United States for Indifference Toward India [ANANDA BAZAR PATRIKA 1 Jul]	40
	IRAN	
	Minister of Intelligence on Political Parties [ETTELA'AT 22 Oct]	49
	New Tay I aws To Be Implemented Next Vear IFTTELA'AT 22 Oct	วบ
	Government Allows Importation of Rice, Vegetable Oils /ETTELA'AT 22 Oct/	ວບ
	Highway Linking Iran Turkey Pakistan To Be Constructed IETTELA AT 20 OCI	วบ
	Salaries of Married Soldiers To Increase IETTELA'AT 16 Oct	51
	Salaries of Married Soldiers To Increase [ETTELA'AT 16 Oct]	51
	SRI LANKA	
	SUN Asks Gandhi To Respect Public Opinion [SUN 29 Oct]	52

Muslim Leader Describes Islam As Progressive Force

44040053 Jerusalem AL-NAHAR in Arabic 29 Sep 88 p 4

[Interview with Islamic leader Shaykh 'Abdallah Nimr Darwish with AL-NAHAR correspondent in Kafr Qasim; date not given]

[Excerpts] Shaykh 'Abdallah Nimr Darwish is one of the most prominent Islamic figures and the "spiritual father" of an influential faction in the Palestinian social and political movement inside the Green Line.

AL-NAHAR had the following interview with his eminence in Kafr Qasim regarding the principles and developments of the Islamic movement which Shaykh Darwish is leading, and the movement's attitude toward the Israeli elections, the Palestinian political forces in Israel, and the area's political future.

[Question] The Islamic movement is not politically organized. Do you intend to get involved in the Knesset and the local council elections?

[Answer] There is political organization on the local council and local authorities' level. There is no intention to establish a political organization on the Knesset level. With regard to the local authorities, we have had the experience more than once and we will continue to do so, because we find in it a useful action that could materialize into certain services. This is as far as local political action is concerned. We do not know future events will bring. [passage omitted]

[Question] In Qalqilyah the authorities confiscated materials which were described as "agitative," such as announcements regarding the fourth festival of Islamic art in Kafr Kanna and other printed materials. The Islamic movement was accused of "agitation" and of having collaborated with the Islamic parties in the West Bank.

[Answer] We are accustomed not to be afraid of accusation and not to be quickly carried away by emotions, not even our own emotions. Also accusations do not make us shudder, for we got used to hearing accusations just as we got used to hearing shouts of enthusiasm and passion in our streets. Neither shouts of enthusiasm nor passion move us, nor do accusations discourage or intimidate us. We proclaim that the Islamic movement in the country has its own program and its method of action. We implement our program and follow our method. We accuse them here, and they accuse us there. The Islamic movement does not try to raise slogans unacceptable to the ruling regime or to a specific party. We tell everybody that the Islamic movement acts within the law, notwithstanding their allegations or their threats. We challenge everybody. We challenge all the officials to accuse the Islamic movement of operating outside the law. We know how to respect our work and our task. We also know how to operate within the law. In no way will accusations affect us. What do you expect from the rightist trend in Israel? The press is full of rightists. What do you expect from them if they see a slogan, a drawing, or a placard? Everything is construed as agitation. I would like everybody to know one thing—that when the Israeli right and many Israeli politicians see the Holy Koran hung on the wall, they see it as agitation. This is the situation today.

[Question] Why the right and not the left?

[Answer] I said the right because the left is preoccupied with its own problem. There is a left that sympathizes with the Palestinian problem, but it is preoccupied with its own problem and is disinterested in Islamic slogans. It would not accept the emergence of a strong Islamic religious movement. Many leftists see "agitation" in a holy Koran hung on the wall. This is the mentality of those politicians. What shall I do for them? Do they want us to tear up the Koran books and take the Koran out of our hearts? No we will neither tear the books nor take the Koran out of our hearts. We will not dismiss Muhammad from our midst. Muhammad shall remain a leader, the Koran shall remain over our heads, and Islam shall remain our path.

[Question] Are there any disputes or divisions within the Islamic movement in Israel, as is the case between certain Islamic factions?

[Answer] Believe me and may God be my witness, God willing, you will never hear about divisions inside our area. The reason is obvious. We in this area we have been fed brotherhood just like a baby is fed his mother's milk. Brotherhood and love among us is much greater than people can imagine. We love one another in a manner for which we are thankful to God. Actual division can never happen but differences in views are desirable. Rather, I encourage this because it is a healthy sign so that the shaykh will not become a dictator. The majority should decide, and everybody should abide by the majority's decision. Decision in the movement is based on consultation, and the view of the majority is decisive. It governs me and everybody else.

[Question] What is the Islamic movement's attitude toward the current political moves?

[Answer] We should not be deceived by temporary and momentary achievements. We must think before we take any steps. I personally support the establishment of a Palestinian state. A state must be established, after which the people will choose the regime they want. What is important is to rid the Palestinians of occupation and to recognize their right to self-determination.

[Question] What is your opinion regarding the severance of ties between Jordan and the West Bank?

[Answer] The decision to break the ties strengthens the independence of the Palestinian character, but this decision might harm the Palestinian problem strategically in the long term.

[Question] What is your assessment of the Islamic movement today?

[Answer] When the Islamic movement was launched in 1970, it was begun by one person. I do not claim that I have a strong personality or the talent to talk balderdash. The fact is that God Almighty wanted to teach the Arab and Islamic world a lesson. Islam makes a weak person strong. The evidence is clear: the person who carried the banner of Islam in our area, Shaykh 'Abdallah Nimr Darwish, is a paralyzed person. Therefore, bodily he has no strength. Therefore, Islam spread when one individual was ready to advocate it and not because of any strong personality. By carrying the banner of Islam we become stronger. It is not that we make it stronger. The movement then began spreading from one town to another. Initially we concentrated on saving man despite the corruption that had spread in a fantastic manner, to save his mind and his heart. How can we save man? There was need for a vanguard to move ahead. The first step was to establish a base or a youth vanguard that would advocate and spread the good word among the people. This was how Islamic action began. The movement expanded till—thank God—it extended from the upper Galilee to the smallest tent in the Negev. What does the Islamic movement do today? We have reached

the people in their homes, the streets, their places of work, and their meeting places. We have begun to alleviate hardships and to inculcate the vitality and identity of Islam in the minds of our people. We are aware that our people lack many public services. We have established Islamic action camps. Islam is a complete system and a total regime. By its nature Islam is practical. I believe that the number one movement in the 1948 region [Israel proper] could be the Islamic movement. The people have gone back to their religion. We build streets. Reducing the local councils budget [by the Israelis] is a political action. The Islamic movement has begun dealing with this deliberate reduction by the ruling authorities, which is aimed against the Arabs inside the 1948 region. It began dealing with it through reparations so that the Arabs will remain here steadfast. Reduction in social services is not due to budget cuts in the government. Rather this is a deliberate plan in order to make life difficult for us so that we will move to other countries. We shall stay here despite all the pressures. We have taken a clear and correct view of this situation. We have eased hardships for our people. We build roads, open schools and clinics, and provide for the people's needs. We have established clubs and organized the Islamic [football] league. We have established Islamic societies and the Islamic arts festival which has begun tapping our people's potentials. Our ties with our brothers in the West Bank and Gaza have been strengthened. The central and primary objective of all these activities is first to please God, and then to help ourselves to remain steadfast on our land.

Moscow Blamed for Deterioration of Situation in Karabakh

46050004a Paris HARACH in Armenian 24-25 Sep 88 p 1

[Editorial: "Because the Cup Has Runneth Over"]

[Text] The news coming from Armenia and Artsakh can only cause dismay to the minds and hearts of those Armenians in the Diaspora whose patriotic emotions still survive. The reason we regretfully make that distinction is because day after day we find in our midst a growing indifference with regard to our vital interests.

Our conversation with Silva Kaputikyan on Thursday confirmed that the situation has assumed extremely grave proportions. "To be realistic about the future and not to be carried away with momentary temptations." These are not lightly spoken words when they refer to the destiny of a nation.

It is true. It is essential to examine and evaluate events with a responsible approach. What is at issue is the immediate future of an unfortunate nation, and in that context it is impossible not to have serious worries. The Soviet army, with its tanks and soldiers, has set up camp not only in Yerevan but in 16 other regions of Armenia. Moreover, the people are not hesitant about challenging this armed force. Should we preach to these masses to be cautious and patient, that they should avoid any acts of extremism and that if they are patient perhaps tomorrow something will happen? That is all very good. But how can we convince a people who demonstrated such exemplary orderliness and who expressed its loyalty to Lenin and Gorbachev only 2 months ago, that it will not be betrayed by history once again? What advantage was seen and what motives were served by disillusioning an entire nation? About the end of February, that nation had listened to what it was told and had stopped its demonstrations and strikes. It was filled with hope. Then came Sumgait followed by a sham trial where accusations against scores of defendants were blamed on a single wretched "hooligan" while the others disappeared. Then came plans and reforms for Artsakh which were not implemented, the "show" staged at Zvartnots airport, Azeris who were settled in Shushi, and so on.

Then why did Moscow do everything to awaken the rebellious spirit in a nation which had sat in its place quietly and obediently tolerating injustice for decades and which, on one morning before spring, thought that its spring, too, was imminent.

An entire nation has rebelled because the cup has runeth over and because it believes that it no longer has anything to lose. It has deviated from its basic just demands—the return of Karabakh and the preservation of its ecology—and has begun pursuing its ancient dreams. With the tricolor [the flag of the independent state of Armenian in 1919-1920] in its hand, it wants

independence, unwilling to understand that it is not yet the day, the hour and the moment for that very natural aspiration of every Armenian.

All the sensible and compassionate members of the Armenian Diaspora stand beside our people in Armenia even if the heroes appear tired. Meanwhile, the three national parties, which so easily aroused the enthusiasm of the community with their united stand, remain conspicuously absent from the scene in these critical days.

Most importantly, the last word on calming down the people of Armenia rests first and foremost with Moscow. Moscow should have known not to think in terms of troops and tanks.

Three-Party Communique Calls For Moderation in Karabakh

46050004c Beirut AZTAG in Armenian 1 Oct 88 p 1

[Joint communique by the Hunchak, Dashnak, and Ramgavar Parties on 29 September 1988]

[Text] The crisis of the Armenians of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast has assumed grave proportions and has turned into a crisis for all Armenians in Armenia, the Motherland and the Diaspora.

From the outset, we, the three Armenian national-political parties, monitored this crisis closely and made it an object of our daily concerns. On several occasions, we expressed, with a united stand and on behalf of the entire Diaspora, our full and unreserved solidarity with the people of Karabakh and Armenia and their just cause which we believe can only be resolved with finality by the unification of Nagorno-Karabakh with Soviet Armenia

Today, with this joint communique, we reaffirm our unflinching solidarity with our people in Karabakh and Armenia and the pertinent authorities in their persistent and resolute stance for a just solution.

We expect and demand from the senior officials and responsible authorities of the Soviet Union that, as a positive gesture of justness, they put all the individuals and groups who engaged in criminal acts in Sumgait and Karabakh on public trial and hand them sentences commensurate with their crimes.

We expect the Soviet press to cover accuraaely and fully the events and the acts which have been committed—in terms of both information and interpretation—in accordance with the principles and spirit of glasnost which has been enunciated by senior Soviet administration officials.

We demand that the state authorities of Soviet Armenia make the Karabakh issue their first priority with added determination by becoming the true voice of just national demands and pursuing those demands with persistent zeal and the use of all legitimate political means with the purpose of finding a just and comprehensive solution; and that they reject the measures that have been envisaged so far as unsatisfactory and incompatible with the rights and yearnings of the people of Karabakh and Armenia.

We also call on our brave people in Karabakh and Armenia to avoid extremist acts such as strikes, walkouts from schools and extremist exhortations and expressions, which upset the law and order of the public life of our Motherland, which cause heavy losses to our country's economic, industrial, educational and cultural life, which harm the reputation of our nation as well as the normality of its relations with senior Soviet authorities and other Soviet republics and which only serve the ulterior motives of the enemies of our people.

Above all, it is essential to preserve the unity of our nation which is the source of our strength and to pursue our supreme interests with farsightedness and determination.

[Date] 29 September 1988

[Signed] Central Administration, Social Democratic Clarion [Hunchak] Party; Bureau of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation [Dashnak Party]; and the Central Administration of the Democratic Liberal [Ramgavar] Party.

Writers' Union Demands Effective Measures in Karabakh

46050004b Paris HARACH in Armenian 6 Oct 88 p 1

[Text of the resolution of the General Congress of the Writers' Union of Soviet Armenia]

[Text] The General Congress of the Writers' Union of Soviet Armenia convened on 19 September and reviewed the extremely tense atmosphere in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO], an atmosphere that is fraught with the threat of intranational conflict and unpredictable massive calamities. The General Congress expressed the view that any agreement which may resolve the problem of Artsakh can now barely ensure a normal coexistence between the two peoples. The latest events, particularly the bloodshed of 18 September, proved once again that fanatical and antiperestroyka forces across Azerbaijan will not permit

the implementation of the 18 July decisions of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. This is not unusual because those forces consider the economic and cultural confluence of Artsakh with Armenia as a defeat for Azerbaijan and a loss of the arbitrary and despotic right which has been exercised against the Armenians of Artsakh for decades. More importantly, they believe that any solution of this intranational conflict must not guarantee the security of the Armenian population of NKAO and Azerbaijan as they have never had any in the past. As a result, the threat to the basic security of life of one segment of the Armenian nation has spurred the entire population of Soviet Armenia to its feet. It is that crisis that has forced it to resort to all possible and even extreme means.

The General Congress of the Writers' Union of Armenia believes that the administrative and legal measures which have been taken cannot be considered adequate to deter criminal activities under present circumstances. These measures must eliminate the possibility of any clashes rather than seeking means of reducing their severity. But that possibility cannot be eliminated because the central television and press continue to evade the truth and often mislead the public of the Union by interpretations which deliberately distort the nature and form of the clashes. All this is done on the pretext that the culprits of the Sumgait and Masis incidents have not yet been properly investigated and convicted and that the force that organized the other known and unknown crimes has not yet been exposed. Finally, the tense state of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations cannot be relaxed because the just demands of the NKAO have not yet been met.

The General Congress of the Writers' Union of Armenia proposes to place the following items on the agenda of the special session of the Armenian Supreme Soviet:

- 1. To ask the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union to recognize the right of self-determination of NKAO.
- 2. To ask the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union to institute effective measures which ensure the constitutional right of the Armenian population of NKAO and Azerbaijan to live freely and in security.
- 3. To ask the judiciary of the Soviet Union to reexamine the judicial investigation of the Sumgait and Masis incidents, to render a true picture of what happened and to convict the ringleaders of the crimes.

REGIONAL

Sudanese Leaders Comment on Rumored Plans To Unite With Libya

Statement by Foreign Minister 45040042 Khartoum AL-ASHIQQA' in Arabic 13 Sep 88 pp 5-6

[Article: "Dr Husayn Abu-Salih: This Is the Story of the Libyan Statement; al-Fazzani Reviews Sudanese Parties' Programs in the Presence of the Parties; Secrets of Crisis Which Nearly Blew Away the Talks"]

[Text] The press statement on procedural arrangements for unity with Libya—a statement for which television transmission was interrupted last Tuesday evening—has evoked numerous reactions of support, opposition, and in between. But what concerns us in this story is the testimony of Dr Husayn Abu-Salih, the minister of foreign affairs and chairman of the Sudanese delegation to the talks which preceded the statement. Dr Abu-Salih is also the primary eyewitness who signed the statement on behalf of the Sudanese Government and who, as usual, has spoken with the simplicity and impartiality for which he has been well known since he entered the field of public action as a leader of the glorious 6 April uprising. Dr Abu-Salih said:

On Wednesday, 24 August, I received from His Excellency Prime Minister al-Sadiq al-Mahdi a memorandum to the effect that a Libyan delegation will arrive in Sudan for talks on Sudanese-Libyan relations.

The prime minister's memorandum talked of prior party contacts on this issue and said that the prime minister believes the Sudanese delegation assigned to negotiate with the Libyan delegation should be formed of the concord parties. He asked me, as minister of foreign affairs, to head this delegation.

The Sudanese side was formed of Mubarak al-Fadil and Dr Ibrahim al-Amin from al-Ummah Party, Ahmad Sa'd 'Umar and Dr Husayn Abu-Salih from the Democratic Unionist Party, and Mahdi Ibrahim and 'Uthman Khalid Mudawwi from the National Islamic Front.

Upon heading the delegation, I learned that the Libyan delegation was to arrive in Khartoum on 28 August. A problem, namely lack of time, surfaced for me. What worsened that problem is that when I met with the members of the Sudanese side, it became obvious to me that there was no specific agenda for the meeting and no prior studies on its subject matter. What we had before us was just a dialoge which resulted in no consequences for the Sudanese-Libyan relationship.

I, as chairman of the Sudanese side, moved in several directions. To start, I visited Muhammad 'Uthman al-Mirghani, the Democratic Unionist Party leader, and familiarized him with the issue. The unionists had no working paper or study on this issue.

I consulted with al-Sharif Zayn al-'Abidin al-Hindi and Muhammad al-Hasan 'Abdullah Yasin, and they assured me that the issue needs to be studied. I then talked with Sayyid Ahmad al-Husayn but he expressed no opinion.

I later met with the Sudanese delegation members to determine the course of the discussion and to organize ourselves. Those meetings coincided with the arrival of another Libyan envoy to hold talks with the Presidential State Council chairman, thus strengthening the possibility of the issue being presented to the Presidential State Council.

We, as a Sudanese delegation, thought that the time was unsuitable for discussing the issue [of unity], which axiomatically requires the presence of a clear Sudanese visualization, even though the National Accord Treaty calls for establishing distinguished relations with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Libya.

In our first meeting with the Libyan delegation on Sunday, 28 August, we discussed the fateful issues of neighborhood, Arabism, and so forth.

In this nearly 3-hour-long meeting, we stressed: We are discussing this issue while our country lives under catastrophic circumstances. This situation makes it inconvenient to continue this dialogue under these critical circumstances, not to mention the current suspicion-casting campaigns aimed at Sudan's Arabism.

Consequently, a clear Sudanese visualization delineating and codifying the level of this relationship must be formed. The Sudanese side did not have such a visualization at that meeting whereas the Libyan delegation stressed that the Libyans were ready. This is how the first meeting, which took the form of a preparatory session, ended.

Second Meeting

This meeting was scheduled for midday Monday, 29 August. The meeting did not take place because Husayn Abu-Salih, the Sudanese delegation chairman, became preoccupied with the death of a relative. Mubarak al-Fadil and Mahdi Ibrahim also missed the meeting. The atmosphere turned almost stormy, especially since the Libyan delegation started grumbling. The meeting was held that evening. At the outset, the meeting witnessed some friction and acrimony when Dr Abu-Salih insisted that the Sudanese side needed to have a unified Sudanese working paper and to be given the time to peruse the proposed Libyan visualization.

When this disagreement was surmounted, the Sudanese delegation did not embark on any discussion in any form with the Libyan delegation. What happened was that procedures were established to make it possible to hold the dialogue after each side prepares its visualization and to then draft the two visualizations in a statement which will not be enacted until it is approved.

So we did not discuss any working paper. We merely discussed the procedures and agreed to form a committee to study these procedures, provided that we agree [on unity] in the future.

This cannot, by any criteria, be considered an agreement. It was just a procedural step. I feel completely discussed when I see people discussing something that is still in the womb of the unknown.

I and the Libyan delegation chairman drafted the procedures, and the drafted statement was presented to the Presidential State Council and to the prime minister. It was signed and then announced.

What is truly surprising and painful to Dr Husayn Sulayman Abu-Salih's mind is for this procedural statement to be called a unity declaration, which is something that has never occurred in our minds.

After Statement

It thus becomes obvious from the details—as told by Dr Husayn Sulayman Abu-Salih—of how the statement was prepared that all the political parties were aware of the contents of the statement and how it was going to be announced, keeping in mind that the final meeting in which the statement was approved had been preceded by several meetings which had taken place since the first days of the April uprising.

Jum'ah al-Fazzani, the Brothers' Bureau secretary [title as published], touched on this fact directly when he pointed out in the first meeting between the two delegations that this unity comes as a reflection of the pan-Arabist tendencies contained in the Sudanese parties' programs, citing a provision in the Democratic Unionist Party's program and a provision in al-Ummah Party's awakening program, as well as the resolutions of the National Islamic Front's second congress.

By fully reviewing the circumstances accompanying issuance of the statement, regardless by what name this statement is called, AL-ASHIQQA' is dotting the I's and crossing the T's, despite the vacillation shown on this issue by some parties and circles.

The question that remains is: Did Dr Abu-Salih sign that statement on an ideological basis? To answer this question, we will point out the meeting Dr Abu-Salih held with the Libyan leadership in Tripoli in September 1986 when he participated in the celebrations marking the September revolution anniversary. Dr Abu-Salih

stressed at that meeting that Egypt's return to the Arab ranks is tantamount to the true voiding of Camp David, that it is not essential that Egypt tear up the accord, and that what is essential is Egypt's return to its [Arab] nation. This statement ignited an argument between Dr Abu-Salih and 'Abd-al-Salam Jallud, member of the [Libvan] historical leadership. This means that ideological reasons are out of the question. The question is then: Did Dr Abu-Salih, in his capacity as minister of foreign affairs, perform an executive role on the instructions of the prime minister or did he, in his capacity as head of the unionist team in the government, play a political role? When answering this question, AL-ASHIQQA' does not take the judge's seat but rather relies on the evidence which demonstrates that the Democratic Unionist Party leadership was aware of the statement and that Dr Abu-Salih's signing of the statement is compatible with the tendencies of the Unionist Party which is one of the first Arab parties to constantly call for Arab unity since the first half of this century.

Interview With Mubarak al-Mahdi 45040042 Khartoum AL-ASHIQQA' in Arabic 13 Sep 88 pp 7-8

[Interview with al-Ummah Party's Mubarak al-Mahdi: "Mubarak al-Mahdi: Islamic Front Is Original Party to Dialogue; No Old Bills and We Are not Agents; Absence of Southern Parties Was not Premeditated"—date and place not given]

[Text] Mubarak 'Abdullah al-Fadil al-Mahdi is, without dwelling on details, the al-Ummah Party's strongman under the canopy of al-Sadiq al-Mahdi's absolute leadership.

Even though the city has talked a lot about him, he has remained confident, steadfast, and daring.

When AL-ASHIQQA' interviewed him, loud clamor and thick clouds engulfing the new statement on Sudanese-Libyan relations were poisoning the political atmosphere which, to begin, abounds with catastrophes, ambiguity, and speculation.

It is not the purpose of the interview to thoroughly examine the meanings of words but more importantly to find out intentions, because words may be rosy and sweet while blood flows from the cheeks at times.

We believe that Mubarak al-Mahdi's primary quality, our facts, and the following questions demonstrate the importance of this interview:

[Question] The general feeling of the average Sudanese is that the circumstances are absolutely not suitable for this sort of statement which makes it look as if the government is (trying to solve) the problems of the unfortunate with a statement of unity with Libya.

[Answer] I guess that this statement has assumed vast dimensions because of the objectives or tendencies of numerous parties. In content, the statement talks of arrangements made to discuss issues which have been raised and on which there is general agreement in principle. It is true that the country has witnessed catastrophes. But government action [to deal with them] has not stopped, and it must continue. To begin with, the issuance of the statement did not materialize from nothing but was an extension of dialogues previously held with the Libyan brothers at all levels, especially at the party levels, because all the parties had held dialogues on the issue of relations and unity between the two countries from the perspective of these parties.

The Libyan delegation came primarily to familiarize itself with the conditions. We then agreed on a framework for a dialogue to discuss the relations between the two countries, especially since the National Accord Treaty calls for establishing distinguished relations with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Libya.

As for Egypt, the Brotherhood Treaty was concluded at a time when there was no government in Khartoum. It would have behooved us to say at the time: The time is inconvenient for a visit by the Egyptian prime minister, accompanied by 10 Egyptian ministers, as there is no Sudanese Government to sign the Brotherhood Treaty.

[Question] We have noticed that the Sudanese committee which held talks with the Libyan delegation and of which you were a member did not have a Sudanese working paper or a visualization of the type of relationship or degree of unity with Libya, as Dr Abu-Salih, the committee chairman, has said.

[Answer] The idea of this committee emanated from the Sudanese side last April when his excellency the prime minister conveyed to the Libyan side a proposal to discuss the relations between the two countries within the framework of a committee, and asked this side to study the proposal.

The Libyan response was received last July, i.e. before the catastrophes, and contained the names of the members of the Libyan committee assigned to hold talks with the Sudanese committee.

Upon receiving the Libyan response, the prime minister formed the Sudanese committee. But the developments came in rapid succession and diverted us from holding a committee meeting and forming a visualization. This coincided with the visit of a Libyan official to familiarize himself with Sudan's circumstances. However, this official was made to understand that Sudan was ready for talks. Consequently, the Libyan side decided to visit Sudan to acquaint itself with the conditions and to discuss ideas on the committee's agenda and program. This took place while we, as a Sudanese side, were making our preparations. We had expected to get ourselves organized by the first week of September. But

what happened is that the Libyan delegation proposed a preparatory meeting to discuss ideas on the committee's work and we liked the proposal.

The Libyan delegation arrived on Friday, 26 August, and cordial meetings were held between the two sides. The first session was held on the evening of Sunday, 28 August, a second session on Monday morning, and a third session the same evening.

It was agreed that the joint committee would next meet on 10 October 1988 in Tripoli.

All these events coincided with the arrival in Sudan of a Libyan envoy carrying the Arab federation plan which Libya had distributed to all the Arab countries.

When the Sudanese prime minister met with the Libyan envoy, he pointed out to him that there is a Sudanese committee to discuss this issue and that it will study the Arab federation plan as part of its work.

We are now in the process of formulating the Sudanese visualization of the relations between the two countries and Sudan's opinion of the Arab federation plan. Both will be presented at the committee's coming meeting in Tripoli.

[Question] Don't you think that delineating a distinguished relationship with Libya in accordance with the provisions of the National Accord Treaty will have a negative impact on Sudan's distinguished relations with other countries, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia?

[Answer] Not at all. Such a relationship will have no negative impact because we have resolved to steer clear of the policy of axes. We will not meet with one country against another. Sudan has common interests and common borders with these countries and has Afro-Arab-Islamic affiliations within whose framework Sudan must work and must delineate its relations with these countries.

The National Accord Treaty calls for establishing distinguished relations with these countries, and we establish such relations without allowing our relations with any country to have a negative consequence on our relations with another country, and so forth.

The proof is that when we concluded the Brotherhood Treaty with Egypt, the act did not influence our relations with Libya. These relations have continued to be advanced relations and we are now in the process of delineating them within a framework.

We have also tried to normalize the relations between Egypt and Libya by reopening the air route between them, by putting an end to the propaganda campaigns, and by confining the disagreements between them to pan-Arab issues without influencing bilateral relations. [Question] You have talked of prior consultations on this issue between the Sudanese parties and Libya. Our question is: How agreeable is the Islamic Front to this unionist projection?

[Answer] The National Islamic Front is not isolated from this dialogue. The front had firm relations with Libya when it was in the opposition [to Numayri] and many of its leaders lived in the Jamahiriyah during that period. A number of the front's cadres were also trained in Camps in Libya.

The front's relations with Libya continued after the national reconciliation of 1977. Hasan al-Turabi visited Libya and had several lengthy discussions with Colonel al-Qadhdhafi.

The front's relations with Libya continued even when it was a partner in Ja'far Numayri's regime. Even under the canopy of the deep-rooted hostility between Numayri and the Jamahiriyah, the Islamic movement leaders did not sever their relations with the Jamahiriyah. Rather, they made several confidential visits to it. As observers and opponents in the political arena, we were aware of those contacts.

[Box, p 8] Al-Sadiq's First Visit to Saudi Arabia

On occasion of the distinguished relations with the Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah, we told Mubarak al-Mahdi that it is noticed that the al-Ummah Party had distinguished relations in the past with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, that we find that these relations have weakened, and that the al-Ummah Party's interest in the Jamahiriyah has grown and become comparable to the unionists' traditional interest in Egypt. We then asked his excellency how true he believes this statement to be.

Responding, Mubarak al-Mahdi asserted that the al-Ummah Party has special relations with the kingdom and that it is fully eager for and proud of these relations which started in the days of the late King Faysal ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz. Let me reveal to you a secret announced for the first time [said Mubarak], we have presented a plan for economic integration between us and the kingdom, and a plan concerning the Red Sea security and the hot issues connected with the Horn of Africa. There are also numerous proposals to delineate the relations between our two countries within a [specific] framework. We fully appreciate what the kingdom, and especially the custodian of the two venerable mosques, has done. Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi has expressed the Sudanese citizens' gratitude in a number of messages he has sent to the kingdom's officials, and so have the minister of defense, Minister of Finance Dr 'Umar Nur al-Da'im, and Dr Hasan Taj-al-Din who expressed this gratitude in a press conference in Jiddah while on his way back from Pakistan to Sudan.

What I want to underline here is our distinguished historical relations and ties with the brothers in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Therefore, the first visit al-Sadiq al-Mahdi will make outside Sudan will be to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia so that he may express thanks and gratitude to the custodian of the two venerable mosques and to our people there.

Statements by Opposition

45040042 Khartoum AL-ASHIQQA' in Arabic 13 Sep 88 p 10

[Article: "Unionists and Unity Statement; Abu-Salih Signs, al-Husayn Denounces, al-Mirghani Rejects, and al-Hindi Is Mysterious Wall of Silence"]

[Text] Political life within the Democratic Unionist Party begins at a point where the white thread disappears and the black thread does not appear and where shadows cover large areas of the party's lobbies. The man who signed the statement of unity with Libya is Dr Husayn Sulayman Abu-Salih, the minister of foreign affairs and Political Bureau member, and the man who has opposed the statement strongly is Sayyid Ahmad al-Husayn, the party's deputy secretary general, who has asserted that the unionists were surprised by the statement and that they were not a party to it, whether at the level of the leadership, the Political Bureau, or the parliamentary committee.

Muhammad 'Uthman al-Mirghani, the party leader, has denounced the unity statement and has characterized it as offhanded, futile, and a waste of time.

A statement he issued says that the Democratic Unionist Party did not discuss this new Libyan unionist formula which was not presented to the party agencies.

Consequently, the party is not even obliged to express an opinion on the statement. Regardless of what has been said about the source and credibility of this statement, upon his arrival at Khartoum airport after a visit to Kuwait and Iraq Muhammad 'Uthman al-Mirghani told AL-AYYAM that Sudan's current circumstances do not permit the establishment of unity with Libya because Sudan must first put its house in order internally and must devote its efforts to bolstering its national unity. I will contact his excellency the prime minister to seek the facts about what has been said in this regard.

Mysterious silence has been the wall encountered by journalists and politicians who have tried to find out the opinion of the Democratic Unionist Party secretary general, especially in view of the obvious variance among the unionists on the unity statement.

What is interesting in this mysterious silence is that al-Sharif Zayn-al-'Abidin al-Hindi visited the Constituent Assembly premises twice last week. Yet, nobody was able to get any comment from him.

Delay to Restoration of Cairo-Aden Diplomatic

PM1811152688 London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic 16-22 Nov 88 p 9

[Unattributed report: "Exchange of Ambassadors Between Cairo and Aden Postponed"]

[Text] The talks between Egypt and the PDRY on an agreement to exchange ambassadors have been suspended nearly 8 months after the two countries decided to restore their diplomatic relations, during which period they exchanged diplomatic delegations for discussions on the subject.

The suspension of the talks came after Aden requested the closure of the office of the National Grouping of Patriotic Forces, which is opposed to the present Aden regime; suspension of AL-WAHDAH magazine, which is the grouping's mouthpiece in Cairo; and a ban on political activity in Egypt by Yemeni political refugees.

Egypt has emphatically rejected any preconditions for the exchange of ambassadors, particularly as the PDRY's decision to resume diplomatic relations with Egypt was not coupled with any such requests and the activity of the grouping's members in Egypt is minimal.

Egypt To Receive Billion Dollars in Iraqi Projects 45040037c London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic 12-18 Oct 88 p 9

[Text] President Saddam Husayn has informed President Husni Mubarak that Iraq has allocated to Egypt a share in the implementation of the construction plans to rebuild what has been destroyed as a result of the war. The value of the allocation is \$1 billion. This does not include the bids which Iraq will announce, which will be open to various international companies, including the Egyptian companies which can also take part in these bids.

The work which the Egyptian companies will be charged with carrying out will mainly involve road and building construction and planning new towns.

Problems in Gulf Stock Markets Discussed 44000070 London THE MIDDLE EAST in English Oct 88 p 29

[Text] On the face of it, stock markets look like a good way of mobilizing private funds for productive investment in the Gulf. Gulf governments certainly seem to think so in principle, since they are eager to encourage greater private sector involvement in economic development. In practice, however, Gulf stock markets face problems which will take a long time to overcome.

In October, the Gulf Organization for Industrial Consulting (GOIC) plans to bring together 400 regional

businessmen who will discuss the establishment of a Gulf-wide industrial investment company. GOIC is owned by the governments of Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman which are committed to the idea that the private sector must now play a greater role in regional development.

Since an estimated \$100bn-\$150bn is held overseas by private individuals who have largely become wealthy because of government-sponsored development programmes, GOIC has some powerful moral arguments on its side. Fostering the entrepreneurial spirit is seen as crucial, even in Iraq. But entrepreneurs invest for profit rather than as a national duty, and it is an open question how much of the expatriate pool of funds can be lured back to direct investment in Gulf countries.

In seeking to encourage private enterprise, Gulf officials gaze longingly at the example of the West's stock exchanges. The logic is irrefutable. If regional economies are to become less dependent on the fortunes of the oil markets and the amount of largesse governments can afford to disburse, the private sector must be provided with the mechanisms to make its own contribution. Commercial banks, frightened by the bad loan experience of the past four years and still oriented towards taking deposits and placing short-term funds on the international wholesale market, do not provide the answer. Building up local stock exchanges—and ultimately establishing a unified Gulf capital market—offers a brave new alternative.

Kuwait, which has the longest though perhaps not the happiest experience in share dealing, is revamping its stock market. Oman and Bahrain have given the goahead for the establishment of formal exchanges. Saudi Arabia made a faltering start last year and is still officially committed to setting up a centralized trading floor. But will Gulf stock markets ever become a major element of regional business?

The prospects are patchy. On the plus side, enthusiasts can point to the oversubscription of recent flotations in Saudi Arabia and the resilience of the Kuwait stock exchange. When the newly-reconstituted Al Rajhi Banking and Investment Company was floated in May, the shares were seven times oversubscribed. The majority of other public flotations in the kingdom since 1983 have received similar, if less spectacular, support.

Meanwhile, the global stock market crash of last October left Kuwait's exchange largely untouched. Shares seem less susceptible to worldwide trends than regional developments, and though they slid steadily in the first six months of 1988, they perked up markedly at the prospect of peace in the Gulf.

The outlook for private share trading playing a vital role in the evolution of Gulf economies is clouded by numerous problems, however. Getting potential investors to put money into the relatively scarce good industrial opportunities is hard enough. Developing a vibrant secondary market is even tougher.

One obstacle is that markets are thin. Fifty-four companies are traded on Kuwait's exchange, by far the most sophisticated in the area. Hishman al Oteibi, the chairman of the Kuwait Stock Exchange, says he wants foreign companies to increase the numbers (the London-based United Bank of Kuwait may be the first to register). But as matter stand, deals are done in only a small number of firms. The banking sector accounts for almost half total trading, and three of the eight financial institutions do most of that business.

To complicate matters, the government itself holds about 60 percent of local shares, inherited from its efforts to support sick companies brought low by the Souk al Manakh crisis. Al Oteibi is reportedly drawing up a programme for selling these off to private investors. But it is an open question whether the government will find many buyers or how it will accomplish the operation without knocking the bottom out of the market.

The prospects for new exchanges such as Oman's are even less exciting. The government hopes that some 40 to 50 joint stock companies could eventually be listed. But local bankers say that turnover on the existing unofficial market is minimal.

There is also a problem of confidence. Ever since rampant speculation led to the disastrous collapse of Kuwait's parallel Souk al Manakh market in 1982, investors have been understandably wary. Speculative investment, the motor of any secondary market, can be more confidently undertaken overseas where confidence between lenders, borrowers and supervisory agencies, adequate legal rights for creditors, and the flow of reliable business information is far better assured.

Thirdly, there are the contradictory policies of the authorities. The principle of a free capital market is often contradicted in practice, not least because of official fears about a repetition of the fiasco on the unregulated Souk al Manakh. Bahrain first declared its intention to set up a stock exchange in 1984. After endless studies and deliberation, 29 companies may be registered by the end of this year. But prospectuses will have to reviewed by no less than four agencies (including the Commerce Ministry, the central bank, the Finance Ministry and the board of the Bahrain Securities Market) before they are accepted.

Saudi Arabia's experience is a salutory warning. With much fanfare, a stock trading floor was established in May 1987. Less than a month later it was suspended. A faulty computer system was blamed, but nothing much of the scheme has been heard since. The stumbling block seems to have been regulatory disputes between the

Ministry of Finance and National Economy and the Ministry of Commerce, and uncertainty about the role of the Saudi Share Registration Company.

Then, in their eagerness to develop local money markets, some governments are actually deflecting funds from the stock markets. With only a limited amount of money available to be raised, the need to attract private funds in order to finance budget deficits tends to conflict with the aspiration to develop capital markets. Saudi Arabia, for example, began offering treasury bonds in May. Admittedly, only institutions are currently allowed to buy them, but it is generally acknowledged that they will not be particularly attractive to banks (which already do much of their business in overseas money markets) until a secondary market is created.

Kuwait provides an example of the problems. Jassem al Saadoun, who heads Alshall Economic Consultants, has pointed out that the average yield on Kuwaiti stocks in 1987 was only 2.1 percent compared with average 12-month Kuwaiti dinar deposit rates of 5.2 percent.

Experiment Links Television Between Jordan, Egypt

45040037a Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI in Arabic 9 Oct 88 p 5

[Article by 'Abd al-Fattah Ibrahim]

[Text] Jordanian Minister of Information Hani al-Khasawnah has stated that tests are currently being carried out preparatory to linking Egypt and Jordan by television. The building of the ground microwave network which will be linked to the Egyptian network in Tabah has been completed. The minister stressed that Egypt remains a primary center of the Arab renaissance that is influencing Arab life.

The Jordanian minister made this statement during his talks with Egyptian Minister of Information Safwat al-Sharif. Al-Sharif said that an international plan is being worked out to establish a new Arab media system that will adhere to the fundamental principles of freedom and the preservation of Arab tradition, while remaining capable of facing challenges.

The two ministers affirmed that President Husni Mubarak and King Husayn are interested in the role the media will play in the near future in serving both countries and the two brotherly peoples.

Al-Sharif said that Egypt has completed its transmission tests to Jordan. We are now awaiting the Jordanian tests, he added. He said that contacts are now under way with the aim of extending the microwave system between Egypt and Jordan to Iraq in order to boost media cooperation between the three countries.

The two ministers toured the television and radio studios. The Jordanian minister also visited the al-Ahram establishment, where Ibrahim Nafi', the doyen of journalists, chairman of the board of directors, and editor in chief, explained to him the method of operations in the institution and the most up to date and scientific methods being used in the editorial and printing presses.

Egypt Rejects Demands Related to Tabah 45040037d London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic 19-25 Oct 88

[Text] An Israeli military delegation of the military liaison branch assigned to the task of implementing the judgement of the arbitration board on the Tabah question recently arrived in Cairo. The Egyptian side (as well as the military liaison branch, too) was surprised by the Israeli side submitting a list containing several Israeli demands. The Egyptian side rejected the list, informing its counterpart that it is a body with the specific prerogative of discussing a particular issue, namely to prepare a timetable for Israeli withdrawal from Tabah; it is not a political body. It is not the concern of the two sides to discuss such matters which should be referred to the Egyptian diplomatic authority. However, the Israeli side refused to look at the agenda which includes one topic, namely how to implement the judgement. But the Israeli side relented in the face of Egyptian insistence.

The Israeli list of demands included:

- 1. Fixing documentation for the travel of Egyptian official delegations to Israel and Israeli delegations to Egypt in order to sign cooperation agreements.
- 2. Fraternization agreements between Cairo and Tel Aviv and Alexandria and Haifa.
- 3. Making compensation payments to the victims in the "Egypt's Revolution" case.
- 4. Giving Israeli airlines the right to operate domestic flights between the airports of Luxor, al-Ghardaqah, Sharm al-Shaykh, and al-Nuzhah.

Egyptian Laborers To Help Rebuild al-Faw 45040037b Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI in Arabic 9 Oct 88 p 11

[Article by Muhammad Khalid]

[Text] During his visit to Cairo, Fadil Gharib, president of the Iraqi Labor Union, discussed with Ahmad al-'Amawi, president of the Egyptian Labor Union, the question of Egyptian workers helping to rebuild the Iraqi town of al-Faw which was occupied by the Iranian forces for two years and was completely destroyed during the liberation battles.

Before leaving Cairo, the president of the Iraqi Labor Union said that the participation of Egyptian workers in building al-Faw will give the new town a national dimension as a symbol of Arab steadfastness and resistance. He said that a national committee has been set up in Baghdad in order to collect contributions from popular and trade union organizations in the Arab countries for building al-Faw, and that subcommittees have begun collecting contributions in a number of Arab countries.

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

Adverse Effects of Rift With Jordan on West Bank Education Decried

44040052 Jerusalem AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI in Arabic 1 Oct 88 pp 37-43

[Article by Wafa' al-Bahr: "The Inappropriate Timing of the Jordanian Measures in the Wake of the Rift: Education Is Paying the Price"]

[Excerpts] In spite of the tension, anxiety, disorder, floundering, and improvisation which dominated academic life in 1987-88, about 8,000 out of a total of 12,000 male and female Palestinian students managed to bid farewell to this year "with a success that inspires amazement."

However, "success" for the first time since 1967, indeed since 1948, was not the "passport" helping these students enroll in the universities, institutes, and faculties of the occupied homeland or enroll in the universities of the Arab countries, foremost among them the Jordanian universities. Why not?

As is well known, because of the events taking place in the occupied territories, all educational and academic organizations have been in a state of suspension for more than 9 months. For the same reason—and this is what concerns us here—the Jordanian authorities last 31 July ventured to sever legal relations between the two banks. It was necessary to follow up this "political decision," which has been acceptable in the Palestinian context, with a group of administrative measures most of which were not appropriate in timing, and educational considerations received the main share, indeed the lion's share, of them! Thus, Palestinian students found themselves between the hammer and the anvil, between the wave and the rock, between the dream and the unknown. How could they realize their personal, social, family, and national aspirations while all paths and gates were closed to them abroad and domestically?

The decree on education for Palestinians has become one of the most difficult of decrees, and the view of the future of the academic scenario in the regions has become thoroughly "obscure" and difficult, keeping solutions and recommendations from being set out for saving the fates of these students because of our educational and academic institutions' inability to possess the instrument of decision, the instrument of solution, in the domestic or foreign context.

Such an abnormal situation makes us voice loud cries and wonder if what the Jordanian authorities ventured upon is favorable toward our Palestinian people and aimed at establishing their entity, identity, and innate independence. How should we interpret the group of decisions which have infringed on hundreds of our male and female students, including those whose scholarships have been cancelled, who returned emptyhanded in the wake of the determination of the number of academic seats in the university, who returned from the borders of some Arab countries because of errors in dealing with temporary transit documents and so forth? One should bear in mind that they have no weapon in their hands but knowledge. The final question is: Is it permissible to subject a human right which all international and humanitarian documents and laws have advocated to a political decision? How can that be, and why is it?

As we pose these questions to all officials and persons concerned in Jordan in the Ministry of Higher Education, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of the Interior, we also pose them at the level of the League of Arab States and the international and humanitarian organizations and bodies headed by UNESCO of the United Nations: How are the aspirations and hopes of hundreds of Palestinian students being exploded by a hasty decree, or one at the stroke of a pen; how are these basic rights of people being trodden underfoot, and why is there silence on the part of these official bodies?

In any event, in order to describe the dimensions and results of the academic state of affairs in the occupied areas in the context of the current circumstances, we will relay the following cries uttered by some students, administrators, and academicians in the universities and schools who have kept abreast of the educational process, lived in close conjunction with the decree, and have understood its dimensions in their concern to save the academic future of the area, which might be "grim" if this policy of neglect continues.

An Example of Suffering and Politics Over Aspirations

Salfiya Hashim Hasanat, 17, a resident of the village of al-'Ayzariyah in Jerusalem, had not expected that her academic hopes and aspirations would be subjected to a political decree—she who had stayed up long nights seeking the education and excellence which would give her the possibility of obtaining a scholarship and studying in an Arab country, especially since her family did not have the ability to defray the burdens of the expenses of years of university study.

Salfiya described in detail what happened to her before and during her acquisition of the scholarship and the issuance of the decree to sever the relationship with the West Bank by the Jordanian party. She said, in exactly these words, "I completed the guidance stage with an 85.8 percent average and my financial situation does not allow me to study the area of specialization I want. My father told me by virtue of his teaching experience that there are scholarships which might be given in which I could have a share."

She went on to say, "Indeed, what was expected happened, since the Ministry of Higher Education in Jordan allocated 115 scholarships to all the districts of the West Bank, including Jerusalem. Of course all these scholarships were cancelled after the issuance of the decree in favor of the people in Jordanian governorates. I made an application with great hope and firm determination, and obtained the scholarship I wanted to study chemistry in an Arab country, which would save a year of language study." [passage omitted]

She felt that her future, indeed the future of hundreds of Palestinian students, is proceeding along an unknown road. She stated that her objection was not against the decree as a political decree, which all Palestinians on the inside and abroad welcomed, and the independent entity for the Palestinian people it means, but that this decree infringed on the most important consideration in the life of Palestinian youths—education. Steps ought to have been taken so students could avoid the loss of a whole year of their academic future. She said, "Especially since there are closed universities and ongoing conditions of tension. There are not even courses worth enrolling in for which the student should sacrifice a year of his academic life."

In spite of that, Salfiya Hasanat is faced with an unavoidable state of affairs since she is intending to enroll in a printing class in the Muslim Girls' Society along with courses in English and French.

She resumed commenting by saying, "It did not occur to me that I would lose a year of my life over secondary matters, but a student who is involved in waste must satisfy himself so his pride is not crushed at some point. Therefore, I will wait until the end of February of the new year, then I will resume the attempt once again to obtain a scholarship, even if it is in a foreign country."

There are many cases similar to Salfiya's situation in which coincidences worked to cause the people involved to confront each other in front of the gates to the official departments in Amman or along the bridge on the way back. There is female student 'Ubayr Qaraqi,' who obtained a scholarship from Iraq to study "forests and pastures"; female student Rim Qatinah; and many others besides them. She said, "As I was coming back to the nation on the bridge, the situation was very sorrowful. Most of the travelers returning were students. Every one of them had an approved dossier with papers and transactions, and they were all returning to involve themselves in a waste."

Hashim Hasanat, Salfiya's father, participated in the conversation, and said, "Imagine what exorbitant expenses these students and their families undergo to carry out transactions and stay in hotels and other expenses they cannot afford; it would have been proper for the Ministry of Higher Education to inform the students in advance of its intention to cancel benefits so these students would not bear all these hardships."

A Duplicate Tax and the Scope of Boycott

As we pointed out, Salfiya is not the only one to have been affected by the Jordanian measures bearing on the educational system in the occupied areas in the wake of the decree severing the relationship between the two banks.

All the scholarships allocated to the West Bank students, including Jerusalem, whose number exceeds 115, were cancelled in favor of people in the Jordanian governorates, and these measures proliferated, including the royal allowance given to the children of retired persons and the setting of the admissions volume at just 3 percent, as an informed source pointed out, while the Jordanian council of higher education declared a 25-percent increase in the number of students in Jordanian universities, that is, the equivalent of 1,200 students, and gave notice that this increase would be restricted solely to Jordanian students and would not include the students of the West Bank, since they were people of another country. [passage omitted]

As sorrow contorted the features of her face, she went on to say, "But unfortunately after the appearance of the results, it was apparent that all these applications had been ignored in the first place. As for the applications submitted for enrollment in Egyptian and Iraqi univerisities, these were handed over to quasiofficial centers in exchange for a fee ranging from 5 to 10 dinars. A few days ago, after the submission of the applications concluded, these centers returned all these applications to their owners, asking them to submit these applications through the Ministry of Education—of course after the conclusion of the period stipulated for the submission of these applications."

She immediately went on to say, "Today, all these students must wait until the new coming year and must enter into a new spiral of submitting applications to get a chance to travel or a seat in a Jordanian university. Nor do we want to forget the measures for the travel document in use recently. These are equal to the measures which the student must perform to enter the university."

One of the youths commented by stating "It would have been proper for the Ministry of Higher Education to inform the students in advance of its intention to cancel the benefits and facilities of the people on the West Bank so these students would not have undergone the hardship of travel and the high cost of permits which the Israeli authorities impose which is the equivalent of 30 Jordanian dinars." He pointed out that the period the student's family requires to obtain the new transit document is no less than 3 weeks, although the period permitted for residence in Amman is just 2 weeks. This is a clear inconsistency.

This father, whose daughter lost her scholarship to an Arab country, resumed talking, asserting the magnitude of the difficulties and sufferings these students and their families go through in addition to the exorbitant expenses. Ultimately their hopes and dreams vanish and they return to where they had come from.

The sum total of these decrees, by a minor logical analysis, means cramming the Palestinian students into a "cauldron" of closed borders which prevents them from realizing their educational aspirations—aspirations which do not mean merely obtaining a numerical certificate in higher studies, but also mastering various vital issues of development, technology, technique, and society in the world in the sense of the Palestinian students' effort to break academic isolation and to come into contact with the various cultures and sciences of other peoples and nations.

However, the obstacles the Palestinian student faces upon his admission to the universities, institutes, and faculties of Jordan or the other Arab countries in the wake of the decree severing the relationship with Jordan have not been restricted to this dimension. There is the second dimension to this academic problem, rounded out by the boundaries of the scope of the boycott. This is the closure of the schools and universities in the regions, through which the Palestinian student has come to pay a "dual" tax. He cannot enroll in Jordanian universities or universities in Arab countries and is not able at the same time to enroll in the universities, institutes, and colleges of the occupied nation as a result of their closure about a year ago. Consequently, Salfiya's problem becomes not an individual one but a "collective" one whose gist is the Palestinian students' deprivation of a basic right which all international and humanitarian documents and recognition have advocated.

Waiting and Learning Are the Only Route

In spite of all that, Palestinians believe there is no course before them but "waiting," and, however long the journey might be, it is necessary to follow the course of education in the last analysis. That is considered the only investment all these minds and competent youths are capable of. That is what student Aminah Badran, a resident of Jerusalem who obtained the general secondary diploma for 1987-88, science branch, asserted.

She said, "There is no doubt that such a situation affects the psychology of all Palestinian students, who have become confused over their affairs, in choosing between traveling or staying and waiting." She added that she sometimes thinks of traveling abroad to follow up her higher studies, but in the context of the current circumstances and the many obstacles the situation causes her to refrain from adopting such a decision. She said, "I settle for patience, because this situation is imposed on everyone, not just me. I am convinced and believe that the public interest must always and permanently remain above special interests. [passage omitted]

"In spite of everything, we have not submitted to the policy of neglect. How will the situation be in the context of the future Palestinian nation? For this reason I believe that the future of education in our country gives good signs of optimism, hope, and brightness."

Therefore she felt that the Jordanian decision to sever the relationship is without a doubt in favor of the Palestine cause from a political standpoint but from an educational standpoint she considered it a decree in service of the general policy of neglect, since the numbers of students in the West Bank are much greater than the seats available to them in local universities. In addition, the economic situation does not allow Palestinian families to spend on their children abroad, and giving the seats which had been allocated to Palestinian students to Jordanian students will have the effect of reducing the level of education in Jordan, since the accommodation of greater numbers with low averages means graduating students who are not competent, and making this grant to them is negative. In addition, they do not have adequate job opportunities. As for the Palestinian students who do not find vacancies for themselves in local universities, the situation will ultimately prompt them to work in Israeli factories and workshops, and who is satisfied with this situation?

Student Iyad 'Awad shared student Aminah Badran's opinion in terms of the severity of the crisis the educational system in the country is suffering from, pointing out that the recent Jordanian measures have helped to a large degree to aggravate this crisis.

In this regard he pointed out that the responsible authorities in Jordan ought to have distinguished between the political consideration and the educational, and applying these measures all at once without giving an opportunity to the academic organizations and the bodies responsible for programming and setting out educational plans on the inside is ultimately aimed in the direction of serving the general plan, which has the goal of ignoring the members of our people.

Iyad, who was prevented by the existing circumstances in the regions from enrolling directly in a university abroad to continue his studies, demanded that all the people concerned with the matter—institutions, families, and students—begin movement to reopen the universities and schools as well and said, "From my stand-point, this movement is a struggle because knowledge is the only weapon our people possess." [passage omitted]

Dr 'Ayyush stressed: Not since 1967 have students gone through difficulties in enrolling in universities, institutes, and colleges.

Dr Dhiyab 'Ayyush, dean of the Faculty of Letters and chairman of the Department of Social Studies at Bethlehem University, described the nature of the difficulties and problems affecting students' enrollment in universities and higher institutes and said, "It is certain that the general secondary graduates in the occupied territories in the current and preceding 2 academic years have faced difficulties and problems affecting their enrollment in universities and higher institutes that no class had faced since 1967. In the first place, no sooner could an elite of general secondary graduates last year enroll in universities, institutes, and intermediate faculties than studies began to be disrupted as a result of the circumstances prevailing in the nation at that time which ended with an early closure whose likes were unprecedented for all the educational and academic organizations in the nation. Thus, academic life was suspended and the dreams of the young university men and women turned into a mirage. On the other hand, the secondary graduates for this academic year, 1987-88, are still awaiting the hour of relief. They are not able to enroll in the universities in occupied Palestine in view of their continued closure by the authorities, nor are they able to enroll in foreign universities due to numerous factors, some of which are connected to the circumstances of the students in the occupied territories and some of which are connected to the facilities or obstacles related to travel measures."

Dr 'Ayyush summarized the most prominent of these difficulties as follows:

• First, the delay in the receipt of the grade lists from Amman since the education departments in the occupied territories had distributed the West Bank lists and official lists had not come in from Amman in spite of their importance and the inability to do without them when making a submission to any university on the inside or abroad. Therefore, the people have committed thousands of dinars to bring in their sons' and daughters' lists, and so many were not able to bring them and fill out the application forms that most of them lost their opportunity to make a submission and even obtain a copy of the grade list in English, which was a problem in itself. The students had to pay a specific fee to obtain it, and had to wait a long time for it;

 Second, the inability of many students to travel abroad either to submit applications to universities and institutes abroad or to travel after obtaining

admission into specific universities;

 Third, as a result of these obstructions, the students fell prey to university service office dealers, some of whose proprietors charged excessive fees for sending applications to Arab and foreign universities since it is not possible to consider their work service to our student youth but rather an unfair commerce that merits study and treatment. Here I am not stating that

the characteristic of greed is general and comprehensive. I personally have seen some offices which show facilities and offer fine services, free of fraud, but they are still relatively limited;

Fourth, the continuation by the authorities of the closure of the universities and higher institutes to the students, which makes the situation extremely difficult because the problem is not peculiar to an individual or individuals but involves one or two generations of graduates, as well as slowing down the academic and educational process, which is a frightening thing and something that is difficult to believe because the right to an education and expression is an absolute right which all international documents and recognition have advocated;

Fifth, the limited nature of the Jordanian temporary passport and the imposition of the condition that the student himself go to Amman to complete the procedures for obtaining a passport. If the student finds difficulty in obtaining a permit for travel abroad, even after bringing proof of the acceptance he has obtained in a foreign university, is it expected that he will be permitted to travel to obtain the passport then again to enroll in the university within the course of a month?

Pitfalls and Fears

In light of these facts, Dr Mahdi 'Abd-al-Hadi, chairman of the Palestinian Academic Society for Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem, talked about the academic situation in the occupied areas and said, "The right to education, culture, and expression is one of man's basic rights, and armed with this the Palestinian people have succeeded in preserving their vitality, vigor, and survival, and it has been and remains the basic element which has preserved the people's survival as a national entity and Arab identity. Statistics and studies which these people's enemies have published have stated, more than their friends, that the Palestinians are in the forefront of the peoples of the region in terms of progress and interaction in the fields of humane sciences and other scientific fields."

Dr 'Abd-al-Latif al-Barghuthi, lecturer at Bir Zayt University, concurred in the statement since he felt that the whole issue is very vital, very painful, and very sad and that the current situation reminds us of the Turkish historic situation and the policy of deliberate stultification. He said, "Naturally, if over time the situation is perpetuated and Arab regimes languish, completing the cycle of stultification by impeding West Bank and Gaza students from being admitted to Arab institutions, then this would cause us to fear first of all for the laxity of our students and consequently the deterioration of the Palestinian educational institutions from which the migration of large numbers of people working in them will result. We will thus have a dual loss, embodied in the drain of people from the territories and in the drain of brains and competent persons."

Dr Albert Aghazarian, director of public relations at Bir Zayt University, stressed the points which Dr 'Abd-al-Latif al-Barghuthi dealt with in the course of talking about the future of the academic situation in the regions in pointing out that this future more than at any time in the past was firmly connected to the development of the course of affairs in the general context. The great event in the occupied territories has embraced all the small events. He said, "There are stages in the life of peoples in which 'peripheral' issues are put on the 'shelf' in spite of their vital nature while awaiting the realization of seminal political developments. This is on the one hand. However, on the other, it is not possible to belittle the structural composition of university education. The closure of all the institutes of higher education for an unspecified period is a matter of the utmost seriousness. Here we are talking about 12 universities and intermediate colleges (the total of the institutions taking part in the Education Council), which envelop no less than 17,000 students and 2,500 lecturers and researchers. If we assume that a number of these students and researchers will be going abroad, how many of them will return, and how many of them will be caught up in the framework of the freeze on all institutions? Has emphasis started on 'voluntary' exile, and do these conditions come within the context of a policy that has been arranged? To what extent do they implicitly lead to the fragmentation of the bonds of Palestinian society, and how will all this be dealt with?" [passage omitted]

Al-Tazami said: The academic future in the region might be dark.

Shahadah al-Tazami, director of the al-Rashidiyah school, spoke, saying, "Much has been written in the media, specifically in the local papers, about the educational situation in the occupied areas. There have been many recommendations on the part of persons who are concerned with this field, be they educationalists or academicians, but in my concept everyone is in agreement that there are many flaws in our educational situation which require activities of rehabilitation and reform. The body qualified to carry this process out will arise only in the presence of a responsible authority which will set out plans and programs in this framework. In addition, the continuation of the situation as it is causes me to make the prediction that the future of education in the region will be very dark." [passage omitted]

Israelis Sign Trade Protocol With Palestinians 440040054 Jerusalem AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI in Arabic 8 Oct 88 p 12

[Text] Setting a historic precedent in Palestinian-Israeli relations, a trade protocol was signed on Tuesday 5 October between Israel and the Palestinians, represented by the Charitable Society in Gaza. The protocol, the first of its kind, permits the Palestinian farmer to export his products to Europe independently.

AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI has learned that the late Haj Rashad al-Shawwa was slated to sign the protocol while senior officials from a number of ministries were to sign it for the Israelis.

It was also learned that the protocol will help prompt the European Parliament to endorse trade agreements between Israel and the Common Market countries. The endorsement was withheld because of Israel's stands on the question of exporting Palestinian products directly to Western Europe, and because of the recent events in the West Bank and Gaza.

The observers say that the signing of the protocol is regarded as a first step toward Israel's recognition of the independence of West Bank and Gaza from Israel.

AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI publishes herewith the text of the agreement reached between the official Israeli and Palestinian sides:

In light of the agreement reached between Israel and the EC on 7 January 1987 and the subsequent talks between the ministerial committee and the Arab farmers in the areas, the following agreement has been reached between the internal ministerial committee, representing the Israeli government, and the Charitable Society in Gaza, collectively representing the Arab farmers and exporters in the areas (here below referred to as exporters).

In consideration of the sincere desire to solve together any problems that might arise during direct exportation, this agreement shall be a binding protocol detailing and regulating the procedures governing the export process.

- A. The exporters shall submit to the Israeli authorities before every season a seasonal plan for export programs showing the qualities and approximate quantities. A joint review will be carried out with the aim of achieving maximum benefit to all concerned. Agreement on the plan will take place between the internal ministerial committee and the exporters, from which there will be no deviation except with the exporters' written consent.
- B. During the export season the exporters will apply for an "export permit" from the civil administration for each shipment of agricultural produce. The application form includes: the date, the means of transportation, nature of the produce, the quantity, and the country of destination. The export permit is to be issued quickly, within one or two days, provided the application is in accordance with the seasonal plan. It is agreed that the purpose of the export permit is purely for statistical records. The time it takes to issue should not exceed two days, excluding official holidays.

- C. All the documents and certificates which the EC authorities require, such as the certificate of origin and quality, the health certificate, etc., are those issued and organized by bodies agreed upon and delegated by the EC without interference by any local authority.
- D. All technical arrangements relating to foreign shipment, such as packaging, storing, transportation, and complying with trade agreements in Israel and abroad, shall be the exporters' responsibility.
- E. Trade marks and labels are to be designed by the exporters. Certificates of origin should be in compliance with the EC's declared position, as contained in Mr (?Chaisson's] letter of 12 October 1987, or any other future declaration.
- F. Coordination of security searches will take place between the exporters and the authorities concerned in order to pursue well-known procedures that will cause no delay or damage to the shipments.
- G. The exporters agree to restrict their operations to Arab farmers in the areas and not to enter under any circumstances into any contractual agreements with Israeli farmers.
- H. The exporters undertake to stick to sound trade practices in order not to create a state of confusion in the market that might have adverse effects on the interests of all the farmers in the area.
- I. The internal ministerial committee shall be obliged to ban any Israeli exporter from using any trade or geographical trademark or label in any way having any connection with the areas, without regard to the origin of the exported shipment.

PLO Criticized for Disregarding Palestine National Charter

44040051 Amman AL-RA'Y in Arabic 30 Sep 88 p 20

[Article by Hasan Sabra: "Who Has the Right To Abolish the Palestine National Charter?"]

[Text] Naturally, we shall never wait for the word of someone like Abu-Iyad, who has announced that the prospective provisional government will not abide by the Palestine National Charter, to express our opinion of that provisional government.

We shall not await his opinion supporting Resolution 242, which is tantamount to a proposal for direct negotiations over the occupied territories between Israel and some Arab countries without dealing with the Palestinian cause in an openly political manner, to pass our judgement on this future government. Ever since the death of Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir, the policy of those who

control the PLO has openly and increasingly obviously followed the line of getting rid of everything which the Palestine National charter itself stands for.

This charter was drawn up in 1964 in Jerusalem itself, at a time when the Arab milieu was distinguished by a degree of Arab solidarity which gave birth to the PLO.

This charter mapped Palestine according to its history, geography, and aspirations; underlined its affiliation with the Arab world; and emphasized that there should be no presence in the land of Palestine except that of the free Arab Palestinian people who would establish their independent Arab state on all of Palestine.

The Palestine National Charter is the political and intellectual foundation on which depend the activities of the PLO as well as those of the Palestine National Council, the Palestine Central Council, and all the other functioning Palestinian departments and organizations. So, if the PLO is no longer committed to the articles of the Charter itself, what is the political and intellectual basis on which it now relies?

Before we say that the absence of the Charter from PLO policy abrogates the PLO and not the Charter, because it was the Charter which gave birth to the PLO; and before we say that if the Charter needs to be changed no individual or group of individuals has the right to do this or to depart from it, not to mention draw up a charter for a people or a political movement which will express their aspirations and be based on and work for their rights, we must go back to the very beginning, to the point when those controlling the PLO dared to take liberties with the self-evident truths which have given a political identity to the Palestinian Arab people for the first time since the usurpation of Palestine in 1948.

This beginning consisted of altering all the self-evident fundamentals of Palestinian political action, the first being that Palestine is a land which the West and the Jews wanted to get as a jumping-off point for controlling the entire Arab world, that the Arabs all bear responsibility for letting this land fall into the hands of the Western-Zionist plot, and that no individual inside or outside Palestine has the right to give up a single inch of it just as no Arab near to or far from Palestine can give up a single inch of his own land for any reason. So how, if Palestine was the target, could it be the base for an attack against the entire Arab world?

In 1965, we cursed the moment when Habib Bourguibah took us in, because he called for peace with Israel. At that time we were at our prime on the Arab nationalist scene, and our heads almost touched the sky. Even when we were in our worst political, military, and psychological situation following the 1967 aggression, it was not enough for us to hear the Arabs, led by 'Abd-al-Nasir, say that there would be no peace, no negotiations, no recognition of the Zionist enemy, and no neglecting the full rights of the Arab Palestinian people. And today we hear

people talking of surendering all of Palestine except a few square kilometers where a jurisdiction governed by one of their priests would be established.

The second self-evident fact is that all of those who are in Palestine against the will of its people and all the Arabs are usurpers, no matter what their intellectual inclination—whether they are surrealist or abstract artists, athletic or flabby, short or tall, an admirer of Marx or a supporter of Freud, a fan of Michael Jackson or a follower of Beethoven. This is his opinion, and he is free to have it. But let him pursue his freedom outside my home, your home, and the home of the Palestinian farmer, worker, employee or property-owner—over there, in Ireland, Poland, Germany, America, or Russia.

If we treat the usurping Jews differently; if we say that this one, a Marxist, is entitled to have us recognize his usurpation and permit him a piece of land or a home, while not letting in someone else who thinks highly of Adam Smith because he is a capitalist or loves money; this is not merely legal or constitutional heresy but is also a concession by a nonowner to a nondeserver. This is how the West treated us when it occupied our land in Palestine and gave it to the Jews—a party which didn't own the land gave it to another party which was not entitled to it.

The third self-evident fact which is constantly being ignored is that history stands still for the death of no one, and the universe can never be sketched to the measure of any man. If so-and-so was unable to achieve any of his goals—whatever they were—during his lifetime, the course of history is not altered and geography is not changed. We may talk of the fate of a cow that we sell before it is butchered, or a tree that we chop down so that it doesn't block the sun, or a flower we cut so that it doesn't wither on the stalk, but we don't outline the destiny of a nation or a people in a moment of weakness, nor do we abandon it in a moment of despair, nor do we make concessions in its name to please so-and-so.

The most important fact, which even children know, is that territorial conflicts cannot be resolved justly unless two conditions are present; the first being a true balance of power in that land, and the second being a will which knows how to make use of this balance until the last breath without any concessions, indifference, or regression. So how can we now outline this balance of power between the PLO and the Zionist enemy?

The PLO has made one concession after another to the enemy, who turns his back and asks for more; the PLO has ignored the will of the Arab nation, wagering just like Israel, the West, and all the other enemies on its weakness; the PLO thinks that for time to go by now without reaching any agreement with Israel or America is the end of the world; the PLO continues to think there is a difference between a general in active service such as Mordechay Gur and a reserve general like Abraham

Tamir, and continues to bet that Sharon might be an enemy because he is still in the Shamir cabinet while Peled is not an enemy because he has joined the reserve.

This renunciation of self-evident facts is what made it possible for Abu-Iyad and his like to say that the Palestine National Charter has become outdated. As for the Palestinian left, it will have the final say.

Need for Provisional Government Assessed 44040081 Jerusalem AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI in Arabic 22 Oct 88 p 28

[Article by Dr Sa'id Zaydani of Bi'r Zayt University: "Opinion: Provisional or Transitional Government or Government-in-Exile"]

[Text] The following argument sums up an opinion that has become explicit and a position that has become popular these days, the days of the 10th month of the uprising.

Preludes:

A political and also perhaps a legal and administrative void has emanated from Jordan's decision to disengage itself from the West Bank. A provisional or transitional Palestinian government or government-in-exile is capable of filling the void created by Jordan's decision. Moreover, a provisional or transitional Palestinian government or government-in-exile is capable of gaining an international recognition that enables it to embark on direct or indirect negotiations within the framework of a still-prommised international conference. But international recognition of a provisional or transitional Palestinian government or government-in-exile is conditional upon the adoption of a political program necessarily different from the national charter. The features of this political program, which is different from the national charter, have begun to surface in the statements, interviews, and consultations made by Palestinian leadership figures.

Conclusion:

If we acknowledge that all the abovementioned preludes or assumptions are true, then the compounded conclusion is the following: A provisional or transitional Palestinian government or government-in-exile can, if recognized internationally on the basis of a political program different from the national charter, embark on direct or indirect negotiations within the framework of a promised international conference. It can also fill the legal and political void created by the Jordanian disengagement decision.

Critical Observations:

First, if all the preludes are proven to be correct and if the compounded conclusion is proven to be sound, this

argument continues to fall short of proving that a provisional or transitional Palestinian government or government-in-exile is necessary to achieve the abovementioned objectives or that it is the only instrument to achieve all or part of these goals. Try to replace provisional or transitional government or government-in-exile by organization [PLO] and think of the political logic we are about to address. In other words, why cannot the organization [PLO], if recognized internationally on the basis of a political program different from the national charter, embark on direct or indirect negotiations within the framework of a promised international conference and why can it not fill the void created by Jordan's disengagement decision? It seems that the fundamental issue is not so much an issue of a provisional or transitional government or government-in-exile as it is the issue of a political program that replaces, abolishes or surpasses the Palestinian national charter in the political lobbies at their various levels.

Second, look at the same compounded conclusion with some explanatory phrases added to it between parentheses:

A provisional or transitional government or government-in-exile "decided upon by the National Council," if recognized internationally, "which is not sure or certain," on the basis of a political program different from the national charter, "which is a prior condition for the decision and recognition" can embark on negotiations, "which is contestable and doubtful." It can also fill the void, "and it is not known how it will fill the void, not to mention the soundness or defectiveness of the allegation that there is a void in the first place." The question that persists intensely is: Who guarantees that such a government will achieve the desired objectives (negotiations, recognition, filling the void)?

Third, the issue of filling the political or legal void emanating from the disengagement is totally independent of the issue of embarking on direct or indirect negotiations within the framework of an international conference. An internationally-recognized Palestinian government may not be able to fill the void practically, "if it exists." Mentioning the void, what does one say to a reproachful whisper from Gaza: Why hasn't anybody previously paid attention to the chronic void in Gaza Strip? Moreover, the question of a political program different from the national charter "to freeze, replace, abolish, or surpass this charter" is, in turn, totally independent of the issue of forming a provisional or transitional government or government-inexile.

Finally, the central issue is not so much an issue of a provisional or transitional government or government-in-exile as it is the issue of a political program and of its imapet on the national charter. As for a decision on a government, it does not require further justification or deliberation.

ALGERIA

Background, Political Leanings of Key Officials Discussed

45190008 Paris LIBERATION in French 12 Oct 88 p 5

[Article by Jose Garcon: "The Five Men Who Embody Power"]

[Text] "There are too many contradictory interests in this country for 'them' to understand one another on any one issue": The skepticism of the people of Algiers after Chadli's speech is certainly the best indicator of the realities of power in Algeria—a concept difficult to grasp for one key reason: Secrecy is a rule in this country. In addition, the alliances, which often shift, seem more circumstantial than strategic. According to their interests of the moment, leaders will come closer to, or put more distance between, one another. Rivalries and personal ambitions are often what lies behind "unnatural" alliances.

In this way the "clans" are all the less rigid in that the "ideological" causes of dispute advanced to explain one or another split sometimes call more attention to honorable "face-saving" and "patronage" than to any real convictions. In this maelstrom, regionalist sentiment is one of the criteria for cohesiveness. All of that renders somewhat relative the conventional division between the "liberals" and "those who hold to the tenets of socialist orthodoxy."

This classification has nevertheless acquired a certain reality, notably because of the self-preservation reflex among the privileged members of a system that has exacerbated the divisions. Faced with the risk of explosion—of which a large number of the political class were aware—two attitudes existed without being clearly expressed: a "closed" behavior essentially tied in with the fear of opening a breach into which an uncontrollable opposition would plunge. That was often the attitude of the "guardians of dogma," the old Boumedien people withdrawn into their shells in the party or the army. In brief, it was the attitude of a "left" that justifies itself by maintaining that it wishes to "preserve the gains won during the socialist revolution."

The second attitude was that of the partisans of the "economic reforms," which predicted that only the "opening-up" or rather a certain "unlocking" of the system, could disarm the generalized discontent. But the timid reforms intended to cure the catastrophic management of the economy became confused at times with an Egyptian-style infitah (economic opening) that "makes the rich richer every day and the poor poorer every day." Riadh el Fatah, the symbolic Algerian "lacuna" and the temple of Chadli-style consumerism, has become its symbol. The system is such that any room for initiative is turned aside in favor of personal goals and the desire of fraudulent enrichment.

But will Chadli Benjedid, who pronounced himself in favor of "political reforms" yesterday and who announced sanctions against "deficient government economic authorities" be able to bring them to completion under such conditions? Even supposing that he has the willingness, success would not be assured for all that. The strategies of the various actors have at this point cancelled one another out to the point where they immobilize each other.

Chadli Benjedid

No more than anyone else did the former commander of the Constantine military region, and later of Oran, expect to become the third president of Algeria. An amateur scuba diver and fond of chess, belote [card game], and cigars, this son of a poor peasant from the Annaba region, who has not mastered classical Arabic very well, had neither charisma nor great range of ideas, but he did have common sense, pragmatism, prudence...and the authoritarianism of an officer inclined to cut people off without much discussion. "After the inflexibility and asceticism of a Boumediene, Algeria was happy to be able to breathe freely with a man like Chadli," people say in Algiers these days.

One thing is sure: It was as a "man representing a compromise" between the clans of Colonel Yahyaoui—supported by the Arabists—and those of Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Boumediene's minister of foreign affairs—turned more toward the West—that Chadli Benjedid was elected for a first presidential term in 1979.

For 9 years, the Algerian head of state has ruled by effecting compromises between the various clans. Having nothing of the visionary in him, and placing his confidence—especially in economic matters—more in technicians than in "politicians," Chadli has surrounded his Presidency with a number of men who favor "economic reforms." His avowed goal: To remove the economy from its bureaucratic straightjacket and promote a minimum of political openness to prevent the inevitable social convulsions.

Among them, the president's secretary-general, Larbi Belkhir, who made his career in Constantinois with Chadli and who derives his decisionmaking power—deemed "excessive" by some—from the fact that all the "lines" converge on him. Having his own "clientele"—the charter members from the West—Larbi Belkhir may nevertheless not be at the center of all the decisionmaking; as for example when the president deals directly with the security forces. This modus operandi of Chadli helps to explain the role of the president.

Presented by the "liberals" of his entourage as one of their own, the head of state plays a game that is above all a balancing act. Though he has been able to break the old apparatus of the Military Security (SM), he nevertheless maintains favored relations with Sherif Messaadia, the "number one man" of the FLN, and with General

Belhouchet, who is linked to "the old guard of the army," relationships all the closer in that the three men come from the base of the East. The way in which certain highly-placed government officials, who defend positions totally opposed to those of the "president's men," claim the support of Chadli, is a perfect example of the tight-rope artist's role that the latter has assumed.

On the eve of the riots, the Algerian president, who appeared as the sole candidate of the FLN at his own succession, was nevertheless strongly contested in the Army which focused its discontent on the "abandonment" of the Polisario in the Western Sahara affair. By confiding the re-establishment of order to the military, has he become their prisoner? Will he renounce—voluntarily or under pressure—a third presidential mandate, as rumor has it in Algiers? Rare were those willing to risk the least prediction on this subject yesterday.

The Military Command

Two generals belonging to that command charged Thursday evening by Chadli to reestablish order: Abdallah Belhouchet and Nezar. Are these two generals the only members of this "command," or are they the front for a more "muscular" military power? Is it General Attailia, the commander of the First Military District, who pulls the strings, as some believe? It is difficult to say. Chadli made a recent attempt to secure the retirement of this "big businessman," this partisan of strong-arm methods, who had led the repression at the time of the coup d'etat against Boumediene in 1965.

In the present state of affairs, one can see in the choice of Belhouchet and Nezar nothing more than a willingness to maintain the unity of the Army, even to immerse it completely in the repression of the Algiers riots: Like General Belhouchet, the majority of the "old guard" of the Army are natives of Aures and veterans of the war. The close bonds that Belhouchet, a personal friend of Chadli, maintains in other areas with favored civilians—highly placed civil servants, ambassadors—and natives of Aures, are important in the light of the current situation.

As for General Nezar, a man with experience in the field, an excellent technician, he represents the "technocratic" wing of the military, the one that wants to "modernize" the army and make of it an operational fighting body. This "School of Cherchell" is today in confrontation with various political resistance forces.

El Hadi Khediri

For about 2 years, Chadli's minister of the interior has been doubtless one of the most visible men in the government. He is handling the re-establishment of relations with Morocco, the hijacking of the Kuwaiti Boeing to Algiers, the negotiations with Paris concerning the children of mixed Franco-Algerian marriages: He is present on all fronts. Nevertheless Hadi Khediri belongs

neither to the inner circle nor to the Political Bureau of the party which is exceptional for a man who holds such power. Recalling that he was among those students who had deserted during the war in 1961, to show their defiance of military service, Boumediene had refused to let him occupy any office after independence. He nevertheless began his career in the Algerian diplomatic service under Ben Bella, and was later in the cabinet of Abdelaziz Bouteflika—before becoming director of the police force, an entity which he does not deem a simple instrument of repression although this was a subject of reproach to him at the time of the Constantine riots in November 1986.

Few "policemen" have had such listening posts trained on society. The minister of the interior is probably one man who realized most clearly that something would soon explode, and who believed it indispensable "to open up" society, at least minimally, to avoid it. The riots that bloodied the capital prove him to be tragically right.

Hated by certain clans, will he be blamed for not having brought in the CNS (National Security Squadrons) placed under his command on the first day of rioting, even though it is difficult to believe that an order to do so was not forthcoming from higher up? It was he, in any case, who first appeared on television Saturday evening, livid with rage, to protest the fact that the forces of law and order had opened fire on the rioters.

On the other hand, will the "political reforms" announced by President Chadli move in the direction intended by Khediri? According to some Algerian political officials quoted by AFP, the changes that are in the works would focus particularly on an associative representative movement. Now Khediri had taken steps in this direction: He tried to have a "Law on Associations" passed, and announced several months ago that the FLN's monopoly on candidates for the communal elections would be eliminated and that local politicians not members of the party could throw their hats into the ring, initiatives that were never accepted by the FLN. The "capacity for dialog" with all the forces of society, which even his enemies recognized as his right, remains a considerable trump card for him in the present situation.

Cherif Mesaadia

Often presented as a proponent of the "hard line," the secretary-general of the FLN, along with Hadi Khediri, is the man who best foresaw through the eyes of the UGTA [General Union of Algerian Workers]—the one and only union—the upsets that were on the horizon. Contrary to the minister of the interior, Mesaadia tried to contain them through greater control of the party apparatus on behalf of which he wants to keep the monopoly on political and social action. He is helped in that by the "external relations" of the FLN: This is the party which in effect handles all relationships with the Palestinians,

with liberation movements throughout the world, and also with countries such as Libya.

An Arabist, this former union member turned wily politician—who is said to be ambitious—has a working relationship with most of the superior officers of his district, Constantinois. He was even able to effect a reconciliation between himself and the minister of foreign affairs, Taleb Ibrahimi, although the latter was considered a "moderate." While it may be true that he "capitalizes" on all the opposition tendencies toward "Chadli-style liberalism," he is also capable of pragmatism. Whatever his distrust regarding the creation of an "Algerian-Moroccan axis," which would cut Algeria off from its "traditional" alliances, he has journeyed to Morocco on several occasions, thus participating in the process of rapprochement with this nation which took place last summer.

LADH Members Interviewed on October Demonstrations

45190011 Tunis LE MAGHREB in French 28 Oct 88 pp 6-8

[Unattributed LE MAGHREB reporter's interview with Salah Boubnider and Aziz Ben Miloud, members of the Algerian League of Human Rights [LADH] in Tunis; date not given]

[Text] Salah Boubnider and Aziz Ben Miloud, members of LADH, are in Tunis for the meetings supporting the uprising of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories. LE MAGHREB took advantage of this opportunity to interview them.

Salah Boubnider is a FLN figure who has participated in the field and under arms in the national liberation struggle. After independence he had some difficulties with Ahmed Ben Bella, who imprisoned him. Today, he is one of the founding members of the LADH.

Aziz Ben Miloud, former president of the Algiers Bar, is a lawyer known for his commitment to the struggle for human rights.

[Question] What role did you play during the recent events in Algeria?

[Answer] We are the only ones to have raised our voices during the events. In spite of the complete silence of the press, our president, Mr Miloud Brahimi, held a press conference in Algiers on 13 October and issued several communiques which took positions on the tragic events.

At the time of our meeting with President Chadli Bendjedid, we protested against the manner in which information was dealt with. We think that it is illogical to criticize the foreign media—captive throughout Algerian territory—and to prevent Algerian journalists from informing the people.

[Question] What are, according to you, the underlying causes of the bloody riots that Algiers has witnessed?

[Answer] The Algerian people have struggled and agreed to make sacrifices for two essential things: independence and liberty. During the revolution, the Algerian people demonstrated exceptional will and courage.

For the Algerians, the FLN symbolized national unity, but the policies pursued after the revolution were not up to the aspirations of the people. The Algerians were, before and during the revolution, very politicized.

The Algerians are also a hardworking people who had ideals and principles. They have progressively lost these qualities. Depoliticization, the love of gain, laziness, and a lack of principles were encouraged. Petroleum revenues served to conceal the problems. The Algerian economy was living beyond its means and all sectors (agriculture, industry, etc.) were unproductive. The decline of the oil revenues bared the defects of the Algerian economy. The state was no longer able to maintain the population's standard of living and consumption. It is this refusal to see one's standard of living lowered, coupled with the complete absence of channels for dialogue and expression of discontent, that explains to a great extent the revolt of the Algerian people and the bloody events that we have experienced.

[Question] What, according to you, is the solution?

[Answer] It is essential that a pluralistic democracy be established in Algeria, even if it means having to go through certain indispensable phases.

[Question] What are the political forces behind the uprising?

[Answer] The uprising was spontaneous. There are no organized democratic forces. The demand for democracy is spread throughout the Algerian people. Neither Ben Bella nor Ait Ahmed are representative of this current.

[Question] And the fundamentalists?

[Answer] The media have inflated the role of the fundamentalists. In reality, they do not have a real presence in the country. They simply wanted to exploit the situation for their political ends by demanding the establishment of an Iranian-style "Islamic Republic." In our opinion, the Algerian people are an Arab and Muslim people and no one can assume the right to issue certificates attesting as to who is a good Muslim.

[Question] Are you optimistic about the future of democracy in Algeria?

[Answer] We are neither optimistic nor pessimistic about the future of democracy in Algeria. There are

possibilities for democratization. Those that are against democratization act for themselves. History will judge.

We sincerely believe that President Bendjedid is determined to continue on the path of democracy and pluralism. He has our confidence, but we are aware of the difficulty of the task.

[Question] Can you give us an idea about the circumstances of the creation of LADH and on its activities?

[Answer] Algeria is a signatory of the International Convention on Human Rights. A league created by Mr Ali Yahia has not been recognized by the [Algerian] authorities in spite of its recognition by the International League of Human Rights. Another league, that of Mr Amor M'naouar, has also not been recognized.

[Question] Why haven't the authorities recognized these two leagues?

[Answer] In our opinion, Mr Yahia's league has not been recognized because of its regional character, whereas the other one did not have much influence.

Our organization is, in contrast, representative on the national level. It includes activists from different regions, from various social strata, and of all leanings. That is why historic personalities of the FLN figure among its founding members, who are, in a way, the guardians of the temple. The archbishop of Algiers, Monseigneur Duval, and the rabbi of Algiers are founding members.

[Question] How well is LADH established. What is its influence, and what are its activities?

[Answer] In spite of its young age—barely 14 months—the League has accomplished an impressive expansion. We currently cover the whole of Algeria. Human rights activities in Algeria are not of spontaneous generation. Among the founders of the League are several lawyers who have plead in political trials (Zbiri, the Islamicists, etc...) at the risk of their liberty. We have always defended human rights and we shall adhere to this policy. The League has members who belong to the FLN, none of whom hold a position of authority. We have refused to allow FLN members holding positions of authority or sovereigntyto enter the League.

We have managed to express the demands of all classes of Algerians in an area where there is national consensus. The main theme of our activity has been human rights.

[Question] And what of certain circles that accuse you of being regime followers?

[Answer] This accusation is meaningless. We are not a political opposition party. We are simply human rights activists in a broad sense of the term (political rights and social rights). We believe that in order to properly fulfill

our duty we must have contacts and regular relations with the authorities. We are proud to have succeeded in being recognized by the authorities, something unprecedented in the history of independent Algeria. Besides, if we were "regime followers" as certain of our opponents claim, we would not have been arrested by the police.

EGYPT

Foreign Minister on New Balance of Power in Region

45040035 Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI 30 Sep 88 pp 28-30

[Interview with Foreign Minister 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid by Ulfat Qatamish: "Saudi Arabia Has Special Weight in the Gulf Peace; Egypt Has a Vital Role Which Determines the Region's Balance of Power"]

[Excerpts] Shortly before his trip to Washington in response to an invitation from American President Reagan, Dr 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid, the Egyptian deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, replied to AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI's questions on his expected visit and overall conditions in the Middle East and the Gulf. [passage omitted]

[Question] Following the two superpowers' success in realizing detente between themselves at the highest level, and following the halt to the Gulf war, are we truly living in the era of "the settlement of regional problems?"

[Answer] The negotiating table is the accepted language in the world now, now that the severity of the confrontation between the two superpowers has been alleviated with the emergence of the course of negotiation. Indeed, there has been tangible progress as far as some issues such as Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and Namibia go. As you see, the countries of the developing world were a theater for these struggles. We hope that the current rapprochement between Moscow and Washington will be reflected in these problems, among them the problem of the Middle East.

I believe that the countries, the parties to these problems, must seriously strive to eliminate these focal points of tension and take the initiative to submit recommendations which will in effect create common understanding, helping the attainment of a comprehensive, permanent peace.

The Gulf Peace

[Question] The peace negotiations between Iraq and Iran have stumbled. What is your view of these negotiations? Are they a war truce or are they a comprehensive settlement between two countries? What about the Shatt al-'Arab issue?

[Answer] As we always say based on our experience, negotiations are sometimes more vicious than military confrontation. Therefore the Iraqi-Iranian struggle, which has assumed the form of war combat for a period of 8 years and goes back in its roots more than 300 years, will not be solved in a short period—indeed the negotiations will be a battle, and we hope that limited skirmishes will not permeate them but rather that there will be total respect for the cease-fire.

What there is no doubt about is that just sitting down to negotiate on the part of the two belligerent countries has been a positive sign. I can say that victory in battle might be easier than success in realizing comprehensive peace. Therefore the present situation requires the joining together of true efforts desiring the reign of peace and the attainment of a final settlement to this struggle.

As regards the Shatt al-'Arab issue, it has constantly been the problem which turned the dispute between the two countries into an armed struggle. Iran must acknowledge Iraq's historic rights in the Shatt al-'Arab as a sole outlet to the Gulf, with respect for freedom of shipping in this vital artery and commitment to the rules of the laws of international waterways.

[Question] Saudi Arabia sent Prince Bandar Ibn Sultan to Geneva to make contacts between the ministers of Iraq and Iran before negotiations between the two countries reach a dead end, putting the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's weight into offering its praiseworthy efforts to the two countries in spite of its severance of relations with Iran. What is your view?

[Answer] I believe that the visit was not a secret and arose from the Saudi weight in the Arab, Islamic, and international contexts. The laudable Saudi efforts could indeed help pave the way toward permanent peace now that the GCC countries, headed by Saudi Arabia, have offered Iraq the political and material support which helped to change Iran's position and its declaration on accepting Resolution 598 and brought it to the negotiating table.

I would also like to add that the strong Saudi positions in confronting the Iranian threats and the incidents of vandalism during the pilgrimage ceremonies were clear messages to Iran, calling its attention to the need to live in peace with its neighbors in the region.

[Question] President Husni Mubarak has stated that the Gulf countries' security is linked to Egyptian national security. To what extent has this stand had its effect in deterring designs which have the Gulf countries' security as their target?

[Answer] We consider that everything that threatens the stability of the countries of the Gulf region is a direct threat to Egypt, which is considered an important strategic element in the region because of its international

weight, its human and military resources, and its location in the middle, as well as its nature as a country with an ancient civilization from which it derives the necessary elements for supporting its vital role, imposing its presence on the balance of power in the region.

King Fahd's Visit

[Question] On the occasion of King Fahd's upcoming visit to Egypt, what is your view regarding the areas of bilateral cooperation between Cairo and Riyadh? Where is the course of bilateral relations headed? What future scope is there for the two countries to be able to contribute to the stability of conditions in the region?

[Answer] When we talk about the relationship between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, we are talking about two countries which have an ability to exert influence and an effectiveness that transcends their borders and together lay strong foundations for Arab solidarity. With the anticipated visit of His Majesty King Fahd, which enters into the framework of mutual visits between the political leaders in the two countries, Egyptian-Saudi relations will return to the peak of their prosperity, and a new stage will begin in relations which will have its positive reflections on the Arab stage.

[Question] How is it possible to improve the Arab image in America?

[Answer] It is fair for us to say that the Arabs have credibility vis-a-vis the American people but American society is buffeted by various forces and tendencies, and there are other influential forces. However, the scope is there for us to move and influence American public opinion. The important thing is for us to act with awareness and confidently and not to hesitate to address American public opinion. [passage omitted]

[Question] What is proposed at present regarding a [Palestinan] temporary government and independent nation—is there anything that has been agreed upon, if only in principle?

[Answer] It is a matter for the Palestinian brothers. We told them that during the consultations we held with our brother Abu Mazin when we received him at the head of a Palestinian delegation on 15 and 17 August 1988. Our confidence in the Palestinian leaders is total in terms of their political, technical, and legal capability, and we believe that they are able to formulate their coming step without foreign influence. As I have mentioned on numerous occasions, we will accept everything the Palestinian consensus arrives at and Egypt will remain in its position of support for the Palestine cause.

The important thing now is agreement and unity of ranks among Palestinian leaders and the insistence on emerging from the dilemma of party games and foreign influence which undoubtedly weakens the rigidity of the Palestinian leadership and supports the view of the enemies of peace inside and outside the region.

[Question] Jordan's latest decision—has that brought Egyptian-Palestinian relations closer together and made them warmer? What have been the results of the talks of the Palestinian delegation in Cairo? What have been the results of King Husayn's talks in Cairo? What can Egypt offer the Palestinians at this important, decisive stage in the development of the Palestine cause?

[Answer] Egyptian-Palestinian relations go beyond the context of ordinary relations which are subject to rapprochement or alienation. The Palestine cause is the focus of Egyptian political concerns and it heads President Muhammad Husni Mubarak's concerns. It takes up the major part of his excellency's contacts with the world's leaders and heads. The Palestinian brothers will always find full support and backing from Egypt. It was natural, after King Husayn's decision, that a Palestinian delegation should carry out consultations in Amman and after that come to Cairo to present the Palestinian viewpoint and obtain the necessary advice and opinion.

As for the results of the Palestinian delegation in Cairo, these were embodied in clear directives from President Husni Mubarak that the Egyptian Foreign Ministry was to offer all the technical and legal aid required to the Palestinian leadership in the coming stage. We also stated to them the need to set out a political program with clear objectives which would include orientations compatible with reality in the desire to obtain world support which would bring the Palestine cause into the main framework of the attention of the various influential parties which are able to settle the issue in a manner which will guarantee that the Palestinian people acquire their legitimate rights.

[Question] What does the improvement which has occurred in Egyptian-Soviet relations mean? What is the Soviet Union's role in finding a solution to the Middle East problem?

[Answer] Egyptian-Soviet relations are advanced and they are going through constant improvement in various areas. The era which dictated that good relations with either of the two great powers would be at the expense of the other one has ended. Egypt supports a positive, active Soviet role as far as the Middle East problem is concerned, through the international conference, and the Soviet Union, as a major power, has its interests and concerns in the area. As Moscow and Washington have reached some bases with respect to the solution of some regional problems, we believe that it is necessary that they act together in cooperation with the secretary general of the United Nations and the parties concerned to realize the first step toward the solution, which is the holding of the international conference for peace in the Middle East.

Abu Ghazalah Calls for Establishing Arab Armed Force

45040036c Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 15 Oct 88 p 8

[Text] Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense and Military Production Field Marshal 'Abd-al-Halim Abu Ghazalah has attended a defense maneuver with live ammunition in the heart of the Sinai. This was the second maneuver since the Sinai was restored; the first was held last year. At the end of the maneuver, Field Marshal Abu Ghazalah said that Egypt "is seeking peace backed by strength and not by capitulation." He added, "The training of our forces has reached the highest levels, and the state does not stint in providing the armed forces with the most up-to-date weapons that can be obtained from foreign countries or from Egyptian production." After attending the maneuver held by one of the second field army units, Marshal Abu Ghazalah said: "This year we will begin introducing new improvements on the eastern T-52 tank in our tank corps units. Its power will be greatly boosted with the addition of fire control and electro-optical devices. This would enable it to hit the target the first time and to deal with several targets simultaneously in record time."

Marshal Abu Ghazalah said that the training of the Egyptian armed forces in various battles and on different combat methods has reached the highest level. Praising the maneuver, he said: "The performance and the development of battle you have seen underscores the significance of combined forces operations. The participation of all the branches in the maneuver has shown the extent of the forces' absorption of weapons and their ability to make the right decision at the right time."

The maneuver for the first time included an air battle in which the U.S.-made F-16s and Chinese-made F-9s took part. It was decided to extend the arms exhibition currently underway for one more week.

On this occasion, Marshal Abu Ghazalah called for "the establishment of an advanced Arab armed force capable of responding to aggression, because without the existence of such force there will be no existence for the Arabs now or in the future." He stressed that all the elements for the establishment of such force and for the achievement of self-sufficiency in arms and military hardware are available.

AL-AKHBAR on Israeli Plan To 'Extinguish' Uprising

JN111N226 Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 9 Nov 88 p 5

[Editorial: "The New Plans That Preoccupy Shamir"]

[Text] While there is an ongoing talk about the need to prepare for convening an international conference to settle the Middle East disputes to reach a durable peace in the region, the Israeli leaders under Likud leader Shamir are engaged in another kind of activity absolutely irrelevant to peace or to efforts that can be exerted for its sake.

The major concern and greatest preoccupation of Shamir in his attempts to head a new government that is more extremist than the previous one is to honor his electoral pledges made to the extremists and fanatics who gave him their votes. In these pledges, Shamir promised to use all legitimate and illegitimate means to extinguish the Palestinian uprising which has made the Israelis sleepless and pressured their nerves for the past year. To achieve this objective, a wide-scale plan is being prepared. This plan is not only aimed at suppressing the uprising, but at displacing hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees after destroying their camps and at fragmenting their groups and families through distributing their members over new, scattered areas. This method is unprecedented except under the Stalin rule and at some stages of the Nazi rule.

The Tel Aviv rulers are mistaken in believing that their government's strange methods of tightening the grip on the Palestinian land, such as isolating it from the world, turning it into a large prison, setting up secret squads to assassinate PLO leaders, and resorting to terrorist operations in which Shamir, Rabin, and Begin specialized in the forties will succeed in halting the wheel of time or silencing the 1-year-old voice demanding an end to the tyrannical occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. The Israeli rulers are under a big illusion which will not last for long.

The mask of democracy and civilization which has concealed Israel's face for a long time has dropped to reveal an ugly picture of a government which prefers the methods of Mafia gangs to the methods of civilized governments.

Paper Urges U.S. To Recognize Peace Opportunity

PM2211160688 London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 20 Nov 88 p 9

[Ahmad Baha' al-Din article: "Now, Immediately"]

[Text] There was a time when the Arab states used to meet and say "we will determine our attitude towards any state in the light of that state's position on the Palestinian question." Those were the days when the Arab Nationalist Movement was at its peak, when oil was a rare commodity ruling the world, and when the Arab regimes had an acceptable degree of agreement and ability to take unified stands when it mattered.

Can we say that that is the case now, or that there is something similar?

The United States has triumphed and now controls the fate of the entire Arab world. In one way or another we have placed all the cards in U.S. hands, maintaining that it would return our love and sympathy and would change its policy of complete alignment with Israel and Israeli proposals.

I repeat here that the PNC message was addressed to the United States before Israel, because every Arab knows that the weight of what Shamir says depends on the extent of U.S. support for him.

The United States believes that as long as the Arab states are in disagreement and even conflict, and as long as Israel is stronger than all its neighbors put together, there is no cause for concern and Israel can stay where it is.

We, however, believe that this is the last real opportunity for peace and that the alternative is a thousand years of war. The Arab states must draw U.S. attention to this in every possible way and they must use all their resources, however limited, to convince the United States, principally, and also the West and the entire world of this fact.

There is a clear crossroads now: Either acceptance of a Palestinian state coexisting with its neighbors, including Israel, or pursuit of a policy of solid support for Israel to keep it where it is now, which would subsequently mean displacement, that is, a policy of driving the Arabs into the desert.

The Arab states must make the United States understand that nobody is under any illusions and that the palliatives, such as sending Murphy on visits to the Arab states or "censuring" Israel for its "cruelty" in occupation, have become nothing but a thin veil of deception that no longer conceals anything.

This must be done now, immediately, without delay.

Cabinet Meets, Reviews Economic situation NC1411135788 Cairo Domestic Service in Arabic 1230 GMT 14 Nov 88

[Excerpt] The cabinet met today under Prime Minister Dr 'Atif Sidqi. It discussed the economic situation on the basis of a detailed report on the foreign currency situation since the establishment of the free money market. It also discussed the general financial position.

This was stated by Information Minister Safwat al-Sharif, who said that the cabinet made a number of decisions to increase the inflow of foreign currency, improve the efficiency of the banking sector, organize the foreign financing of development plans, and arrange the necessary resources from the free money market for the public and private sectors for the import of food commodities and production equipment.

The information mihnister added that, in his report on the development of the free money market, the economy minister stressed the success of this market in obtaining funds to finance imports. The money obtained came to \$4.7 billion in 18 months, he said. The average amount of foreign currency flowing into the banks for exchange daily against Egyptian pounds has also increased, reaching \$9 million on 9 November. The report added that a larger share of money for financing imports went to the private sector than to the public sector. The private sector's share of the increase was \$864 million more than that of the public sector. The report said that there have been improvements in the financing of imports of production equipment, spare parts, commodities, and basic foodstuffs.

Regarding the foreign currency balance, the report said that during the first 3 months of the current financial year, the overall credits available for the government and the public sector for the import of basic materials for the production and foodstuff sectors reached \$1.51 billion.

The report also reviewed the possible shortage in the Egyptian Central Bank's foreign reserves. There are several reasons for this, the most important of which are the drop in oil prices and the increase in price of grains and other foodstuffs. [passage omitted]

Studies for Soviet Aid to Naj' Hammadi Completed

45000033b Cairo EGYPTIAN GAZETTE in English 19 Oct 88 p 2

[Text] The Chairman of the Metallurgical Industries Authority, Mr Adil al-Danaf, yesterday stated that industrial and economic studies were finalised in cooperation with the Soviet Union with the aim of extending Soviet technical as well as financial aid to develop the melting cells in the Naj' Hammadi aluminium blast furnaces to increase the plant's productivity to 200,000 tons annually as of next year.

Mr al-Danaf further stated that the value of production increase, using the same amount of electricity, is estimated at LE 160 million according to international prices.

Meanwhile, an Egyptian industrial delegation is due in Moscow next November led by the Chairman of the Misr Company for Aluminium, Mr Sulayman Rida, to discuss with Soviet officials procedures to carry out the project. The delegation will comprise a number of Cairo University professors.

It is worth mentioning that the value of Egyptian aluminium exports to different international markets amounts to more than half a billion Egyptian pounds.

Meanwhile, Egypt will participate in an international conference on aluminium industry to be held in the Venezuelan capital of Caracas from 29 October to 3 November.

The Chairman of the trade sector at the Misr Company for Aluminium, Mr Jalal Lutfi, stated that the Egyptian delegation will submit a number of research papers on the Egyptian expertise in that field and national plans to increase production.

Fifty NDP Members Resign Over Election Practices

45000036 Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 2 Oct 88 p 5

[Text] More than 50 members of the NDP in al-Minufiyah have submitted a collective resignation protesting the NDP's crooked practices and methods in nominations for the local elections.

In their resignation, the members mentioned that the party's nominating methods show favoritism and cliquishness, without considering the candidates' political popularity and without regard for party principles.

It is worth mentioning that the NDP has nominated three members from the village of Sharanis in Quwaysina District. These three are Ahmad Shahin al-Dirbali and his two nephews.

Egypt's Revolution Organization Members Interviewed

JN16N1922 [Editorial Report] Kuwait AL-ANBA' in Arabic on 13 November carries on page 23 an approximately 4,000-word "dialogue" with three members of the Egypt Revolution Organization currently on trial for attacks against Israeli and U.S. targets in Egypt.

Shaykh Hamid Ibrahim, the 10th defendant in the organization, who faces charges of training the organization's members, is quoted as saying: "I hope we all will be freed from prison because we neither committed a crime nor did something wrong against our country. On the contrary, we carried out a duty dictated by our national and religious conscience." He then says: "I did not participate in any of the operations claimed by the organization." He says that he was tortured during interrogation and in prison.

Lieutenant Colonel Ahmad 'Ali, another defendant, says he is happy and proud because he is charged with a national case. He says: "I am a professional military man and took part in the October war." He then describes the war and how his colleagues were killed in front of him. He says: "The Israelis are the enemies of the homeland and God. And the peace agreement cannot annul texts in the Koran saying that they are bitter enemies of religion."

Ahmad 'Isam al-Din Sulayman, the third defendant, reported the organization. Asked if he regrets reporting the organization and contacting the U.S. Embassy, Ahmad 'Isam al-Din says: "Who said this? I said nothing in the interrogation about any contact with any foreign embassy. I do not know how you got this. I heard this in prison and asked the prison administration to transfer me to the prosecutor to make a new statement. I categorically denied in front of the prosecutor any contact with the U.S. Embassy to report the organization."

He then explains why he reported the organization to the Egyptian authorities. He says: "The organization began to destroy its sons. Mahmud Nur al-Din shot me to get rid of me. He also wanted to kill Sami Fishah." Asked why he did not agree on killing the Americans, he says: "I saw in this a serious change in the objectives for which the organization was established—that is, the killing of the Israelis, not any Israeli but Mosad members only. Although it is easy to kill civilian Israelis, this was not in our plan. When the organization turns to killing Americans in accordance with Mahmud's opinion, I rejected this and did not take part in it." Asked about reports that he had a relationship with two girls who work for American intelligence in Egypt, he says: "You must not say this. Those girls are helpless and know nothing about America and American intelligence." He admits that he was a drug addict and denies that Khalid 'Abd-al-Nasir knew about this.

Muslim Brotherhood Leader Sa'd Lashin Arrested 45000047 Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 1 Nov 88 p 1

[Article by Muhammad 'Abd-al-Qaddus and Rabi' Shahin]

[Text] The continuous campaign of arrests has been extended to the Muslim Brotherhood society. National security investigators arrested Sa'd Lashin, one of the Brotherhood's most prominent leaders, in the governorate of al-Sharqiyah after a big conference which was held in the city of Abu Kabir several days ago. It was attended by the leadership of the Islamic alliance, chaired by Ibrahim Shukri and Ma'mun al-Hudaybi, and organized by Sa'd Lashin.

New Law Uncovers 96 Smaller Investment Companies

45040036b Cairo UKTUBAR in Arabic 9 Oct 88 p 10

[Text] The enforcement of the new law on investment companies has uncovered the existence so far of 96 companies engaged in investing citizens' money. This is apart from the well-known big companies whose advertisements were almost their only business.

A large number of companies have been operating secretly with a capital ranging from 1 to 20 million pounds. These companies are preparing their documents for submission in order to readjust their position in accordance with the law.

Economy Minister on Assistance for Al-Rayyan Depositors

NC-1811115588 Cairo MENA in Arabic 0730 GMT 18 Nov 88

[Excerpt] Cairo, 18 Nov (MENA)—Dr Yusri Mustafa, minister of economy and foreign trade, has emphasized that the state will not allow depositors' funds in the Al-Rayyan investment company to be squandered. He added that nontraditional measures will be adopted by the Interior Ministry and official departments to ensure that funds that have been smuggled abroad will be returned.

In a statement to AL-AHRAM newspaper today, the economy minister noted that the cabinet has not decided yet whether the government, banks, or insurance companies will purchase the company's assets in order to return the funds to the depositors. Dr Mustafa pointed out that he has presented a number of ideas to the cabinet for study. The depositors will be informed when agreement has been reached on one of these ideas. These ideas include, among others, the issuance of bonds to the depositors to the value of their deposits, so that they may reclaim their deposits in full.

Dr Yusri Mustafa affirmed that the government is not against investment companies, nor will it interfere in their work. However, the government will control these companies because they operate with depositors' money and not with their own. Therefore, these companies should be placed under a special kind of control. He added that law-abiding companies will receive every kind of assistance and support. He disclosed that 200 law-abiding companies for Arab and foreign investment are operating successfully and are receiving the government's support. [passage omitted]

Electricity and Energy Minister Discusses Future Projects

45040030 London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 14 Oct 88 pp 48-49

[Interview with Minister of Energy and Electricity Engineer Mahir Abazah by Amir al-Zahhar in Cairo, date not given]

[Text] Will the Arabs achieve the first unified project linking the various parts of their Arab nation in the modern age? Can the cables of the joint electric power network transcend political differences among the Arab countries? Steps and contacts currently under way augur the near realization of this dream within a few years. But what about energy and electricity in Egypt? What problems have been brought on by lower Nile water supplies during the past 9 years? And has the High Dam fulfilled its futuristic purpose, and why has the nuclear plant program in Egypt come to a halt?

Finally, what plans do Egyptian officials have for the future of electricity and energy in an era in which Israel and several developing countries have entered the nuclear age and the satellite-launching stage?

AL-HAWADITH took these questions to Minister of Energy and Electricity Eng Mahir Abazah; this resulted in the following interview:

[Question] We have heard about a joint project to link the electric power network in Egypt both to the one in Jordan and to the unified European system. What are the details of this project?

[Answer] The first part of this project is between Egypt and Jordan and has been tentatively approved by the joint committee chaired by the prime ministers of the two countries. The final step for its implementation will be taken during the committee's next meeting to be held in Cairo in December. This project calls for linking the two Egyptian and Jordanian electric power networks, and efforts are now under way to explore sources of financing which, so far, include a grant from the Arab Development Fund and another from the French Government. The project will be carried out by experts from both countries with the assistance of a French consulting firm.

The second step will take place in the context of an agreement between Jordan and Turkey whereby the Jordanian network will be linked to the Turkish network which is tied to the unified European one from Moscow in the east, to London in the west, and from Spain in the south to Stockholm in the north. We in Egypt and the Arab countries as well are making every effort to ensure that our networks are not kept as "isolated islands," and to take advantage of scientific advances in this field and joint economic and technical benefits.

[Question] What about linking the Egyptian network to networks in the Arab countries?

[Answer] In addition to the Egyptian-Jordanian contacts, there are numerous other contacts being made between Arab countries, and European countries as well. Jordan and Syria are talking about fully integrating their networks, and work in this regard is actually under way. Other contacts are taking place between the Syrian and Turkish Governments aimed at linking their two networks. When the Turkish prime minister, Turgot Ozal, visited Egypt early this year, he discussed electric power linkage between the two countries. It was agreed to hold a joint meeting between Turkey, Jordan, Syria, and Saudi Arabia to discuss the idea of integrating their electric power networks, whereupon the first phase of the project to link a large part of the Arab nation, Turkey, and Europe would be achieved.

On the other hand, Iraq and GCC countries are studying the possibility of integrating their networks on one side and linking the Iraqi network to the Turkish one on the other side. Other studies are being conducted in the west to link Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia, thereafter joining the Egyptian network to the Arab Maghreb one, which has actually been joined together by an integrated system. Morocco and Spain are discussing the idea of connecting with the European network at its southwestern end. When all these contacts are achieved, the Arab network will be almost integrated and connected to the unified European network at several crucial points.

The last official contact with Egypt in this regard was made by Kuwait which, at the invitation of Mr 'Abd-al-Latif, a few days ago dispatched an official to Egypt to hold talks and attend meetings the Arab representatives were holding to discuss the idea of electric power integration.

[Question] To go back to the local network, what is the fate of the Egyptian nuclear power plant project which was put on hold following the Chernobyl incident?

[Answer] As is done throughout the world, we get our electric power from conventional sources, be they hydraulic energy or thermal energy in all its various forms, including oil, the sun, natural gas, and coal. The third source is nuclear energy. We had actually prepared studies and made contacts with a view to building nuclear power plants, but the Chernobyl incident in April 1986 compelled Egypt, as a country with capabilities and a small research reactor in Inshas, to reexamine this source in an effort to make sure that all safety measures are considered before endeavors in this field are expanded. The Chernobyl incident has been a frightening experience with all kinds of harmful ramifications. Although the Chernobyl reactor was a special model different from the Western system the United States, Germany and France have suggested for Egypt, it was necessary to wait anyway, because safety studies are a requirement for all types of nuclear reactors, so that the Egyptian Government could ascertain that Chernobyl had not affected nuclear programs in other world countries.

At the same time, however, we are putting the finishing touches on a study concerning a 1,000 megawatt pressurized water reactor which is different from the graphite reactor at Chernobyl. This kind is widely used in western countries and its margin of safety is high. Should the government determine that the project poses no hazard, there will be no objection to taking advantage of nucelar energy as is done throughout the world.

[Question] In the last 9 years, the Nile River has experienced a severe drop in its water level, and this drop has had a great impact on agriculture, electric power production, and fluvial navigation. What is the real situation concerning electric power and energy during those lean years?

[Answer] First of all, we thank God that during the last few months the innundation of the Nile has improved a great deal, reaching the 165-meter level which is considered above average, and is expected to rise higher during the current month of October. Compare that to the last July level of only 150 meters, and the magnitude of the

problem we would have had to face in terms of electric power generated by the High Dam become evident, considering that the turbines turn off automatically when the level drops below 147 meters. This drop deprived us of part of the dam's electric power supply estimated at 40 billion kilowatts. With the rise of the water level, however, these turbines have gradually gone back to full production.

[Question] What role did the High Dam play at the time?

[Answer] Basically, the High Dam saved Egypt from the drought. Were it not for the dam's water supply, we would not have been able to secure enough water in the last 9 years for our arable land. The same water supply allowed navigation in the Nile to continue and tourism and electric power production to be maintained. It also guarded against the water level dropping to a point where the turbines would turn off automatically. Notwithstanding the disagreement over Egypt's current dependence on the High Dam electric supply compared to what it used to be, up until 1975, 75 percent of the electric power supply was produced from hydraulic energy and the rest was secured from thermal energy. Today, the situation has been reversed; 72 percent of our electric power supply is produced from thermal energy while 28 percent is from hydraulic energy. This rate is expected to drop to only 10 percent by the year 2000. Note that six of the High Dam turbines have been refurbished and the other six will be replaced in the next 3 years by a grant from the United States. The turbines had suffered cracks and their life expectancy had run out. Naturally we cannot forget the help of the Soviet Union in building the High Dam at an extremely low cost.

[Question] If the High Dam's contribution to electric power production has fallen back to less than 30 percent, what other electric power sources do we have?

[Answer] At the beginning of the first 5-year plan, electric power reduction from various sources, be they the integrated central network or various outlying plants such as the Sinai, Red Sea, Marsa Matruh, and other stations, amounted to about 18 billion kilowatts. As of the end of the first 5-year plan in 1986-87, the amount of electric power that could be produced in Egypt rose to 45 billion kilowatts, an increase of 250 percent in only 6 years.

Of course, we do not use all the available energy except when a shortage occurs, as happened when the Nile water level dropped. In such cases, the difference is made up from thermal plants.

Some examples of thermal power plants that were added during the first 5-year plan are the Abu Qir 600-megawatt plant in Alexandria, the Shubra al-Khaymah 1000-megawatt plant, the al-Mahmudiyah 440-megawatt plant, and other plants in Damietta, Isma'iliah, Suez, and Talkha, etc.

[Question] What are the future plans for securing Egypt's electric power needs for both industrial and residential use?

[Answer] The future of power in Egypt is taking first priority. Beside the first 5-year plan (1982-87) which added about 4,200 megawatts to Egypt's electric power supply, the second 5-year plan ending in 1992 is expected to add another 5,500 megawatts.

Preparations for the third 5-year plan are already under way, and we are thinking of using coal in four major electric power plants planned for construction in al-Za'faranah in the Red Sea, 'Uyun Musa in Sinai, al-Kuraymat on the Nile, and Sidi Karir in Alexandria. These plants will operate on natural gas first, and coal when the natural gas supply runs out.

[Question] Is there a specific map or a distribution chart used in setting up electric power plants?

[Answer] The plant distribution chart is drawn up on the basis of available sources of energy, be they water, thermal energy, oil, gas, solar energy, or others. In addition, allowances are certainly made for industrial needs and residential consumption.

[Question] Egypt is known for certain phenomena such as weddings and funerals that consume excessive amounts of electricity. Do you plan to deal with these negative phenomena in the future?

[Answer] These phenomena I call "conspicuous consumption," and I add to them residential consumption by households that use air conditioners, electric heaters, washers, huge refrigerators, and video machines, not to mention the 9 million TV sets in use in Egypt. All this contributes to higher residential consumption. We certainly hope that the electric power supply will be used primarily for production as is done in any devloping or advanced country. We do sense, however, a new positive trend and a popular response to President Mubarak's speech on Labor Day and to the government's appeal for rationing when it expected a drop in the High Dam water level. In fact, consumption has dropped by 2 percent in 6 months, from 11.5 to only 9.5 percent.

[Question] There is a complaint about the high cost of electricity. Have prices actually been raised?

[Answer] We have undoubtedly raised the price of electricity to a certain extent, but not for all segments of consumption. Limited income people are given special treatment so as not to add to their financial burdens. Those who consume 100 kilowatts pay an extremely low price of 1.8 piasters per kilowatt. To illustrate the amount of subsidy low income people receive, I simply say that in Jordan, where different rates do not exist, people pay 30 piasters per kilowatt of electricity, while this segment in Egypt, representing the great majority of consumers, pays subsidized rates. Consumption above

this level is subject to a progressive rate and the subsidy is maintained up to 500 kilowatt hours. The only people paying high prices for electricity are those who consume between 1000 and 5000 kilowatt hours, the very small high-income groups that barely comprise one percent of the population.

[Question] Another complaint concerns meter readers who are accused of putting down inflated estimates without actually reading the meters.

[Answer] Of course, all employees cannot be angels or perfect. However, we are in the process of dealing with such negatives in several ways:

First, to get around the problem of not finding the consumer at home when the meter reader gets there, we are now using special meters that are installed inside the residence with the panel showing on the outside.

Second, we have sent a team to the United States to train in the use of an electronic meter reader which can read the meter from an electric cable outside the residence. Readings are fed into a computer which accurately records the amounts consumed, showing the number zero if no electric power was used and so forth. These modern methods will be put into operation gradually until no more complaints are received.

Palestinian Journalist Arrested in Cairo Airport 45000046 Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 1 Nov 88 p 1

[Text] On Tuesday evening, security forces in Cairo airport arrested Palestinian journalist Mahmud Khazzam, editor in chief of the newspaper AL-NASHRAH, which is published in Athens and specializes in the role of the Arab opposition. Security authorities refused to let him enter the country despite the entry of several Palestinian officials into Cairo. He was thrown into a holding cell for several days before being deported to Athens.

The editor in chief of AL-NASHRAH was coming to Cairo to meet with some of his friends and conduct a number of press interviews.

Ministry of Agriculture Seeks Increased Fertilizer Production

45000032 Cairo EGYPTIAN GAZETTE in Arabic 20 Oct 88 p 3

[Text] One of the most important agricultural achievements in President Mubarak's era is self sufficiency of phosphate fertilisers which were previously imported until the early eighties, stated yesterday the deputy premier and minister of agriculture and land reclamation, Dr Yusuf Wali.

Addressing the inaugural ceremony of the first conference of Arab fertiliser companies that is being held at the headquarters of the Ministry of Agriculture and Land

Reclamation, Dr Wali stated that the total consumption of nitrogenous and phosphate fertiliser is estimated at 5 million and 1 million tonnes yearly, respectively, noting that fertiliser production will be increased to meet the demands of agricultural plans.

Dr Wali further called upon researchers to continue their attempt to raise the production of Arab fertiliser factories in order to achieve self sufficiency, noting that production of slow-soluble fertiliser and experiments using ammonia to fertilise soil are fruitful.

The minister, moreover, pointed out that there is joint research work with the Ministry of Industry to raise the quantities of nitrogen in soil through growing green algae.

The minister of industry, Mr Muhammad 'Abd-al-Wahhab, stated that a giant project to double the capacity of Abu-Qir and Suez fertiliser plants will be carried out during the current 5-year development plan, and that expansion operations will be implemented at the Abu-Za'bal phosphate fertiliser plant whose phosphate mines' capacity will be increased.

He further stressed the importance of manufacturing the required equipment of fertiliser plants locally, noting that there is a giant factory in Hawamidyah to produce such equipment. He added that the current development plan allocates 50 percent of the total investments to creating modern technology.

New Fodder Company Uses Modern Techniques 45040036a Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic 7 Oct 88 p 57

[Article by 'Ali Shaltut]

[Text] Prime Minister Dr 'Atif Sidqi, Minister of Supply Dr Jalal Abu al-Dahab, and some other ministers inaugurated the Rashid Fodder Factory. They were received by Engineer Hasan Shabanah, chairman of the public sector for rice-hulling and marketing; Eng Muhammad Sharif al-Harawi, chairman of the board of the Rashid Rice-Hulling Company; Fawzi Yusuf al-Jundi, head of the administrative sector; Fathi 'Abd-al-Baqi al-Quray'i, head of the financial sector; Ibrahim Mustafa al-Qashish, head of the commercial sector; and Muhammad Khalifah, head of the technical production sector.

The Rashid Rice-Hulling Company, which built this plant, is considered a pioneer in the field of food production. It produces 12.5 percent of the white rice produced nationally.

The Rashid Fodder Factory, which was built for 24 million pounds with a capacity for producing 150,000 tons annually, will cover the fodder shortage from which we are suffering. Because of the acute shortage in animal fodder, it was necessary to conduct a thorough study with a view to covering the present shortage and meeting the country's need for fodder in the future. The public

sector authority for rice-hulling and marketing has therefore started building a number of factories for the production of nonconventional fodder in order to meet the country's needs and support future plans.

The Rashid factory produces fodder which among other things is composed of by-products left from the ricehulling process, thereby realizing a national goal, namely to make full use of by-products.

The factory also produces crude fodder utilizing leftovers such as rice straw, corn stalks, and hay. This would enable these leftovers to be turned into important economic revenue which in the final analysis benefits the national economy. In its processes, the factory uses advanced technological methods. In order to insure correct mixture of materials, the factory uses electronic and computer systems, and production lines are observed through closed circuit television. The Rashid Rice-Hulling Company is currently building a factory for the production of good quality macaroni using semolina. It will also produce artificial rice and pasta for diabetics as well as baby food. The factory is automated in all its production stages, which would enable it to match the highest quality macaroni products which would open new export markets.

The company employees, who work diligently, pledge to the Egyptian people and President Muhammad Husni Mubarak to boost production and to support our national economy.

Ministry of Awqaf To Publish Guide Books for

45000033a Cairo EGYPTIAN GAZETTE in English 2 Oct 88 p 2

[Text] The Ministry of Awqaf has worked out a plan to help imams of mosques develop their thought and tackle new topics in an updated manner at the Friday sermon and daily lessons given in mosques. The plan involves the publication of guiding books, said the Minister of Awqaf, Dr Muhammad 'Ali Mahjug, at a meeting with youth of the National Camp in Ra's al-Bar.

He pointed out that a hospital for the ministry's employees and the ulema and their families is to be established, as President Mubarak has approved to finance it with LE 12 million.

He added that more dialogue will be maintained the weeks ahead between the ulema and young people to acquaint them with the genuine teachings of Islam.

Mr Mahjub explained that the state has not and will never close down any one single mosque.

Replying to a question about the currently enforced laws, the minister said that the opinions of the ulema concerning the amendment of some laws to cope with Islamic Shari'ah have been referred to the committees concerned.

Tourism Ministry Recommends Limiting Tourist Agency Licences

[Editorial Report] Cairo UKTUBAR in Arabic on 2 October 1988 carries a three-part report on page 55. The first part discusses the status and problems of tourist agencies and the extent of their contribution to the Egyptian economy. The figures, presumably from 1987, were prepared by the General Administration for Tourist Companies at the Ministry of Tourism, and the results were summarized by the Egyptian Federation of Chambers of Tourism. These results indicate that, from among 589 agencies, 482 are for general tourism, 50 for ticket purchasing, and 57 for tourist transportation.

Of the 482 general tourism agencies, only 62 achieved a volume of services of more than one million pounds in dealing with tourists from abroad. These agencies contributed 230 million pounds to the Egyptian economy.

Among the rest of the agencies, 198 earned 43 million pounds, and 222 agencies did not show any income at all.

Based on these figures, the report recommends limiting the issuance of new licences unless the agency can perform a unique activity that contributes positively to the Egyptian market. It notes that the Ministry is presently facilitating the establishment of tourist transportation agencies because the market needs their services. The report also says that it would be a good idea for the Administration to suggest holding a meeting between the minister of tourism and the heads of the successful agencies as a show of appreciation. It calls for another meeting with the unsuccessful ones to encite them to work harder and to warn them that, otherwise, they will be subject to the 1983 law dealing with this subject.

The second part of this report deals with analysis and a potential solution. It says that these figures mean first, that the number of general tourism agencies is on the increase, from 159 agencies in 1980 to 482 in 1987, and second, that a tourist agency is considered to be economically profitable work which depends on quality instead of quantity. Therefore, ten large, successful agencies are better than a thousand unsuccessful ones. It also says that most of the 222 ineffective agencies are operated by brokers who get their clients wherever they can find them, usually during religious pilgrimages, and then pass them on to the large agencies. The solution is said to be in sifting through, evaluating and classifying the existing agencies to separate the serious ones which contribute to the economy and are run by specialists in the field from the ones that have no income and are essentially run b y incompetent individuals.

The third part lists the figures on the agencies which made more than a million pounds. They are: Egypt

Tourism, 21.4 million pounds; Isis Tourism, 14.3 million pounds; Najjar Tourism, 12.2 million pounds; Spring Tours, 11 million pounds; Trafco, 10.4 million pounds; Mamnun, 9.7 million pounds; Abercrombie-Endicott, 7.5 million; Eastmar, 7.2 million; City First, 7.1 million pounds; and First Cairo, 6.5 million.

Extremist Students' Try To Stop University Celebration

45000044 Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 26 Oct 88 p 1

[Text] Day before yesterday, a group of students tried to prevent the holding of the Cairo University faculty of commerce's annual celebration to receive new students. From morning until 6 pm on the day of the celebration, 300 students occupied the stage that the faculty had prepared for the celebration. The faculty sought help from the university guards and the extremist students were forced to withdraw. The celebration took place that evening.

Asyut Students Protest Attack on Teacher 45000045 Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 28 Oct 88 p 1

[Text] Nearly 500 University of Asyut students gathered inside the University campus chanting slogans to protest a fight between one of the university security officers and a teacher in the University's faculty of engineering.

Major General 'Ali al-Banna, assistant interior minister and director of security in Asyut, ordered that there be no interference with the students as long as they remained inside the university campus. The demonstration broke up after several hours.

After its meeting yesterday chaired by the University's president, Dr 'Abd-al-Razzaq Hasan, the University of Asyut's council of deans issued a statement condemning the attack on Dr Kamil Jabir, a teacher in the faculty of engineering, by one of the security officers. The statement demanded an investigation of the officer, who was unknown to the teacher he attacked. The council implored faculty members not to go on strike tomorrow.

Columnist Views Egyptian Judicial System JN16N1846 Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 13 Nov 88 p 5

["A Word of Love" column by Muhammad al-Hayawan]

[Text] All of us wish to shut and then open our eyes to find that all the Jews of the world have died, been killed, or eliminated from the face of the earth by any means. They have been the root of evil throughout history everywhere, the enemies of religions and murderers of prophets, the callers for fanaticism and vileness. They hate non-Jews to the extent that they could murder them.

They are the enemies of the non-Jewish person everywhere and at all times. They are hated by everyone who has dealt with them.

However, killing Jews on Egyptian soil is considered a crime—today, yesterday, and tomorrow. Yesterday, they were Egyptian citizens with the same rights, duties, and protection, even if they demanded what was not theirs, refused to do their duty, and threatened the freedom of people as they did in 1954 in their famous explosions in Cairo and Alexandria. The deciding factor here is the law, which does not distinguish between an Egyptian and others.

After the peace treaty, their situation changed. They became tourists. Their presence in Egypt is based on diplomatic grounds. They have the right to the same protection as any other tourist. The Egyptian Ministry of Interior must protect every soul on Egyptian soil, even if we reject them and refuse to deal with them. Egyptian security is responsible for protecting Egyptians and foreigners on Egyptian soil. Attacking foreigners disrupts Egyptian security, and this cannot be justified by any excuse.

Although we all refuse to deal with the Jews, killing a Jew, however, is considered a crime in accordance with Egyptian law, which applies on Egyptian territories. And even though some of us reject the peace treaty, as some of the Jews in Israel also do, the peace treaty still holds according to the constitutional situation. We are implementing it even if we are against it. If we really despise the presence of Jews on Egyptian land, it is our right to demand that the Ministry of Interior decrease the number of visas given to them or to stop them totally. We are not benefitting from Israeli tourism. We are in fact losing. The majority of Jews are behind smuggling, drugs, counterfeit dollars, and other such crimes.

Because of all this, attempting to kill Jews in Egypt at present is a crime and not considered a heroic act. It disrupts Egyptian security and is not a purification of Egyptian territory. The crime cannot be changed into a political demonstration. Opening fire at some cannot possibly be a political act. The people denounce such an act, be it by the rightists, leftists, or Nasserites. Trying to present a crime as a political act is doomed to fail, even if those dead are Jews. There is a diffference between wishing death for all the Jews and to actually kill them on Egyptian territory.

Whoever is looking for heroism can find it in the occupied territories, in Palestine, Lebanon, and the Golan. The Arabs have built a statue of a Lebanese girl named Sana' Muhaydi, who killed Jews in southern Lebanon and blew herself up in the process. Resistence in occupied territories is legitimate behavior according to any law.

The sovereignty of Egyptian law on Egyptian territory empowers the Egyptian judiciary system to issue sentences. It also empowers Egyptian lawyers to file suits before the Egyptian courts. There is no nepotism in the law. There are no demonstrations in the arena of justice.

ISRAEL

IDF Chief Evaluates Army's Role in Uprising 44230008 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 23 Sep 88 pp 6-7

[Interview with IDF Chief of General Staff Dan Shomron by Yesha'yahu Ben Porat; place and date not given]

[Text] [Question] It has been 12 years since the celebrated Entebbe operation which you commanded. This was not only a perfect mission, it also apparently generated a certain spirit which swept through the IDF. Is this spirit still alive?

[Answer] It is certainly alive from the standpoint of initiative, strength, and originality. In the same period (after the Yom Kippur War), it was claimed that the Army had lost its originality and initiative. Operations are currently no less complex than the Entebbe operation, however they are not discussed.

[Question] If there were a need today for a second Entebbe operation, could the IDF take this upon itself?

[Answer] Certainly. With the resources currently at our disposal, I believe that an operation of this type would be better than the first one.

[Question] Following the Yom Kippur War, you were one of the initiators and a full participant in changing the structure of the Army in two areas—increasing mass, and establishing a Field Forces Command. The command was indeed established and is operating, but you subsequently became a well-known advocate of substituting mass with quality and sophistication.

[Answer] One of the problems of the Yom Kippur War was the integration of land forces. To a certain degree, armor was developed at the expense of other elements. Therefore, there arose a need for a Field Forces Command. As a parachute and main infantry commander, I firmly supported this development. However, commanders of other arms warned me: "What are you doing? This will clip your wings!" I am pleased to have had the opportunity to be the founder and first commander of the Field Forces Command. Today, I find it difficult to understand how the IDF could have functioned without this tool.

Otherwise, it would have been as if one were to divide the Air Force so that there would be a fighter aircraft chief officer, a combat helicopter chief officer, a transport aircraft chief officer, and so on. Imagine the General Staff facing this situation according to sectors without seeing the entire aerial arena.

[Question] Is the command currently functioning to your complete satisfaction?

[Answer] Its essentialness has been completely confirmed.

[Question] What about your demand for quality and sophistication as opposed to mass, which you yourself helped to develop after the Yom Kippur War?

[Answer] It is necessary to create some order regarding this matter. The problem is that, within a certain budgetary framework, you have to decide whether to maintain a large army, which would naturally be at a lower level, or a smaller, better trained army equipped with more sophisticated weapons. Usually, the two concepts must somehow be balanced. However, after the Yom Kippur War, we felt that we were depleted, and that we had to initially become stronger quantitatively within a short time, if only for the purpose of deterrence.

The amassing of forces in a short time means "more of the same," in other words, more than what is on the shelf. This is not the case in a process covering many years in which, instead of tanks and artillery, you can develop and become equipped with more efficient weapons. Therefore, former Chief of General Staff Motta Gur correctly asserted that the Army's mass must be increased. There was simply no alternative.

[Question] But when did the second phase involving the shift from quantity to quality begin?

[Answer] In my opinion, around 1978 at the beginning of the peace process with Egypt. At the time, I already thought that we had to take certain risks, and be more concerned about the future—not just readiness, which is an immediate concern, but also preparation for the future in order to develop a more efficient army with emphasis on quality. It is a pity that we actually began this task so much later.

[Question] Here is the unavoidable question: When you assumed the duties of chief of General Staff, you promised to shake up the IDF. Where is the shake-up, is it a victim of the Intifadah?

[Answer] If you presume that the result of a shake-up in a body as large as the IDF must be manifested by sections of soldiers ordered to turn right or left, then of course you do not see it. But if this shake-up is a change in direction, it exists even if you do not see it immediately. It has entailed, for example: Investment in combat resources, manpower, and training to create a more efficient and sophisticated army in the future; the shutdown of the "Lavi" project, which was a very difficult decision in which I had a significant role; and the Navy's order of forces, which requires difficult decisions regarding scope and the unequivocal selection of weapons to enable a change in orientation. We reduced commands, and regular personnel exactly as I said we would do. This is certainly a change in direction, and represents a

long-range view of the Army with emphasis on quality. The media views the shake-up as a slogan, and I will not argue with a slogan. In reality, the shake-up is very difficult on-going work.

[Question] Despite the Intifadah?

[Answer] It began before the Intifadah, and will certainly continue. The media creates the perception that the IDF is chained to the territories and does nothing outside of the Intifadah. This is a very serious mistake. You should know that service in Judea and Samaria and in Gaza involves no more than six to eight percent of the army depending on circumstances.

A shake-up is, in the nature of things, removed from the media. It involves the development of initiative and responsibility on the part of commanders from the lowest to the highest command level. This is the antithesis of the chessboard on which pawns are moved by someone from above. It is the junior commander who really knows the situation in the field during combat and comes face to face with reality.

As the chief of General Staff, you decide on directions, and you concentrate forces where it seems appropriate. But in combat, in the field, initiative must come from the lowest levels through comprehension of the mission and its objectives. I see our advantage over our enemies as being the fact that their operational system entails the downward issuance of orders without the activation of initiative along the way.

For example, we use the system of initiative in the field to fight terror in the North, in the security zone, and sometimes beyond it, against terrorists. Ask, and you will be told that a real revolution in the granting of initiative and responsibility to junior commanders was created in this sector. Yah-yah [not further identified] was a full participant in putting this system into operation as the commander of a group in the North. And this is a central component of the shake-up about which you asked. Since the war against terrorists was turned over to us, the North constitutes for us a school in which we instill the norms and values of command and combat.

[Question] Perhaps a humorous question: When the units or formations engage in training exercises, is the chief of General Staff also drilled?

[Answer] The question is not funny, and the answer is yes. Drilling the commands, including the chief of General Staff is a most important task. We train from the level of the General Staff downward.

[Question] Is it possible for the judges in exercises such as these to determine that the chief of General Staff erred?

[Answer] It certainly is possible. In contradistinction to other periods, there is an openness which exists in the Army today. Despite the very clear military hierarchy, I am attempting to assure maximum openness and self-examination together with unity of action. An order is of course an order following the decision of the commander. But openness and the chance to air opinions and criticisms are vital at all levels of command.

[Question] Have you gone too far regarding openness? Have you given major generals too much freedom to speak? Is your authority at the "top" being damaged?

[Answer] In the final analysis, every commander and major general must accept the decision of the chief of General Staff, and they do in fact accept it and carry it out.

[Question] Unequivocally?

[Answer] What are you implying? Drop this journalistic nonsense. You asked if this was unequivocal? My answer is yes, it is unequivocal. In the IDF, it is not possible for someone to move without the approval of the chief of General Staff. It simply cannot be otherwise. However, there is an openness to different opinions until a decision is made. The military system, which is fundamentally hierarchical, is always open to the danger of lacking the necessary openness. Therefore, I am mindful about encouraging openness, and view it as a relatively central advantage over our enemies. (It is worthwhile to recall how concepts are created.)

[Question] Your appointment as chief of General Staff was preceded by some—pardon the expression—chaos. There were opposing cliques and intrigues, and even an appeal to the prime minister. In your opinion, how should the chief of General Staff be selected?

[Answer] Like every army, the IDF is a very complex framework which is supposed to function efficiently and achieve victory in the most extreme situations and in the face of the most difficult challenges that human beings are liable to be required to confront. Therefore, a system such as this is basically different from civilian systems such as the political system or normal organizational systems. It is structured on team work, and on absolute obedience to the commander who bears overall responsibility.

The phenomenon of cliques within the Army, and to the same extent, the creation of a lobby outside the army are damaging phenomena liable to cause real damage to the unity and teamwork which are so vital. No less serious, in my opinion, are cases in which commanders—occasionally senior commanders—who, frustrated and bitter because they have not realized their expectations of receiving positions in the IDF, pour out their bitterness on all those whom they believe to be responsible for causing their disappointment. These cases are no less

damaging than the "politicization" of Army personnel, and they make a mockery of the principle that IDF service is primarily a mission and secondarily a personal career.

[Question] Should the outgoing chief of General Staff assert his opinion, including appealing to the prime minister, if he thinks that the minister of defense has erred in his selection of the next chief of General Staff?

[Answer] In my opinion, it is forbidden for the chief of General Staff, or any other commander, to apply pressure regarding the appointment of his successor because this is not his responsibility. Naturally, he will make recommendations if requested to do so. In any case, I plan to act in accordance with these principles.

[Question] In the Lebanon war, you headed a command which was not called up to fight. However, as an observer and someone connected to the situation, is the current situation in the North better than what it was before the war?

[Answer] The current situation in the North? It is definitely better than before. Have you forgotten what the situation was at Qiryat Shemonah and Nahariya? Have you forgotten that residents were leaving the North? There was a definite need to rid the area of terrorists. There cannot be any doubt about this matter. Beyond this, there are political and emotional arguments in which I do not wish to take part. Of course, we are studying the lessons and, as you know, I established a team headed by Major General Bar-Kokhba' to ensure that we will learn the necessary lessons.

[Question] What do you say to someone who says—and some are saying this loudly—that the Intifadah can be ended quickly?

[Answer] Only someone who does not view the uprising as part of a process and thinks that it broke out as a result of an automobile accident can assume that a single aggressive operation could restore the situation to its previous state. I view the uprising as part of a process involving a struggle with the Palestinians over the land of Israel. This is a continuous process. Therefore, action against the Intifadah is necessarily a continuous process in which our objective is to assure that violence and terror will not produce gains at the expense of the essential interests of Israel.

[Question] As the chief of General Staff, have you experienced a moment in which you wanted to stand up and say to the government: Dear friends, this is not for the IDF, you must come up with such and such a political solution?

[Answer] I do not receive such an opportunity at all. Any political route to a settlement agreement must rest on the assumption that force will not dictate a solution to us. Otherwise, there would be no limit to the demands of the

other party. There is a military course and a political course regarding a solution. Therefore, I have no dilemma with regard to this matter. It is inconceivable that the Army would become involved at the political level.

[Question] However, is the Intifadah perhaps damaging the Army?

[Answer] There are real dangers posed to any army in the world which operates against civilians. We know of armies of democracies in the free world which have deteriorated in situations such as these. The IDF has endured, is enduring, and will, in the future, endure this difficult mission. There were deviations, and we are dealing with each one of them. Our legal system is absolutely independent, including the military police, and the commander of the investigative military police, who investigates every case in which someone is killed or wounded. His conclusions are turned over to the judge advocate, and it is the judge advocate, not the chief of General Staff, who decides whether the case will go to court. He can and must listen to me, but he is the one who decides. With this mechanism we have created, there is no possibility that the facts will be concealed. Commanders at all levels, from myself on down, meet with the soldiers and explain this complex subject and the detailed instructions regarding the opening of fire. The Army endures this with honor.

[Question] What do you say to politicians who promise to end the Intifadah within a few days?

[Answer] Whoever says this simply does not know what he is talking about unless he wants to change the laws according to which the IDF operates. As you know, we are under pressure with regard to this matter from both sides—those who claim that the Army is too soft, and those who claim that it is too tough.

[Question] What about the phenomenon of refusal to serve in the territories?

[Answer] It is absolutely marginal.

[Question] The Army is not morally eroded?

[Answer] No, because the Army understands the importance of its actions in relation to benefitting any political agreement which might come about. The entire political spectrum exists in the army. The IDF carries out national missions, and does not do what is convenient for it. Of course, I would be happy if we did not have to deal with the Intifadah. Before it began, I thought about increasing the border guard. As a matter of fact, we are currently transferring a portion of the border guard recruits in order to engage fewer Army units in the territories. This process will continue, and the border guard will be increased significantly.

[Question] Nevertheless, the Intifadah has a price?

[Answer] It does, primarily in relation to training, which currently affects the regular Army less, and the reserves more. By next year, I hope that reserve duty will be approximately 40 days, and not 60 days, as a result of the learning curve and the improvement of resources. The price is also expressed in the damage done to the budget. If we do not receive back the expenditures caused on account of the Intifadah, training and combat resources will be harmed.

[Question] The [military service] evasion network which was uncovered, is it not a result of the Intifadah?

[Answer] There is no network here. What we have here is one major who was involved in this for a long period, and there are others who became involved and uninvolved in different periods. The major in question was involved in this for more than 2 years, in other words, without connection to the Intifadah. He was interested in money. There have been other cases of evasion in the history of the IDF. How about the case some time ago involving sergeants [rav samal ri'shon—no U.S. equivalent] working in an armor workshop who tried to evade working by putting sand into engines. Does that seem less serious to you? (And there was no Intifadah at the time.)

There have always been individual cases. This time as well, we cannot speak of a network. However, I relate to this matter according to the strict letter of the law. The case at hand involves individual officers and civilians, mostly physicians, who falsified medical examinations. There were only a few individuals in the regular forces whose profiles were changed in this way. It is still difficult to know how many reserve personnel are involved, but they certainly constitute the majority. The Army will cast out the guilty parties.

[Question] Did you exaggerate the matter initially?

[answer] It was exaggerated, not by the Army, apparently for the purpose of dramatization. It was not we who spoke about a network.

[Question] In which direction will we be moving in the coming year?

[Answer] Internally, the IDF will continue to respond to terror and the Intifadah. Externally, it will defend the country's borders. The most dangerous problem is posed by the regular [Arab] armies which have undertaken a comprehensive build-up. A war could occur, possibly within a short time, and the IDF is preparing for it.

[Question] Has Syria attained its famous strategic balance?

[Answer] In their opinion, they have advanced nicely, but they have not yet reached parity. It is, however, erroneous to think that there is some technical line at which parity is reached. Waging war is a much more

complicated matter. It is possible to wage a war without adequate preparation and to attain great achievements if other conditions exist such as external international support, or the participation of other armies. It is not always the quantity of tanks and aircraft at one's disposal that decides in favor of, or against waging a war. The opposite is also possible inasmuch as one could assume that a strategic balance has been attained regarding all parameters yet suffer a complete defeat because other conditions are absent.

[Question] Is someone in Syria liable to become insane and decide to start a war?

[Answer] He does not have to be insane. He might only make a mistake. From time immemorial, there have been Arab rulers who have gone to war based on the mistaken assumption that they could achieve great gains through military force. What happened in the past can happen in the future. The IDF is constantly preparing and is ready. Our investment in immediate readiness is also paralleled by preparations for the long term.

[Question] Has the Iraq-Iran cease-fire already brought about changes in the field, such as the transfer of weapons to our region?

[Answer] From a comprehensive strategic viewpoint, there has definitely been a change, but this does not mean that they are already marching three by three toward the west to fight against us. They have not transferred anything; they have not yet finished the war. Rather, they are in the process of ending it. Then, energies will be freed up, but not only for external targets. Iraq also has many internal problems. The arms race, which has continued there for years, leaves in its wake a large, well-equipped experienced army, and their arms depots are filled.

[Question] If someone is struck by insanity there, can he push a button and launch a missile into the heart of Israel?

[Answer] They have surface-to-surface missiles which can reach our territory from the border of Iraq. The capability of these missiles to cause damage is not great, and they have a low level of accuracy. I assume, however, that they will upgrade them. Iraq is therefore a long-range potential threat. I would add that I find it inconceivable that they would freely use missiles or chemical weapons against Israel as they did against Iran and are doing against the Kurds, because they know that we have a powerful response capability.

It should not be forgotten that in the Yom Kippur War, Syria and Egypt already possessed weapons with chemical warheads, deliverable via artillery and from the air. They did not use them because they knew what the Israeli response would be. It should not accordingly be concluded that they would not use such weapons. We must remember that the potential exists.

[Question] Would you say that this year is liable to be a year of war if the peace process is not renewed?

[Answer] I cannot make such an indication. However, I do think that with the end of the Iran-Iraq war, the Arab-Israeli conflict is liable to once again occupy the center of the Arab world's consciousness, thereby increasing the possibility of war. However, I would certainly not say that a war would necessarily break out if these or other processes do not take place in the coming year.

Religious Ideologue Envisions Islamic State 44230007 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT (Supplement) in Hebrew 16 Sep 88 pp 1-2

[Article by Ron Ben-Yishay: "The Khomeyni of the Territories"]

[Text] The small car winds its way through the narrow alleys and garbage piles of Gaza. Once in a while our escort slows down and shakes his head in the direction of young men standing around street corners in groups of two or four, doing nothing. They nod at him, and the car accelerates again. We pass a little girl relieving herself in the warm sand of the main street, and we stop before a seedy looking two-story house. In a wheelchair under the awning sits Shaykh Yasin.

A little boy, one of his five or six children, stands by the chair and waves away the flies. The health of this small man, paralyzed from the neck down, whose eyes burn with the strange fire of religious fanaticism, is increasingly deteriorating. He has speech difficulties. Every once in a while his bent body is wracked by a fit of coughing. At such times the child runs inside and brings him a small metal cup to spit into. That done, he devotedly returns to his post against the flies. In complete contrast to his fragile appearance, the political power of this man is a permanent nightmare for the PLO activists in the territories and a constant threat to their position.

Shaykh Yasin is viewed as an ideologue and as the driving force behind the Palestinian religious fanatics. Not only those in Gaza, but in Judaea and Samaria, too. Some claim he is the founder of the Hamas movement, whose purpose is to coordinate the actions of religious extremists in two areas and unite them into one strong and influential movement. That objective has succeeded above and beyond expectations. Hamas is rapidly rallying power and support both in Gaza and in Judaea and Samaria and is even openly challenging the PLO's hegemony. One day Shaykh Yasin may emerge as the "authentic Palestinian who is not a PLO member" with whom Israel must talk.

Once, in the 1970's Israel encouraged the Muslim faction as a counterbalance to the PLO in Gaza. Hundreds of mosques opened under the Israeli rule, and the civilian administration turned a blind eye to the money pouring

in from Saudi Arabia for the "Muslim Brothers" and the "al-Mujma' al-Islami" (the Islamic Union). That was the time when Shaykh Ahmad Yasin began to gain prominence among the religious notables of Gaza.

Now the 51-year-old shaykh is pinned to his wheelchair. His voice is weak, his breathing laborious, and he falters in his speech. In his teens he fell while playing on the beach and broke his back. Some people say he was injured in an explosion. Despite his injury, he studied at the 'Ayn Shams University in Cairo and returned to Gaza as a teacher. Although his health progressively deteriorated, he became the leader of the Muslim Brothers in Gaza and later the head of the al-Mujma' al-Islami movement. That is a political organization which, in contrast to the belligerent Muslim Jihad, describes itself as a non-violent movement. According to various estimations, about half of the residents of Gaza, if not more, recognize its authority. Formally, al-Mujma' is led by Dr Ibrahim Yazuri, but everyone knows from whom Yazuri gets his inspiration and even specific instructions.

In 1984 Shaykh Yasin was arrested, sentenced to 12 years in jail, and was wheeled into an Israeli prison. The Security Service had discovered a huge cache of weapons and explosives in his house. He was accused of belonging to al-Jihad al-Islami. He was released 1 year later as part of the prisoner exchange deal with Jibril.

The current dominant power in the territories is the PLO. However, many Palestinians, including PLO members, believe that soon no initiative will be possible in the territories without the prior agreement of Hamas and the blessing of Shaykh Yasin. If the PLO's current political initiative fails, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians may well despair and run into the arms of Shaykh Yasin and his people. The Security Service and the IDF are aware of that and are fearful of such an occurrence. According to Yasin's supporters, at the beginning of this month Security Service men broke into the shaykh's house in the middle of the night and searched it, but failed to find anything.

Last Saturday, in the small inner court protected by high walls, a small group of bearded men dressed in long robes clustered around Shaykh Yasin. Their heads were bent over him and he talked to them in whispers, stopping the moment we came in. In Ghawrah al-Shams, south of the city of Gaza, it is easy to see from where the Islamic fundamentalist movement led by Shaykh Yasin draws most of its troops.

When he talked to us he spoke in a general and theoretical manner that did not reveal what is special about him. The message, however, was clear. During the interview he often lifted his eyes to the tower of the nearby mosque as if looking for inspiration in his struggle to express himself. He did refer to Israel by its name, but he called its citizens mostly "Jews." He often answered a question with another question. "The Intifadah is like the sea waves," he said. "They ebb and flow, but they go

on. We, the Palestinians in the occupied territories, do not now have the power to chase out the Jews. But we can bring our strength to expression through stones.

"Today we are weak, tomorrow we will be strong, as opposed to the Israelis. You are strong now, but in the future you will weaken, and then our time will come. Look at history. The strong powers which were in this area lost their strength in the end. The people finally grew strong enough to force the Romans, and the Turks, and the British to go away."

According to him, what we are experiencing now is the first wave of the Intifadah. Without saying it in so many words, he hinted that, in his opinion, this wave will fade away together with the PLO's futile political initiative. After a while it will be followed by another wave of Intifadah, more intensive and more violent perhaps that its predecessor. That time, however, Islam will be the dominant factor and the PLO its minor partner.

[Question] Shaykh Yasin, what do you want to achieve through the Intifadah?

[Answer] "First, the withdrawal of the Israeli occupiers from the occupied land. The evacuated area should be put under autonomous UN rule. Later the residents will choose their representatives. Those representatives will negotiate among themselves the future of the Palestinians, and will also negotiate with Israel." (What he means is that while the United Nations is in charge of the territories, chosen representatives of the Palestinians will agree among themselves on the form of the Palestinian state; only after that will they negotiate with Israel).

[Question] If the Israelis were to come to you and offer to negotiate before evacuating the territories, would you agree to negotiate?

[Answer] "No. We are under occupation. People who are under occupation cannot talk freely. The occupier can put me in jail if I say things that he does not like. There can be no negotiations between ruled and ruler. He can banish or arrest me anytime I make proposals that annoy him."

[Question] Yasir 'Arafat is considering decreeing Palestinian independence, forming a government-in-exile or a provisional government, and perhaps even recognizing Israel. What do you think about that?

[Answer] "As long as we have not liberated any part of Palestine by ourselves there is no point in such moves. The time has not come for it. The PLO must be patient and not recognize Israel, because Israel has taken everything away from the Palestinian people and has given them nothing. As a first step Israel must restore the rights of the Palestinian people (in their land). Only then will it be possible to talk."

[Question] Can you conceive of a Palestinian state and an Israeli state peacefully coexisting next to each other?

[Answer] "No. That can be only a temporary solution. Two such states can coexist only for a short period of time after which the conflict will resume even more intensely. The (Palestinian) people will rebel repeatedly. Palestine is sacred to the Jews, the Christians, and the Muslims, and that is why the only solution is that all those denominations should live together in one state."

[Question] What you mean is an Islamic state in which Jews and Christians would be tolerated?

[Answer] "I personally would prefer Islam to rule the state and would prefer the state to be Islamic. I would suggest to people to accept Islam as the ruling law of the new state, but I will not impose it on them. If the majority refuses to adopt Shari'ah, I will accept that."

During the talk that followed the interview it emerged that what Shaykh Yasin has in mind is an Islamic Palestinian state that would incorporate Jordan and in which a stable and large Muslim majority would be ensured. Consequently, the democratic generosity he displays does not constitute an ideological deviation on his part.

With a wide and radiant smile the shaykh denied any connection to the Islamic Hamas and claimed to know nothing about the widening rift between Hamas and the PLO. He viewed 'Arafat's al-Fatah as a possible partner in the struggle against the Israeli occupation and later in the government of the Muslim Palestinian state.

"We cannot ignore the existence of others; they will participate, too," he said with diplomatic magnanimity which does not, however, stretch to include George Habash's Popular Front, Nayif Hawatimah's organization, and the hated communists: "No, I do not see any chance of cooperation with them," he says. "They are heretics. We even have differences with al-Fatah because it is secular."

[Question] What is your view of autonomy in the territories?

[Answer] "Negative. The practical meaning of autonomy is that the Jews will have everything and the Palestinians nothing."

[Question] What about Israel's unilateral withdrawal from the territories?

[Answer] "That would be madness for you, if you did it without prior security arrangements. You must at the least ensure the presence of a UN force in the territories before evacuating the area. If you left without such security provisions, your security would be in danger."

Although the shaykh does not say it in so many words, it is obvious that the possibility of an Israeli unilateral withdrawal is the most frightening to him because of the internal blood bath that could be expected between the various Palestinian factions. He also thinks that the blood bath would spill over the border into Israel in the form of terrorism.

[Question] So who is the leader of the Intifadah?

[Answer] "The young, the girls, and even the children. The Israeli Government's persecutions have caused even the innocent ones, who in the beginning stood to the side, to join the riots.

"I cannot tell you exactly who is leading the Intifadah, but you can see that all the big demonstrations originated in the mosques and that the people always shouted 'Allah akbar.' The driving force is Islamic."

[Question] Do you support the Jihad as the means of achieving your aspirations?

[Answer] "If people cannot secure their rights peacefully and without violence, what other option do they have?"

[Question] Do you hate Israelis or Jews?

[Answer] "Islam commands us to love everyone—Jews, Muslims, and Christians. What makes us hate the Jews is not the fact that they are Jews, but the fact that they deprived us of our rights. I will hate anyone who robs me of my rights."

There are people among both the Palestinians and Israelis who call him "the Khomeyni of the territories." In the past Shaykh Yasin used to smile with satisfaction when his name was mentioned in the same breath with the name of the author of Iran's Islamic revolution. "The Palestinian people must learn from every man who is wise, and if Khomeyni is wise, then we must learn from him, too," he said at the time in a newspaper interview. Today, when Iran is on its knees and has asked for a cease-fire in the war against Iraq, Shaykh Yasin is having second thoughts, both about Khomeyni and about the model of the Islamic revolution that he is trying to export:

"What the Iranians are doing is not exactly an Islamic state. It is not the right model for an Islamic state, and that not only because they are Shi'ites and we are Sunnis," said the Shaykh. "I want the Islamic regime to be based on the Koran. Islam defends human life and sees worth in it. It protects every form of life, including animals. However, when people are executed or when they kill others to satisfy the will of the ruler, that is not a Muslim deed. That is not Islam."

JORDAN

Minister Calls For Arab Fleet To Promote Economic Interests

44040060 Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 19 Oct 88 p 10

[Excerpt] Amman (PETRA-JNA)—Eng Khalid al-Haj Hasan, Minister of Transport and Communication, has called for joint Arab efforts to establish an Arab commercial fleet that would help to build Arab economic security and realize national aspirations of promoting Arab marine transport and enhancing its role. He pointed out that Arab fleets transport no more than 4 percent of the total of imports and exports for the entire Arab homeland. This means spending millions of dollars for this purpose.

During his meeting with the chairman and members of the board of directors of the Arab Academy for Marine Transport yesterday, Eng Hasan said, "We in Jordan fully believe that the academy is fulfilling its task of preparing and providing the cadres for the Arab marine transport sector. The cadres receive education, training, and expertise. Therefore, supporting the academy on an Arab level is regarded as a national duty dictated by higher Arab interests.

Eng Hasan added, "The academy has, thanks to the attention of all concerned, been able to overcome the many difficulties its progress has faced. If we want the academy to continue shouldering its duties and responsibilities, we must ensure for it all the means of success, especially moral and material support which are vital for its existence."

Hasan affirmed that he will sponsor the resolutions, which the Academy adopted at the conclusion of its first session in al-'Aqabah the day before yesterday, at the meeting of the Arab ministers of transport due to be held in Tunisia at the end of next month, especially the resolutions calling for maintaining the academy as an Arab institution, financially and administratively independent from the rest of the Arab League bodies.

Hasan praised the fruitful cooperation between the ports authority and the academy, which since its establishment has trained 654 Jordanians.

Reviewing the services which the port of al-'Aqabah offers to the Arab economy, Hasan said that this port, which initially was established as a local port, has, thanks to King Husayn's guidance, become an Arab port serving the Arab economy.

Hasan cited the fruitful cooperation between Jordan and the Arab countries in the field of marine transport, saying that Jordan, in cooperation with sisterly Egypt and Iraq, has established the Arab Bridge Company for Marine Transport, which has linked the Arab West with the Arab East. This company operates between the ports of Nuwaybi' and al-'Aqabah. Hasan expressed the hope that this experiment will become the starting point for wider Arab cooperation through a unified Arab company. [passage omitted]

LIBYA

Iron, Steel Plant To Use Numerous Non-Libyan Employees

45040038 Tripoli AL-ZAHF AL-AKHDAR in Arabic 12 Sep 88 p 7

[Article by Fawzi al-Mazzughi: "Another Achievement—the Iron and Steel Complex at Misratah: Horizons of the Future"]

[Excerpt] If a middleman who trades in people's livelihoods and exploits their need for iron were asked by us for his opinion of industry, he would call it an undesirable innovation or a dangerous evil.

If a middleman who obtains steel through one of his relatives (a company director) and then quadruples its price so that citizens torture themselves and go into debt to obtain a ton of iron were asked by us about the iron complex, he would jump up and call upon God to protect him from so grave a danger.

If men who live by favoritism and influence were asked by us for their opinion about a complex whose production will exceed the needs of the Jamahiriyah, they would think of a way to act as brokers or middlemen, even on the national and international level.

The [complex's] production will uncover many kinds of unnatural relations, and the complex will destroy them.

In any case, this is not an article for propaganda. Neither should it be!

Under the revolution, it was necessary to direct oil revenues toward productive investments, particularly in the field of basic mechanical industries, since these are a foundation and goal for the other industrial, agricultural, and professional fields. Some of the goals in establishing the Iron and Steel Complex at Misratah were to increase income, end reliance on oil, cover local and part of Arab needs, create technical cadres and skills, and draw Arab expertise and skills to work in this complex, it being a pan-Arab complex and the Jamahiriyah being the land of all Arabs.

The complex was designed after thorough research and study by foreign organizations and experts under the supervision of the Center for Industrial Research. The epoch-making leadership [of the Jamahiriyah] gave encouragement and urged moving the complex ahead. The project was presented to the people's congresses, which approved its rapid implementation, especially since it had been subject to a number of obstacles and delays.

The complex was designed to produce about 1 million tons of various end products. Raw iron is injected with local natural gas to reduce the two to sponge. Mixed with scrap in a proportion of 80 percent to 20 percent, the sponge iron is melted, and the required substances and alloys are added in electrical furnaces. After testing and purification operations, the molten steel is poured into continuous casting machines to produce veins, blooms, and slabs. These in turn are rolled into oblong and flat products such as rods, wires, sections, ribbons, and coils, according to international specifications.

Based on economic, technical, and developmental considerations, a site was chosen in the city of Misratah, next to the port of Qasr Ahmad. Turnkey contracts were concluded with major international companies from Austria, West Germany, Japan, South Korea, and Italy in cooperation with more than 25 internal contractors. An Indian consultant (Dustur) supervised the combine, and a British consultant supervised the power plant, water desalinization, and the port.

The principal stages of the work were agreed on—phases and means of implementation, conditions for payment and credits, inspection, tests, and guarantees, etc.

Machines and personnel took their positions in an epic battle. How we hoped its heroes would be Arabs!

The first of the difficulties was how individuals lacking experience but not enthusiasm and dedication would deal with major companies in this huge enterprise.

The project has been moving forward from 1981 to the present with ebb and flow, indefatigable efforts, procedures and transactions sometimes correct and sometimes incorrect, so that everyone might be up to the level of the combine.

At the same time, the consultant was reviewing and authorizing the technical designs and detailed documents in a way that elicited admiration and respect. The only cause of regret was that this practical opportunity was missed by Arab engineers from the Jamahiriyah and elsewhere. The other side of the project was the preparation of cadres of personnel. This is the important side, for without the ability to actively control its management, operations, maintenance, and development, the complex would be nothing but a hole to drain off wealth and material and human resources.

In this connection, hundreds of students were sent to Britain, Canada, and the United States for university study.

Many of them have completed their studies and have returned to participate in the work and fulfil their trust. Some are still studying. The forces of evil found their way to some who were immature, weak-minded, or ungrateful. The second phase of training and formation was practical training in a number of factories in Japan, Austria, Britain, Argentina, West Germany, France, and South Korea.

This phase was to have ended shortly before completion and implementation of the complex, but the program stopped or was suspended for financial reasons. Later, we had to pay many times what practical training would have cost.

Project implementation ended with the training of no more than 8 percent of the numbers required to operate the complex. This will mean begging in the foreign labor market or seeking assistance from Arab experts and workers. In the latter case, we shall say, "O Lord, it was a beneficial distress."

In other words, the fact that the training programs were not accomplished will have contributed to rendering the desired pan-Arab approach successful.

For no economic project can really succeed without work on a unified basis and without economic and industrial integration.

The Arab countries—especially after the decline of oil prices—have become a burden even to themselves.

To return to the complex: It is considered the largest industrial project in the Jamahiriyah and has cost hundreds of millions of dinars. It requires about 7,000 production personnel of various types and levels and incorporates the most modern technical developments in the area of iron and steel manufacturing. [passage omitted]

MOROCCO

Spanish Authorities Detain Moroccan Citizens 45000048 London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic 9-15 Nov 88 p 9

[Text] Spanish police questioned 218 Moroccan citizens at the border between Melilla and the rest of the Moroccan territories on the pretext of trying to "illegally" enter the Moroccan city colonized by Spain. Some 81 of these citizens have been arrested for crossing the border illegally. It should be noted that entry into Melilla is restricted to those carrying passports and that the Spanish authorities impose a payment of 100 Moroccan dirhams on Moroccan citizens with the exception of residents of Nador—a city located next to Melilla—to obtain permission to enter.

OMAN

Incentives To Aid Competitiveness of Local Goods 44000069 Muscat TIMES OF OMAN in English 13 Oct 88 p 4

[Excerpt]

Duty

Extra customs duty is charged on imported goods which are competitive with the local products. In many cases the import of such commodities is restricted or prohibited to safeguard national products. Under a Ministerial decision, prices of power consumption for industrial purposes have been reduced.

The Government has recommended that national products should be given price priority to the tune of 20 percent in Government purchases provided they are not less qualitative than and conform to the specifications of the imported ones.

Among the Government's industrial incentives are: Holding survey for the purpose of industrial investment and preparing feasibility studies for certain projects imported for the national economy and supplying them to the private sectors.

Planned industrial lands are being provided, equipped with services, to set up industries.

During the period between January 1979 and June 1988, the government imposed protectionist customs duties on two products to safeguard the national products. These are: cement and its products, pipes, paints, polythylene products, cartons, vegetable oils, detergents and barbed wire.

The Control and Follow-up Section at the Ministry of Commerce and Industry's Industrial Incentive Department has been following new projects under implementation.

It has been submitting reports reflecting the progress of the project, stating whether it is being carried out in all seriousness, with a view to giving an opportunity to other investors.

The Ministry also gives advice to industrial ventures to ensure that the national products of Oman have high quality and conform to the international specifications, so as to enable them to compete with imported products.

The total number of industrial firms registered in the first and second Five Year Plans (1975-1985) amounted to 2334, their total capital cost being RO 207,294,000.

Comprehensive statistical data is being provided on the industrial production in Oman and feasibility studies carried out on industrial projects.

SUDAN

Radio, TV Unions Decry Culture Minister's Alleged Interference 45000042 Khartoum AL-MAYDAN in Arabic 4 Oct 88 p 4

[Text] The federation of unions for employees of the National Radio and Television Organization affirmed its strong opposition to any attempt [by the Ministry of Culture to fire its employees] and declared adherence to its legitimate right to use all union weapons including striking.

In a memorandum delivered on 1 October, the Union of Radio and Television Employees asked the president and the members of the Head of State Council to intervene immediately to implement the law of the National Radio and Television Organization and form a board of directors to carry out the responsibilities provided for by the law of the organization.

The memorandum described recent statements made by the minister of culture to the newspapers as threatening in nature, hinting at dismissals, embodying a direct threat to employees, and constituting a new attempt to belittle the law of the National Radio and Television Organization.

The unions of radio and television employees indicated that they had previously delivered a memorandum to the president and members of the Head of State Council concerning the minister of culture and information's constant disregard for and violation of the law of the National Radio anbd Television Organization in an effort to minimize the role of employee unions, even though the law grants the minister no administrative powers. The unions further indicated that they have received no reply to the memorandum.

AFGHANISTAN

AFSOTR: Outstanding Example of Afghan-Soviet Friendship

46000026b Kabul THE KABUL TIMES in English 10 Oct 88 pp 1, 2

[Article by reporter Farouq]

[Text] AFSOTR [expansion unknown] joint stock company is one of the best examples of Afghan-Soviet friendship. It is one of the big transport institutions of the country. The company was established with an initial capital of 40 million Afs. in 1976. The share of the Soviet side is 51 per cent and that of the Afghan government 49 per cent.

The company could transport during 12 years of its activities goods from the ports to the capital and vice versa.

This company has 697 trucks. There are 2,251 workers on its payroll. The company has also sections for transport forwarding, loading, unloading and stocking of goods.

Over 173,000 tons of goods were transported in the first five months of the current Afghan year by this company to the capital and provinces of the country. The figure shows that the plan of the last five months of the company was overfulfilled by 102.4 per cent, and shows a growth rate of 8.9 per cent as compared to the corresponding period last year. The company earned 38,636,300 Afs. from the transportation of goods.

About 299,000 tons of goods have been forwarded in the first five months of the current Afghan year through this company from Hairatan, Torghundi and Shairkhan ports. This figure shows that the plant target was overfulfilled by 157.6 per cent.

The company has transported and forwarding branches in Kabul city, Pul-i-Khomri district and Torghundi, Hairatan and Shairkhan ports. Buildings of these branches were constructed with Soviet cooperation.

The company has so far constructed two mosques, bathrooms, hostels, a health clinic, work place kindergarten, two residential blocks of 108 apartments in Kabul and three residential blocks in Hairatan port.

The company pays 30 to 60 percent more allowance to workers and employees in the provinces.

The company has plans to construct residential blocks in Kabul city and as well as in Hairatan port and raise the pension of its workers and employees.

The company conducts training courses for its drivers and other employees every year.

AFSOTR has so far bagged first and second positions in the work competitions launched among transport institutions. It thus plays a significant role in raising the economy of the country.

Fertilizers, Drugs Given To Peasants 46000025a Kabul THE KABUL TIMES in English 12 Oct 88 p 2

[Text] Kabul, 10 October, (BIA)—Sixty thousand and four hundred tons of fertilizer and insecticides costing over 73 million Afs were distributed to the peasants of the country during the six months of the current Afghan year.

A spokesman of the agricultural department told BIA that among them 42,800 tons were Urea fertilizer and 17,600 tons Phosphours fertilizer.

Similarly 4,744 tons of cotton seeds, five tons of sugarcane seeds and 207 kg of vegetable seeds were distributed to the members of the agricultural cooperatives.

Extremist Weapons Bought 46000025c Kabul THE KABUL TIMES in English 12 Oct 88 p 4

[Text] Kabul, 11 October, (BIA)—In accordance with Presidential decree No. 204 dated Mizan 18, 1366 [10 October 1987], five heavy machine guns were purchased yesterday from the extremist opposition groups in Shinwar division. They were paid for in accordance with the price fixed in the decree.

Autumn Sowing Campaign On 46000026a Kabul THE KABUL TIMES in English 9 Oct 88 p 4

[Text] Kabul, 7 October, (BIA)—The nationwide autumn sowing campaign started all over the country from Sunbola onwards (mid-August) with the active contribution of peasants members of agricultural cooperatives and state farms. The state also helps by giving them agricultural assistance.

An area of 1,605,000 hectares will be cultivated this year, out of which 998,000 hectares is irrigated and 607,000 non-irrigated, source disclosed.

Wheat will be grown in an area of 1,487,000 hectares, barley in 88,000, vegetables in 12,000 and other plants in 18,000 hectares.

Also, an area of 38,905 hectares will be cultivated with cereals and vegetables in thirty provinces of the country by 604 agricultural cooperatives.

The distribution of 74,043 tons of fertilizer value at 49,541,000 Afs, pesticides and insecticides six thousand tons of improved wheat seeds and 310,607,000 Afs, bank

loans of Agricultural Bank, have been envisaged in the current year sowing campaigns to peasants and members of agricultural cooperatives.

Kabul Roads Under Construction46000025b Kabul THE KABUL TIMES in English
12 Oct 88 p 4

[Text] Kabul, 11 October, (BIA)—The extension work of the Darulaman road was started recently at a cost of 250,000,000 Afs by Kabul Municipality.

The road, which is being constructed on a length of 5.7 km and width of 60 meters consists of main and subroads, green area and side walks. It will be completed next year.

A spokesman of Kabul Municipality said, "The extension work of Jamal Mina, Kabul University on length of 1.5 km, was also started recently. The road includes engineering establishments, green area and side walks.

The road will be constructed by the end of year at a cost of 50 million Afs.

INDIA

No Similarity Seen In CPI (M), Congress (I) Positions

46070002 Calcutta ANANDA BAZAR PATRIKA in Bengali 6 Oct 88 p 4

[Text] When Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, accompanied by his wife, was visiting Bhutan, the veteran Congress leader, Kamalapati Tripathi made a proposal in the form of a letter. It was addressed to Rajiv Gandhi. Tripathi's proposal was that Congress and the leftist parties should form a national progressive front. Such a front was needed to counteract the concerted and relentless efforts of the rightist parties to throw Congress out of office. When describing the rightist parties, Mr Tripathi of course meant Jan Morcha [Peoples Front], Janata Party, Lok Dal, Congress (S) and other opposition parties known as centrists. It is apparent that the effort of the rightist parties to overthrow Congress has created a lot of anxiety in the minds of the Congress leadership; and this proposal most likely reflects that psychological reaction. Though this unification process has been facing tremendous obstacles, the possibilities of a working relationship between the Centrists and the Leftist parties regarding allocation of seats in the Parliament at the next general election is the genesis of this proposal. However, the anxiety of the Congress leadership which has given rise to this strange proposal may be the product of Mr Tripathi's own mental reaction. This octogenarian Brahmin has earned the right to go into retirement long time ago, though he is not anxious to utilize that right. Due to health reasons, he is no longer active in political activities, but he himself has assumed the responsibility of arousing the conscience of the Party. Consequently, his role has been relegated to offering advice to the younger generation, acknowledge their homages, and offering advice and counsel to them from time to time. Instead of offering his advice directly, normally he communicates his feelings through statements published in the newspapers.

Mr Tripathi's well thought out proposal has been outright rejected by the leftists. Leaders of both CPI and CPI(M), the two communist parties, have rejected the proposal completely. CPI has cited their fundamental difference with the internal policies, especially economic policies. According to this party, though the Congress talks about socialism, the liberal economic policies followed by the Congress are creating greater opportunities for multinational organizations and monopolistic capitalists to entrench themselves in the country, which is highly undesirable. Mr E.M.S. Namboodiripad, leader of the CPI(M) has not only outright rejected the idea of forming a joint front, he has even completely discounted any possibilities of having any cooperation with the Congress. He has termed Congress an enemy of the masses. This has greatly disheartened Congress leader Mr K. N. Singh. He considered this appelation painful. In the second installment of this proposal Mr Tripathi has warned the leftists that if they would join forces with the opposition parties, instead of joining the Congress, then fascism might come to the country. However, even this dire threat of the appearance of this specter has not been able to impress the leftists. It is a fact that though the Communists did not form any direct understanding with Congress in the past, they have indirectly helped Congress on two occasions in the face of serious crises, or at least did not make any effort to make those crises more serious. The first time was when Indira Gandhi split the National Congress to form Indira Congress with the support of her own followers, and secondly, when the Janata's government of Morarii Desai broke apart, if the Communists had adopted a different position than they did, it would have been impossible for the Congress to return to the national political arena with full honors. However, just because the leftists did not drag the Congress to a greater calamity does not justify appealing to them for help. Since the leftists are political opponents, appealing to them for help has revealed great weakness among a section of the Congress Party leadership.

The happy outcome of all this is that Rajiv Gandhi is not as remorseful as his advisor. As soon as he returned from Bhutan, he informed that the matter of forming a joint front with the leftists did not arise at all, because the policies of the leftist parties, both in the internal and external affairs of the nation have been proved useless. Rajiv did not clarify what he meant by the useless policies on external matters, most likely he was hinting at the reformation, correction and transformations that are taking place in the traditional and literalistic Communist nations like China and Russia. Whatever that might be, there is no doubt that Rajiv has completely rejected any possibility of any form of understanding and collaboration between the Congress Party and the leftists parties. It is true that the Congress of today is not as solidly organized as before, the idealism and integrity of the olden days may not be there, and their roots with the masses are much weakened. However, Congress has to solve this problem and crisis out of its own strength. Only the immediate benefit of the election year should not be the sole criteria for a nationalistic and traditionally rich party like Congress to capitulate before a group of parties of completely opposite ideology. This struggle belongs exclusively to Congress, and the Congress Party and its leaders must go through with their own struggle. Rajiv Gandhi has adopted the right posture by taking a firm and uncompromising stand in this matter.

Opposition Feuds May Destroy Opportunity 46070001 Calcutta ANANDA BAZAR PATRIKA in Bengali 23 Sep 88 p 4

[Text] A few days ago in Madras volunteers of various political parties were very active. At that time many had hoped that an alternate to the Congress Party would be formed. However, Mr Chandrasekhar, the former president of Janata Party, Mr H. N. Bahuguna, and other leaders of the Congress Party did not want that. The innermost desire of Chandrasekhar or Bahuguna is to let the plot thicken in the National Front, and they want the public to keep in mind the number of days such a coalition would survive.

The population of North India does not want a coalition. Their apprehension is that a coalition government cannot be strong. More than half of the members of the Lok Sabha [the Parliament] are elected from Northern India. As a matter of fact, the Socialist Peoples' Party was formed keeping this very apprehensive fact in mind. The leaders of the opposition parties have come to realize that the masses want Congress rule to be replaced by one single party, not by a coalition of parties. Mr V.P. Singh is the President of the Samajwadi Janata Dal [SJD—Socialist Peoples Party].

However, if Chandrasekhar and Bahuguna had realized the importance of forming an alternate party to the Congress, and if each were not the contender for the position of President, then the position of the SJD would have been most desirable. But this did not happen. These two persons are speaking out against the SJD in an extremely uncomplimentary manner. As a matter of fact the amount of black ink they are smearing on their opponents [condemnation] should make the Congress Party most grateful to them.

At first Devi Lal conferred the responsibility of overseeing the formation of the SJD to Bahuguna. But Bahuguna started to undermine the unity of the opposition leaders. At that time Devi Lal assumed this responsibility himself. He convened a conference of the Peoples' Party and proposed a resolution for the formation of the SJD. Over 90 percent of the delegates of the Lok Dal were present at that convention. There Bahuguna openly criticized Devi Lal, V. P. Singh and other leaders of the SJD. He could not accept the fact that Mr V. P. Singh

could become the leader of the new party. Even Chandrasekhar did everything possible to harm the SJD. Now he openly spoke out against it. He assured Ramkrishna Hegde, Madhu Dandabate and Devi Lal that he would make them the President of the party. However, everyone caught on to his craftiness. When he told Mr Devi Lal that he was the most suitable person to be the President of the new party, Devi Lal responded, "You may be right, but the people will not vote for me; they will vote for V. P. Singh."

Mr Ajit Singh, the President of the Janata Party was assured of the position of the General Secretary of the SJD, and liked this. His ambition was further heightened by Chandrasekhar. It has become very apparent that Chandrasekhar's job is to create dissention among the opposition leaders.

Among those who have created obstacles on the road to unity among the opposition groups is Mr Unnikrishnan, President of the Congress (S). He is miffed because he was not given an important position in the Socialist Peoples' Party. His pride was hurt. He has now started behaving like Chandrasekhar and Bahuguna.

It is true that Devi Lal announced the names of the members of the Executive Committee of the SJD too soon. It is also true that the leaders of the four parties, Janata Party, Lok Dal, Congress (S) and Jan Morcha, who collaborated in the creation of the Socialist Peoples' Party had expressed their unified opposition at least 10 days prior to the formation of the Party.

On 1 and 2 August, V. P. Singh, Ajit Singh, Devi Lal and Madhu Dandabate finalized the names of the members of the Executive Committee of the Socialist Peoples' Party in the Haryana mansion. They were empowered with that responsibility. For a while, Ajit Singh's name was proposed for the position of the Vice President of the Party. However, later he was offered the position of Secretary General. Ajit Singh was even agreeable to take that position. However, now he has changed his mind. The main problem was that all four parties wanted to maintain their control over the party.

Devi Lal stated that when he found out that the matter was getting more and more complicated, he suddenly announced the names of the Executive Committee of the new party. He had hoped that this would shake up the leaders a bit, and that they would stop feuding among themselves and settle down to real work. However, no one criticized Devi Lal for announcing the names—the criticism was that he announced the names too soon.

Among the critics there were leaders of the Janata Party, such as Indubhai Patel and Jasobant Singh. The reason for their anger can easily be understood—their leader was Chandrasekhar. They complained that Devi Lal acted in a "dictatorial manner." They forgot that during

the previous 10 years Chandrasekhar ran the Janata Party singlehandedly, almost like an emperor. He manipulated the party like a puppet in his hands.

The Jan Morcha was the first party to become interested in the unity of the opposition parties. In the beginning, at a meeting of the opposition parties, it was decided that the opposition parties would relinquish their individual existence, and become an integral part of the new party. But, because of the existence of the law against desertion of parties which would result in forfeiting a number of seats in the Parliament, some objected to it. Then it was proposed that the opposition parties would combine to form the new Party, however they would maintain their individual existence as well. Some objected to this proposal. They wanted this proposal to be put to a vote. But that did not happen. In its place, the followers of Arun Nehru started feeding rumors to all that their proposal had unanimous approval.

Arun Nehru and V. C. Shukla started behaving in the same manner as disgruntled Congress party members do. The tragedy is that they always straddle two boats at the same time. Whenever possible they reap benefit by using the name of the Congress Party, and whenever it is beneficial they oppose the Congress Party.

On 4 July, at the session of the Peoples' Front, held in Allahabad, Arun Nehru and V. C. Shukla tried to subdue V. P. Singh to some extent. They said that they were the ones who had been supporting V. P. Singh. However, no one paid any attention to their statements. They then proposed that in the name of the new party, "Congress" should be included; that might attract the members of the Congress Party to join this party.

As a matter of fact, many are very much apprehensive about Devi Lal's course of action. They are apprehensive that he being the Chairman of the Parliamentary Board of the SJD, and that the names he might select as candidates for election may not be acceptable to the others. Devi Lal has announced that he will not be a contender for the position of the Prime Minister. So far, he has done nothing to bring about doubt regarding his statement. However, his antagonists are not happy. They are looking for opportunities to create trouble.

The critics of Devi Lal are forgetting that the members of the opposition are not concerned about who will become the office bearer of the new party—they are seriously concerned about throwing out of office the person who is dragging the entire country to its ruin. A credible alternative to Congress must be formed. If that cannot be done, masses will once again vote for the same old party.

Janata, Lok Dal, Jan Morcha, Congress (S) and other opposition parties have reached an important crossroad. If they cannot become united they will lose the confidence of the voters. If they do become united, then Bahuguna and Chandrasekhar will not be able to do any harm. They do not have any political bases of their own.

As a matter of fact, their individual accomplishments amount to almost nothing. At the same time, it cannot be denied that V. P. Singh has created a big storm in the Hindi belt of Northern India.

Devi Lal has started the process by pressing the trigger. But it is not relevant who started the process. The most important consideration is that the nation has to be presented with a clean corruption-free government. The masses are anxiously waiting. The opposition leaders should stop fighting amongst each other over insignificant details; they should set aside their egos and take advantage of this historic opportunity. If this opportunity is lost, then there will be no end to the grief of the nation.

Commentary Asserts Bangladesh Tirades Self Defeating

46070003 Calcutta ANANDA BAZAR PATRIKA in Bengali 8 Oct 88 p 4

[Text] The Bangladesh Government surely has reasons for being perturbed with India on some issues. Till this day, even "tin bigha" [1 acre] of land has not been transferred to Bangladesh. There has not been any permanent settlement on the distribution of the Ganges River water. It has not been possible to determine the river's boundary. However, none of these are major problems. At the same time, there has not been any eagerness to solve these matters from the Indian side either. In spite of this, with regards to this year's flood, the Bangladesh officials have expressed in their attitudes and discussions, not remorse, but pure ingratitude. Of course, in politics and diplomacy, there is no such word as gratitude. Any course of action that would fulfill its own self interests and existence is fully accepted in diplomacy. However, one thing the Bangladesh administrators do not want to realize is that the more they try to hurt India politically and diplomatically, the more they hurt themselves.

Bangladesh administrators have never neglected making all out efforts to help the masses forget that it was India which was primarily instrumental in the birth of Bangladesh as an independent nation. As a matter of fact, they are still very much engaged in this effort. If Bangladesh had admitted this unrepayable debt, many of the problems would have been much easier to solve. In its stead, Bangladesh administrators are taking some steps and adopting some policies which cannot help but alarm India.

From all outward appearances, Bangladesh is free from communalism. However, if one opens his eyes and really looks around, it becomes very evident that the minorities are not enjoying a life full of respect. It may sound unpleasant, but it must be stated that male Hindus of Bangladesh have been avoiding wearing dhoti, their traditional dress. It is apparent that this is to hide their identity as Hindus. Of course, no official orders have been issued ordering them not to wear dhotis. In reality,

a certain social environment has been created which causes male Hindus to consider it prudent to wear pajamas instead of dhotis. Under the Enemy Property Act the Hindus have been harassed. This law was enacted in 1965 during the Indo-Pakistani war, when then East Pakistan was a part of Pakistan. In 1971 when Bangladesh became independent with help from India, the Bangladesh Government did not abolish this Act. On the contrary, they have continued to evict the members of the minority community from their home and hearth with the help of this Act. Consequently, the minorities are compelled to enter India in large numbers. Under this Act, the court proceedings are nothing but a farce. In this environment Hindu women are facing a pathetic condition. In Bangladesh there are many examples of women who, under the stress of this hostile environment, have changed their religion to Islam for the sake of maintaining their existence. It is hard to find Hindus in position of importance. Those who were in these positions were removed on some pretext or other. Bangladesh Hindus are largely employed in teaching or small business at present. In addition, the Islamization policy of the Ershad government has naturally caused widespread alarm amongst Hindus. The minorities had been relegated to second-class citizenship even before the adoption of the Islamization policy. Now, after the imposition of this law, the condition of the Hindus is bound to be even more miserable. The Amnesty International should send one of their representatives to find out to what extent the human rights of the minorities are being trampled under the boots of the administration.

The common people of Bangladesh, of course, cannot be blamed for this situation. Poor farmers, laborers and politically conscious progressive people are in general above communal feelings. They are not happy with the social changes being experienced by minorities. However, their points of view do not find any favor with the politically powerful and rigid fundamentalists of the government. They have their vested interests. Furthermore, common people do not have the mental framework to be able to overthrow this military supported administration. The effect of this government sponsored policy is most evident in the eastern section of India, especially in Tripura and in West Bengal. It is not the Hindus alone who are fleeing the country. Driven by hunger, and in search of jobs, everyday a significant number of Muslims cross the border into India, only to get lost in the crowd of humanity in Calcutta. Some of them are also going to New Delhi by train. In the Simapuri and Jama Masjid sections of the Capital, a brief conversation with them would reveal the seriousness of the economic condition of Bangladesh. Even under these circumstances, Bangladesh is refusing to create a cordial relationship with India, the same midwife who helped her in her coming into existence, and is anxious to establish a close relationship with Pakistan, the same Pakistan against whose colonial subjugation the entire population of Bangladesh had risen in revolt. This is a type of perverted, twisted psychology.

The same twisted psychology is apparent in the Bangladesh Government's actions in response to the recent flooding. Many areas of both India and Bangladesh went under water in the floods. There is no doubt that the low lying sections of Bangladesh have been the most critically damaged. Similar damage has also been caused in West Bengal. However, with the help the government supported newspapers, the Bangladesh Government has carried out the campaign of maligning India. In this matter the Bangladesh Government has expressed very bad taste. There can be no language strong enough to denounce this action. India has always extended her helping hands whenever Bangladesh has been in difficult situations. Responding to Dhaka's requests, Calcutta airport was opened wide to provide landing facilities to Bangladesh bound foreign planes. Helicopters had been sent to transport relief supplies to remote sections of Bangladesh. In return for this humanitarian action, Bangladeshi newspapers spread slanderous statements against India, and published fictitious descriptions of the cause of the flood. The Bangladesh authorities even sent back all of India's helicopters in a very discourteous manner. As soon as it became apparent that India was quite disturbed with these developments, Ershad rushed to New Delhi for a conference to patch things up. The Indian Government did not refuse to meet with the delegation. However, in many political circles it is believed that the Indian Government should not have engaged in a six-hour discussion with Ershad on 29 September, Instead, the president of Bangladesh should have been seen off at the Palam Airport after completing diplomatic niceties. India did not do that. On the contrary, Indian officials met courteously with the representatives of the Bangladesh Government, and tried to make them realize that in 1978 the plan which the Indian Government had proposed to control the water resources in the delta of the Brahmaputra and Meghna Rivers at the cost of 70 million rupees, is the only way of solving the severe problems of annual flooding and drought in northeastern India and in Bangladesh. The gist of this plan is that three dams would be built on the Brahmaputra, and a canal would be created to connect the river with the Ganges near Dhubri above Farakka. Bangladesh does not like this proposal. They feel that the canal would ruin some very good land in Bangladesh. Some people in Bangladesh even believe that this proposal of building a canal is actually an Indian conspiracy to divide Bangladesh.

At the recent conference in Delhi on solving the water problem, Ershad proposed that in addition to India and Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan and China should also be invited to a multinational conference. India rejected this proposal. Consequently, compelled to save face, Ershad agreed to the formation of a joint task force to make an in-depth study of the water problem of the Ganges and Brahmaputra rivers.

Obviously, the proposal of a multinational conference proposed by Bangladesh is not inconsistent with the task at hand. Most of the rivers in the north or north-eastern India have their origins in Nepal, Bhutan and China. From that perspective, the true solution of the river water problem should lie in a multinational conference. For various reasons even if it is not possible for India to have a dialogue with China, India's objections to discuss the matter with Nepal and Bhutan are meaningless. Ershad meanwhile is discussing the matter with Nepal and Bhutan. His objective is very apparent. At the forthcoming top level meeting of the SARC [South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation], Ershad would most likely try to create a favorable environment for a multinational conference for solving the water problem. If India tries to oppose this move, India might become isolated in South Asia, as happened when India was hesitant to agree to the adoption of procedures controlling terrorist activities, and when she rejected political proposals brought up at the SARC meetings.

Nayar Chides United States for Indifference Toward India

46070014 Calcutta ANANDA BAZAR PATRIKA in Bengali 1 Jul 88 p 4

[Article by Kuldeep Nayar]

[Text] If one goes to the office of the spokesperson for the South Asian countries in the Pentagon, one could see maps of Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bhutan, but none of India. It would appear that the Pentagon does not have any concern for India. In the State Department the picture is slightly different. Diplomats are naturally different from the military personnel. However, even there it does not take long to realize that the State Department cares for India, but not very much.

Recently, during my visit to Washington, in the course of our conversations, the officials of these two departments expressed their resentment toward India. However, at any reference to Pakistan, they became very complimentary. The Pentagon gives the impression that New Delhi will most certainly attack Pakistan, and under that circumstance, it is the responsibility of the United States to protect Pakistan.

In response to my question as to why they were sending so many advanced weapon systems to Pakistan, which in turn was giving rise to a serious arms race in the subcontinent, a spokesman of the Pentagon told me, "We have given enough weapons to Pakistan so that if India ever attacks Pakistan, it would be able to hold up the invasion for a while till we, or other nations could rush to its rescue."

Such an open statement is rare in the Pentagon; however, from such statements, it should become clear to India that the United States does not view India in favorable terms. However, whenever referring to Pakistan, that spokesman used expressions such as "friend," "associate," "critical" and many other highly complimentary terms.

The spokesman further said, "You have many modern, improved weapon systems also. You have the manpower and capability to manufacture them. You would much rather learn the technique of manufacturing them. But Pakistan is satisfied with receiving the weapons. By the way, a delegation from your country is also coming here to discuss purchasing ready-made weapons."

I had a discussion with the Pentagon in 1985 also. However, the difference between that time and this, is that now there is no effort to conceal their true feelings. They are eager to help the military rulers of Pakistan and they are saying that openly. However, the State Department is a bit more polished, and not as open. An officer of this department told me, "We are not helping Pakistan to become as powerful as India." However, at the same time he admitted that Pakistan is situated in such a geographically critical location where the United States has plenty of interests. It is to protect their interests in that region, that the United States is helping Pakistan, not for other ideological reasons. He said that the United States does not want either India or Pakistan to join any camp, but at the same time he hoped that India would never create a situation when Pakistan would be compelled to take any side.

Most likely, for this very reason, no matter how much concern India might express about Pakistan's nuclear capability, the United States is not paying any attention to that at all. If they did, then it might appear as if they are siding with India. The United States knows very well that Pakistan has manufactured nuclear weapons. If the United States had said anything about this to Pakistan then it would have become apparent that India's concern is factual. Naturally the United States is not making any comment on this matter. I directly asked a Foreign Service official, "Does Pakistan have nuclear weapons or doesn't it?" The official circumvented the question and said, "We know where Pakistan stands with regard to nuclear weapons." The same official did not believe that even after the withdrawal of all Soviet soldiers the situation in that region will change very much. He said that in that region Pakistan is an ally of the United States. The United States depends upon Pakistan. The State Department is fully aware of the fact that a considerable quantity of armaments have arrived in the subcontinent as a result of the distribution of weapons to the Afghan Mujahaddin. The official said the condition may become even more critical. He admitted that some of those weapons have penetrated into India also. However, he did not think that the United States could do anything about it, and should not be blamed for it.

In the same context we discussed Punjab. The officer said, "The network of the Sikhs has become widespread. We should not be blamed for everything." I was surprised at his sudden comment, because during our conversation, I never mentioned that the United States was assisting the terrorists. I did say that Pakistan had something to do with it. I could not understand why he responded in that manner which appeared to be tantamount to admitting their own involvement.

He assured me that Washington has told Islamabad not to help the terrorists. I have a feeling that New Delhi had asked Washington for help in this matter. The officer said, "We believe in the unity of India and we have openly criticized the demand for Khalistan." He did not categorically admit that Pakistan was directly involved in the terrorist activities in Punjab; however, the manner in which he repeatedly told me that the United States has told Pakistan not to help the terrorists, it became very apparent to me that the United States has a fact.

Both the Pentagon and the State Department are unhappy with India over the Afghanistan affair. Both believe that India has supported the Soviet Union unjustifiedly. India supports the Najibullah government in Afghanistan. The Pentagon and the State Department both believe that the government there will not last through this year. However, they are convinced that no matter what happens to Afghanistan, the Russians will definitely get out of the country.

I learned from the Pentagon that it has been decided to offer AWACS to Pakistan. Now it is Islamabad's problem to come up with the financing. The Pentagon spokesman did not get into the discussion of whether Pakistan really needs the AWACS. It became apparent that no one paid any attention to India's objections. In the State Department the spokesman said that this matter was under consideration.

One aspect became very clear that in critical matters the Pentagon makes its own decisions, and the State Department never objects to these decisions. Two retired Indian ambassadors now residing in the United States also confirmed this fact. One of them even went on to say that the CIA can nullify the decisions of both departments.

Now, both the Pentagon and the State Department believe that since Rajiv Gandhi has come to power, the relationship with New Delhi has improved. The spokesman of the Pentagon said, "We did not have much cordiality with India while Mrs Gandhi was in power. Now we have overcome that, and are trying to understand Rajiv Gandhi."

According to some American educators and specialists, in spite of the fact that the United States has given \$4,200 million aid to Pakistan, India's relationship with the United States is much better. If anyone asks why that much aid was given to Pakistan, the response comes: India is much stronger than Pakistan. Incidentally, the U.S. military aid to Pakistan is in the form of "forgivable loans," which never have to be repaid.

I believe in the future there could be further improvement of the relationship between India and the United States. It is certain that America would not bother India without a cause. However, if America's interests become involved, the United States will not pay any attention to India's objections. India wants the most modern technological knowledge from the United States which it is

willing to offer. However, if in the November election the Democratic Party comes to power, that situation might change.

America is interested in the 120 million middle-class people of India. The American business community believes that they can become the purchasers of their merchandise. They are interested in India's current liberalized economic policy. No one was interested in India's culture or rich heritage—which includes Indian businessmen, physicians and engineers who are now residents of the United States.

IRAN

Minister of Intelligence on Political Parties 46400019c Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 22 Oct 88 p 14

[Text] Ilam—At this sensitive historical juncture in the Iranian revolution, the military efforts of the enemy have changed to intelligence efforts.

Hojjat ol-Eslam Reyshahri, the minister of intelligence, who was visiting Ilam, announced this statement and said: Naturally, the military activities of the enemy have been replaced with intelligence activities, and the enemies of Islam have come to the conclusion that they cannot harm the Islamic revolution militarily.

Concerning the intelligence and security situation of Ilam Province, the minister of intelligence said: Thank God, the investigations made indicate that the security situation of this province is very good. According to a report by IRNA:

Hojjat ol-Eslam Reyshahri expressed his gratitude to the people for their constant cooperation with the central intelligence office of this province and pointed out: The alertness of the people of this border province is admirable, and it is strongly felt that counterrevolutionaries have no place here.

In regards to the situation of the hypocrites after the "Mersad" operations, he said: Following the "Mersad" operations, the hypocrites were thinking of another desperate attempt to make their presence felt. For this reason, it is necessary for the military and intelligence forces as well as the border-dwelling people of this region, with complete alertness, to suppress these desperate attempts and give them a better lesson.

Regarding the activities of political parties, the minister of intelligence said: Political parties may be active in the country, provided they do not conspire against and attack the Islamic Republic.

In conclusion, he emphasized that the Cabinet is unanimous in its resolve to reconstruct Ilam Province.

According to the same report: Following his visit to the representative of the Imam, the Friday imam of Ilam and the officials of the province, the minister of intelligence took part in a security council meeting.

Also, in a meeting with the commanders of the Guards Corps, the Amir 11th army and a group of the personnel and officials of the Islamic revolution committee and the intelligence office of the province, he emphasized their grave duties at this juncture in time.

New Tax Laws To Be Implemented Next Year 46400020c Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 22 Oct 88 p 15

[Text] The new law will exempt government employees on incomes up to 70,000 rials.

Overtime pay, harsh climate pay and bonuses up to 100,000 rials will be tax exempt.

Tabriz—IRNA.

The new tax law will be implemented from early next year.

This statement was made by the Director General of Economic Affairs and Finance of Eastern Azarbaijan Province in the administrative council meeting of that province.

He said: The new tax law of the country pays special attention to the low-income strata, and government employees are exempt from paying taxes for incomes up to 70,000 rials per month.

Also, overtime pay, harsh climate pay and bonuses of up to 100,000 rials are tax exempt.

The director of economic affairs and finance of the province continued his report. Concerning tax collection procedures in the province, he said: In the first half of this year, 8,117,850,000 rials in direct taxes and more than 1 billion rials in indirect taxes were collected throughout the province, which, compared to a similar period last year, was an increase of 23 and 350 percent, respectively.

He added: The trend toward collecting more taxes in Eastern Azarbaijan Province has resulted in this province reaching 4th place in Tir [22 June-22 July] this year, from 27th place in 1365 [21 March 1986-20 March 1987], compared to other tax districts in the country.

Government Allows Importation of Rice, Vegetable Oils

46400020b Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 22 Oct 88 p 2

[Text] Political Service. The Cabinet, in its 20 Mehr [12 October] meeting this year, announced the importation

of rice and shortening to be permitted by the cooperative companies of the border residents and Iranian workers working in the Persian Gulf countries, as well as the Emkan union, without the transfer of foreign currency and exempt from pricing and distribution regulations.

According to a report by the public relations office of the Prime Minister's Office, in this meeting, it was decided:

The importation of edible rice, edible shortening or liquid vegetable oil made from sunflower, corn or palm, provided the content of Article 16 of the consumable goods law...and the consumer expiration date are observed, is permitted by the cooperative companies of the border residents, the cooperative companies of Iranian workers employed in the sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf, Iranian workers residing in the Persian Gulf region, and the Emkan union, to act on behalf of workers employed in the Persian Gulf who are not members of a cooperative, at a rial ceiling determined in the export and import law and its implemental bylaws for 1367 [21 March 1988-20 March 1989], without the transfer of foreign currency. They are also exempt from pricing and distribution regulations, and the notes to Article 51 of the implemental bylaws for export and import regulations will not be implemented with regard to those items.

According to this report, imported rice and vegetable oils which do not require foreign currency transfers are subject to 25 rials per kg to be deposited in the account of the consumer and producers protection organization at the time of the release of the goods.

Also, in order to support rice farmers, the guaranteed price for multigrain domestic rice, including Amol 2 and 3, was approved at 250 rials per kg, with 15 percent broken grains.

Highway Linking Iran, Turkey, Pakistan To Be Constructed

46400020a Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 20 Oct 88 p 16

[Interview with Secretary General of ECO Alireza Salari by IRNA in Ankara; date not given]

[Text] Ankara—IRNA. Alireza Salari, the Iranian secretary general of the Economic Cooperation Organization [ECO], explained the future activities of this organization and said: By using the actual and potential resources and the 220 million people of the member countries, the ECO can establish a great power as a market and assembly.

The Iranian secretary general of the ECO, who is visiting Turkey in order to become familiar with the viewpoints of the Turkish authorities concerning the future activities of the ECO, said in an interview with IRNA: In the opinion of the political and economic officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran, ECO can create the nucleus of an Islamic common market.

Alireza Salari continued: During my meetings with the officials of the three countries which are members of the ECO (Iran, Turkey and Pakistan), the organization reached a decision concerning raising the meeting of the supreme council of the ECO to the level of the economic ministers of the three countries. Next Farvardin [21 March-20 April], the economic ministers of the three countries will gather in Islamabad for a meeting of the supreme council of the ECO.

The Iranian secretary general of the ECO, mentioning the studies on the ECO highway project as one of the projects of this organization and other projects of the ECO, said: Issues related to increasing the level of trade, establishing preferred tariffs between the three countries, establishing a consortium of contracting companies, establishing a common investment bank and launching a satellite called the "Exoset" in an earth orbit to facilitate communications between the three countries are among the projects being studied by the organization.

Mr Salari also referred to the connection of the nationwide electricity network in the near future, and of the projects of the organization, he considered the ECO highway to be closest to implementation. He added: Concerning the ECO highway, each country will meet the expenditures for the section on its own soil.

He added: We have reached an agreement in principle on issues regarding the establishment of a common investment bank, except for determining the location of the bank.

Salaries of Married Soldiers To Increase 46400019a Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 16 Oct 88 p 16

[Interview with Mr Nayyeri, director of the Imam Khomeyni emergency aid committee, by reporters in Mashhad; date not given]

[Text] Tehran. IRNA. In accordance with the recent ratification of the supreme council of support for the war and the approval of the Ministry of Plan and Budget, the average salary of needy married soldiers under the jurisdiction of the Imam Khomeyni emergency aid committee will be increased to 1,500 tumans.

According to a report by IRNA, Mr Nayyeri, the director of the Imam Khomeyni emergency aid committee, announced this statement in an interview with reporters in Mashhad and added:

This ratification can be implemented retroactively from the beginning of this year, and the amount owed for the past 6 months to 170,000 families of soldiers under the jurisdiction of this institution, along with their salaries for Mehr [23 September-22 October], which is a total of 4,500 tumans, will be paid all at once.

He said: Based on this ratification, the preliminary steps have been taken for the payment of 1 million tumans in interest-free loans to married persons who meet the requirements. The ceiling for these payments is between 2,500 and 3,000 tumans.

Emphasizing that the Imam Khomeyni emergency aid committee is ready to reconstruct the residences of the war victims under its jurisdiction, as well as other areas which are determined by the officials, he said: In the course of the air and missile attacks by the enemy on the cities of our country, the Imam Khomeyni emergency aid committee brought 40,000 families in the damaged cities under its jurisdiction and paid 55 million tumans in regular payments to them.

Mr Nayyeri pointed out that in this connection, with the establishment of the emergency headquarters, in addition to water outreach, the transportation of the wounded, the creation of permanent and mobile bakeries, the distribution of 400,000 meters of glass and 1,200,000 liters of kerosene, and the reconstruction of 2,350 residential units have been carried out. The total cost of services to fellow citizens during the air and missile attacks is 2.4 billion rials.

The director of the Imam Khomeyni emergency aid committee pointed out that in the course of the 8 years of the sacred defense, 13 billion rials in people's aid was sent to the fronts by this institution.

Pointing out that now the services of the Imam Khomeyni emergency aid committee have reached from 1 to 18 areas, he said: In this year's strike force project abroad, this institution has helped 135,000 needy Lebanese families in addition to 135,000 students, and \$5 million has been spent in this area.

He pointed out that the emergency plan of the Imam Khomeyni emergency aid committee was so beneficial that it contributed to the decline of the dollar in Lebanon.

Mr Nayyeri mentioned the cultural issues of the Imam Khomeyni emergency aid committee and said:

This year, for the first time, with the establishment of precollege classes, 800 students under the jurisdiction of this institution were admitted to the universities of the country.

Army Warns of Danger Posed by Unexploded Ammunition

46400019b Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 20 Oct 88 p 16

[Text] Tehran—IRNA.

The public relations division of the ideological-political office of the army of the Islamic Republic announced: Recently, various types of unexploded ammunition left behind from the imposed war have been found scattered

in cities and various areas, which have been a source of curiosity or have been handled by civilians, at times causing irreparable damage and casualties. Therefore, if such suspicious and dangerous items are seen, the public is requested to inform the military authorities in their area so that steps may be taken to destroy and neutralize them.

SRI LANKA

SUN Asks Gandhi To Respect Public Opinion BK1211091588 Colombo SUN in English 29 Oct 88 p 5

[Editorial: "Indian Factor"]

[Text] Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi addressing the military top brass of India reportedly expressed confidence that the Indo-Lanka accord will not be disturbed or interfered with even if there was a change in the Sri Lanka administration.

Gandhi's reactions followed political statements here by the two main Presidential contenders that they will ensure the withdrawal of the Indian Peace Keeping Force [IPKF] from the island as well as restructure the accord signed in July 1987.

Prime Minister Premadasa who has always expressed his misgivings over the accord as well as the ill-timing of it has even suggested the possibility of abrogating the treaty if and when he assumes the Presidency.

As an alternative the Premier has suggested an accord of reciprocity akin to the Indo-Soviet treaty of friendship and co-operation.

Main opposition contender Mrs Sirimavo Bandaranaike has also expressed willingness to renegotiate the treaty.

What Gandhi has told his military men does not really complement these proposals. What is apparent is that he is not in the mood for change, come what may.

Most political leaders in India do not evidently support their Prime Minister's views. They are getting increasingly frustrated over the very accomplishments of the Indian army in Sri Lanka particularly over its obvious failure in restoring peace and normalcy in the north and east even after eighteen months of heavy deployment.

Questions are already being asked in India about the heavy casualty rate of the IPKF while the cost of maintaining same here has been given wide publicity as elections get closer thus causing serious problems for the government.

About a fortnight ago an international monitoring agency based in London revealed that India is spending most of its defence funds on the IPKF here while sacrificing her other military priorities.

Viewing the accord through these perspectives, the latest affirmative of Gandhi bears testimony to an inherent geopolitical undercurrent in India's Lanka policy. However much they speak of altruistic motives one cannot really overlook the disguised self-centred objectives.

If Gandhi did not have any strategic and political motives then the recent remarks by Lanka's electoral contenders would have been used cleverly to get out of his predicament as well as silence the critics.

Above all an effective response to the call for a change by Mr Premandasa and Mrs Bandaranaike would indeed defuse the high-level of xenophobia that most Sri Lankans have developed against India.

The catastrophe that looms over this island nation has its immediate roots in the Indian factor.

Premier Gandhi, if he is genuinely interested in promoting goodwill among the people of the two countries as he so avowedly professes, should be more accommodating to public opinion as well as the compromises suggested by the future leaders of this country.

At the same time these politicians who have chosen to beat the 'Indian drums' for electoral bonanzas must also act with a certain degree of restraint and avoid generating Indian belligerence.

After all most of the Indo-Lankan animosities of yesteryear have emerged out of misunderstandings and unintentional awkward rantings very often about personalities thus triggering off ego wars. 10

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